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Abstract
This thesis contains an extended literature review and three essays on the interaction of glob-
alization and wage policy, employment, income distribution and welfare. A specific focus lies
thereby on the role of trade unions as one major labor market institution. A brief introductory
chapter motivates the general topic before an extended literature review highlights main findings
from previous studies.
The first essay sets up a multi-sector general oligopolistic equilibrium trade model in which all
firms face wage claims of firm-level unions. By accounting for productivity differences across in-
dustries, the model features income inequality along multiple lines, including inequality between
firm owners and workers as well as within these two groups of agents, and involuntary unem-
ployment. This setting is used to study the impact of trade liberalization on key macroeconomic
performance measures. In particular, the study shows that a movement from autarky to free
trade with a fully symmetric partner country lowers union wage claims and therefore stimulates
employment and raises welfare. Whether firms can extract a larger share of rents in the open
economy depends on the competitive environment in the product market. Furthermore, the dis-
tribution of profit income across firm owners remains unaffected, while the distribution of wage
income becomes more equal when a country opens up to trade with a fully symmetric trading
partner. It is also shown how country size differences and technological dissimilarity of trading
partners affect the results from the analysis.
The second essay also builds upon the framework of general oligopolistic equilibrium with two
countries that, however, differ in the centralization of union wage setting. Being interested in
the consequences of openness, this study shows that, in the short-run, trade increases welfare
and employment in both locations, and it raises income of capital owners as well as workers. In
the long run, capital outflows from the country with the more centralized wage setting generate
winners and losers and make the two countries more dissimilar in terms of unemployment and
welfare. Decentralization of wage setting can successfully prevent capital outflow and the export
of jobs.
The third and final essay is of an empirical nature and investigates the role of wages as a potential
driving force for German export activity. In the past 15 years Germany has been characterized
by a strong export activity while at the same time initiating structural reforms on the labor
market. It is often argued that German firms and plants are particularly successful in exporting
since they are very competitive internationally. By computing unit labor costs as a measure of
international competitiveness based on OECD STAN data and the IAB establishment panel this
study investigates the role of labor costs for the decision to export. The results show that (i)
German plants’ export intensity is positively correlated with competitiveness and (ii) that the
relationship is spuriously driven by a non-industry specific common time trend. The study fur-
thermore applies a corner solution model that allows to disentangle the total effect into its effects
at the extensive and intensive margin of trade. Results indicate a positive and significant effect
of competitiveness at both margins but the effect turns out insignificant before the introduction
of the Euro.
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation besteht aus einem ausführlichen Literaturüberblick und drei Aufsätzen zum
Zusammenhang von Globalisierung und Lohnpolitik, Beschäftigung, Einkommensverteilung und
Wohlfahrt. Ein besonderer Fokus liegt dabei auf der Rolle von Gewerkschaften als eine der
wesentlichen Institutionen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt. Das einführende Kapitel motiviert die Au-
seinandersetzung mit diesen Themen, bevor ein ausführlicher Literaturüberblick zentrale Erken-
ntnisse aus früheren Studien zusammenfasst.
Der erste Aufsatz konstruiert ein Handelsmodell mit oligopolistischem Wettbewerb und einem
Kontinuum an Sektoren im allgemeinen Gleichgewicht, in dem sich sämtliche Firmen Lohn-
forderungen von Firmengewerkschaften gegenüber sehen. Unter Berücksichtigung von sektor-
spezifischen Produktivitäten führt das Modell zu verschiedenen Formen von Einkommensun-
gleichheit, darunter Ungleichheit innerhalb der Firmeneigentümer und Arbeiter, Ungleichheit
zwischen beiden Einkommensgruppen und auch Arbeitslosigkeit. Es zeigt sich, dass ein Über-
gang von Autarkie zu Freihandel mit einem symmetrischen Handelspartner die Lohnforderun-
gen der Gewerkschaften reduziert und damit positive Beschäftigungs- und Wohlfahrtseffekte
hat. Ob sich Firmen nach Handelsöffnung einen größeren Teil der ökonomischen Rente sichern
können ist abhängig von der Wettbewerbssituation auf dem Gütermarkt. Freihandel lässt die
Einkommensverteilung innerhalb der Firmeneigentümer unverändert, wohingegen die Einkom-
mensverteilung innerhalb der Arbeitnehmerschaft ungleicher wird. Abschließend wird gezeigt, in-
wiefern Länderasymmetrien in Form von unterschiedlichen Produktivitäten und unterschiedlicher
Landesgröße die Resultate beeinflussen.
Der zweite Aufsatz baut ebenfalls auf dem Modellrahmen des oligopolistischen Wettbewerbs
im allgemeinen Gleichgewicht auf. Im Gegensatz zum ersten Aufsatz unterscheiden sich jedoch
beide Länder im Zentralisierungsgrad der gewerkschaftlichen Lohnverhandlungen. Die Studie
zeigt, dass internationaler Handel kurzfristig in beiden Ländern zu positiven Wohlfahrts- und
Beschäftigungseffekten führt und sowohl Firmeneigentümer als auch Arbeitnehmer Einkommen-
szuwächse verzeichnen können. In der langen Frist fließt jedoch Kapital aus dem Land mit
dem zentralisierten Lohnverhandlungssystem zum Handelspartner. Diese Kapitalflüsse erzeugen
Gewinner und Verlierer und lassen die beiden Länder hinsichtlich ihrer Wohlfahrt und Arbeit-
slosenzahl divergieren. Eine Entwicklung hin zu dezentraleren Lohnverhandlungen kann die
Kapitalabflüsse und somit den Export von Arbeitsplätzen verhindern.
Der dritte und zugleich letzte Aufsatz ist empirischer Natur und untersucht die Rolle von Löhnen
als Triebfeder der deutschen Exportaktivitäten. In den vergangenen 15 Jahren war Deutschland
durch eine starke Exportaktivität und zeitlich einhergehenden strukturellen Reformen auf dem
Arbeitsmarkt gekennzeichnet. Es wurde oft argumentiert, dass deutsche Firmen und Betriebe
insbesondere aufgrund ihrer hohen internationalen Wettbewerbsfähigkeit viele Exporte tätigen.
Unter Berechnung der Arbeitsstückkosten als Maß für internationale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit mit-
tels OECD STAN Daten und dem IAB Betriebspanel untersucht diese Studie die Rolle von
Arbeitskosten für die Entscheidung zu exportieren. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass (i) die Expor-
taktivität deutscher Betriebe positiv mit ihrer Wettbewerbsfähigkeit korreliert ist und (ii) der
Zusammenhang in loser Form durch einen nicht-industriespezifischen Zeiteffekt getrieben scheint.
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1 Introduction
Over the past few decades the consequences and challenges of ongoing international market inte-
gration have been one of the key issues in the public, political and scientific debate. The protests
during the WTO meeting in Seattle in 1999 and on subsequent meetings of supranational bodies
document a strong interest and emotional, opposing views on the question what the globaliza-
tion process means to people. Proponents often point out that stronger competition, increasing
specialization and larger scales of production offer an opportunity to improve everyone’s stan-
dard of living. On the other hand, less enthusiastic observers point to the negative aspects of
globalization, such as growing market power of multinational corporations, a slump in national
sovereignty, an erosion of humanitarian rights, or a race-to-the-bottom in social standards. While
all of theses issues are highly important and relevant themselves, due to the complexity of the
subject it would be far beyond the scope of this doctoral thesis to tackle all of them. Rather,
this thesis intends to focus on the interaction of globalization and wages since this is a dimension
that has attracted particular interest in the public debate.
With regard to this issue, again, the world seems to be divided into two camps with oppos-
ing views. One camp argues that lower production costs and less regulations in other countries
benefits foreign firms and allows them to outcompete domestic producers thereby harming local
workers through job losses and/or a reduction of the wage bill. By contrast, the other camp
highlights that freer trade leads to an expansion in the export activity which increases the in-
ternational demand for domestic products and, thus, improves the well-being of firm-owners and
workers due to higher output, more jobs and/or a higher wage bill. While these two controver-
sial views are dominating the public debate for as long as globalization has become of general
interest, the way the academic profession looks at the linkage between ongoing market integra-
tion, unemployment and income distribution has changed tremendously. For a surprisingly long
time, the mainstream view of economists on the link between employment and trade was that
unemployment is determined by macroeconomic variables such as growth and business cycles
with trade having no impact (cf. Krugman, 1993; Mussa, 1993). By contrast, in the meantime a
lot of research has been done to revisit the linkage. In that respect, the questions put forward by
public commentators and politicians have been addressed in the academic literature. Will wages
be set in Beijing (cf. Freeman, 1995)? Will good jobs disappear to countries with less regulated
labor markets, with a ‘great sucking sound’ as the former US presidential candidate Ross Perot
illustratively put it during his campaign? Or does an increase in product market integration lead
to an erosion of trade union power meaning an end to decent pay and job security (cf. Rodrik,
1997)? It’s those questions that I had in mind when I started to work on my thesis. The out-
come of almost five years of research is presented in this book. It contains two theory chapters
that introduce and apply a new theoretical vehicle for studying the impact of different forms of
1
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globalization on inequality, unemployment and welfare in unionized labor markets. In addition,
the book covers a empirical section that sheds light on the role of (unit) labor costs as a crucial
determinant of international competitiveness in the export activity of plants and firms by using
micro-level data from the German Institute for Employment Research (IAB) in Nuremberg. In
the course of writing, the topics of interest have been fueled by the latest developments in the
World Economy. First, it turned out that the economic and financial crisis further increased in-
equality in income distribution (cf. Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez, 2011) which has put the issue of
inequality in a globalized world on the very top of public concerns. Second, given the enormous
differences in trade balances in major OECD countries, the question of labor market linkages
in open economies was revisited and policy recommendations to coordinate wage policy were
discussed. Last but not least, a heated debated sparked off whether German wage moderation
has contributed to the strong export activity of German firms and plants at the expense of its
trading partners, especially within the Eurozone.
The remainder of this book is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews important contributions
on the issue of wage setting in open economies. The main focus is on theoretical work and
the review aims at highlighting important findings on the effect of globalization on inequality,
welfare and unemployment. The subsequent chapter 3 studies the impact of trade liberalization
on key macroeconomic performance measures such as unemployment, income inequality and
welfare in a world of unionized general oligopolistic equilibrium. It is a slightly modified version
of a joint paper with my PhD supervisor, Hartmut Egger, which in the meantime has been
published as Egger and Etzel (2012a).1 Chapter 4 is also a joint work with Hartmut Egger and
can be interpreted as extension to Egger and Etzel (2012b).2 The analysis there builds upon the
same framework as chapter 3 but it assumes two countries that differ in their wage bargaining
regimes on the labor market. This setting is used to study labor market linkages in a globalized
world. Chapter 5 is a joint work with two colleagues from the German Institute for Employment
Research (IAB) in Nuremberg, namely Hans-Jörg Schmerer and Andreas Hauptmann which is
forthcoming as Etzel, Hauptmann, and Schmerer (2013). This study looks at the role of wages
as a potential driving force for German plants’ export activity in a empirical exercise. The final
chapter 6 concludes with a brief summary of the most important insights from this book.
1In addition to the published version, the chapter contains an extended appendix which presents all relevant
calculations step-by-step.
2Additionally to the two circulating working paper versions, the title has changed slightly as well as some
explanations on the related literature.
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Given the vast amount of literature dealing with the issues of inequality and unemployment
in open economies, this review cannot cover all theoretical models and empirical contributions.
Instead, it tries to give a rich picture about the main contributions and concepts to summarize
the key findings concerning these two topics. The lion share of the review will be on theoretical
contributions while some stylized facts and empirical evidence is reported to give an idea of the
importance of the theoretical insights.
2.1 Inter-industry trade models with a perfect labor market
The way the economic profession traditionally linked the concepts of inequality and interna-
tional trade built upon the classic trade theory of comparative advantage. Distributive effects
were analyzed either in models of the Heckscher-Ohlin type or in the specific factors model.1 Of
course, employment effects are ruled out by assumption when considering a perfect labor market.
Heckscher-Ohlin model. Consider a stylized economy with two commodities and two input
factors, capital (K) and labor (L), which receive returns r and w, respectively. Both sectors are
perfectly competitive and produce under linearly homogeneous technologies. Commodity 1 is
produced relatively capital-intensive at all possible factor prices, i.e. there are no factor intensity
reversals. The two factors of production are perfectly mobile between industries but not across
countries. Therefore, each factor receives the same income independent of the industry in which
it is employed, since otherwise it would always have an incentive to move to the high-income
industry. Consumers have homothetic preferences and production is diversified by assumption.
Consider country Home being relatively abundant in capital compared to country Foreign. Then,
the key insight from the Heckscher-Ohlin model is that moving from autarky to free trade in-
creases the relative price of the capital-intensive commodity in Home which induces the country
to specialize in the production of this commodity because it has a comparative advantage in
the production of this good. This leads to a reallocation of resources towards Home’s capital-
intensive industry. However, the labor-intensive sector foregoes too many workers relative to
units of capital than the capital-intensive sector can absorb at given factor prices. Consequently,
relative factor prices have to adjust as well. The return to capital increases relative to wages in
order to clear the factor market. However, as the Stolper-Samuelson theorem shows, factor prices
do not only change in relative terms but also in real terms. Opening up for trade leads to an
increase in the real return to the factor that is relative abundant in a country and to a decrease
in the real return to the other factor. Thus, in the example illustrated here, trade would increase
1Harrison, McLaren, and McMillan (2011) provide an excellent review on the linkage between international trade
and the distribution of income. Parts of the subsequent overview are inspired by this review.
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income inequality between capital owners and workers in Home, while the opposite would be
true in Foreign.2
Specific-factors model. In contrast to the Heckscher-Ohlin world, in the specific-factors
model at least one factor of production cannot move between industries, and trade liberalization
only leads to a reallocation of the mobile factor. In the classic textbook example with three
factors of production, in which capital and land are specifically used in the production of one
commodity while labor is free to move between the two sectors, trade increases the real income
of the factor that is specific to the exporting sector and lowers the real income of the factor
being specific in use to the import-competing sector. The effect on the mobile factor, labor, is
ambiguous.
Empirical evidence. While both theories provide workhorse models of international trade
theory to study the impact of trade on inequality there is little empirical evidence supporting the
respective hypotheses. While Feenstra (2000) documents a severe widening in the income gap
between blue- and white collar workers in the US in the period from 1982 to 1994 and suggests
that trade has had some impact on this development, his analysis questions the explanations
following the Heckscher-Ohlin framework especially for the following two reasons: (i) wages of
the high-skilled workers will only increase if there has been a rise in prices of the goods that
use skilled labor intensively, and, (ii) even if goods prices had changed, then there occurs a
reallocation of the factors of production such that the production process becomes less skill-
intensive since the use of skilled labor has become relatively more expensive. Both effects are
not to be found in the data but even contradicted, which led economists to argue that skill-biased
technological change is the more important factor to explain the development of growing income
inequality (cf. Freeman, 1995, 1998).
Putting the focus on developing countries, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004, 2007) show that in-
ternational trade indeed led to distributional changes in these countries but not in the predicted
way. Showing that international trade did not make less skilled workers better off relative to
skilled workers, their empirical evidence stands in stark contrast to the theoretical predictions.
These findings tempted Davis and Mishra (2007) to conclude that "Stolper-Samuelson is dead"
and that it would not only be false but even dangerous to base predictions about distributive
effects of ongoing market integration of developing countries on the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin
trade theory. Instead, they argue that the Stolper-Samuelson theorem only holds in special cir-
cumstances, including the assumptions that all countries produce all goods and that imported
and locally produced goods are close substitutes.
Extensions. There are, however, important extensions to the traditional models of compar-
ative advantage that lead to significant qualifications of the orginal statements. For instance,
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) developed a two-country framework of offshoring in which firms lo-
cated in developed countries are able to shift some stages of the production process abroad. The
two countries differ in the relative supply of skilled and unskilled workers such that cost mini-
2Replacing capital with human capital, one can use the insight to postulate a link between trade and wage
inequality.
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mization determines a cutoff stage, such that firms in the developed countries shift all production
stages with a skill intensity below the cutoff abroad, while keeping all production stages with
a skill intensity above the cutoff at home. Further market integration is modeled as an easier
foreign investment of capital and leads to a relocation of production stages. The skill-abundant
country shifts more tasks to the skill-scarce country. Due to the ranking of tasks in their skill
intensities, the relative demand for skilled workers increases in both countries and this implies
that the skill premium rises in both locations. Hence, in contrast to the Stolper-Samuelson the-
orem, this framework predicts an increase of inequality in both countries and is therefore in line
with the observed empirical evidence from the above mentioned studies.
2.2 Inter-industry trade models with labor market frictions
As indicated earlier, considering a frictionless labor market, the traditional trade models are not
suited to address the question of employment effects of trade liberalization. Interestingly, while
this issue has been at the centre of the public and political debate, the majority of the economic
profession considered unemployment for a long time to be mainly a macroeconomic phenomenon
with trade, if any, only having a minor impact (cf. Krugman, 1993; Mussa, 1993).
Minimum wage. The pioneering work on involuntary unemployment in open economies
dates back to Brecher (1974). He has introduced a binding minimum wage into an otherwise
standard Heckscher-Ohlin world as outlined in the previous section. The minimum wage fixes the
return to labor in terms of good 2, which serves as numeraire, and, of course, it must be higher
than the market clearing wage in order to be binding. Following Davis (1998) and Kreickemeier
(2008), figure 2.1 illustrates the equilibrium in the closed economy with and without a minimum
wage. The following discussion follows closely the discussion in Kreickemeier (2008).
In the first quadrant, the GM locus represents all combinations of the relative price, p, and
economy-wide capital intensity, k, that are compatible with a goods market equilibrium. Hereby,
economy-wide capital intensity is defined as the relative capital usage in production and thus
equals total capital input divided by total labor input: K/L. GM is downward sloping since an
increase in capital intensity rises the relative output in the capital-intensive sector which, with
homothetic preferences, requires a decrease in the relative goods price to restore equilibrium.3
The second quadrant shows the ZP locus that represents all combinations of the relative price
and the wage rate that are compatible with zero profits under full diversification. The underlying
Stolper-Samuelson theorem explains the downward slope. An increase in the relative price of
the capital-intensive commodity reduces the wage rate. Finally, the KI locus in the fourth quad-
rant simply illustrates the definition of economy-wide capital intensity graphically. For a given
capital stock, economy-wide capital intensity shrinks in aggregate labor input L. The standard
Heckscher-Ohlin model can be easily explained with the help of figure 2.1. The determination of
the equilibrium starts counter-clockwise in the fourth quadrant. The exogenous endowment in
labor, Lˆ, will be fully employed together with the given stock in capital, which determines the
3This mechanism is unambigously true when considering a closed economy. In the case of an open economy, one
has to distinguish two scenarios. If the country under consideration is large, then the downward sloping GM
loci remains. If, however, the country were small, then the GM loci would become horizontal.
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Figure 2.1: The one-country equilibrium with and without a minimum wage
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aggregate capital intensity, kˆ. This furthermore directy implies the goods market clearing price
(pˆ) and the equilibrium wage rate (wˆ). Opening up for trade shifts the GM locus north-east
which implies for the given factor endowment a rise in the relative goods price and a decrease in
the wage rate, as has been discussed above.
The implementation of a binding wage floor changes the analysis systematically. In such a
scenario, the equilibrium is determined clockwise beginning from quadrant II. The exogenously
specified minimum wage w˜ increases costs in both sectors, but, relative more so in the labor-
intensive sector. Hence, the higher wage can only be compatible with zero profits if the relative
price of the capital-intensive commodity sinks to p˜. Since consumers then want to buy more of
the capital-intensive good, goods market clearing can only be restored if the relative supply of
this good rises. This requires a higher capital-intensity, k˜. Since endowment of capital is fix, the
only way to accomplish this is to adjust the amount of labor used in the production. Therefore,
in the end, aggregate employment will fall from Lˆ to L˜. The Brecher framework contains two
important features. First, as long as we assume diversified production, the minimum wage fixes
the relative prices of the commodities in the economy.4 As a consequence, the minimum wage
ties down all relevant world market prices via factor price equalization in the open economy.5
Second, as can be neatly seen in figure 2.1, the setting allows to talk about both, the level of
unemployment, as well as the rate of unemployment. The given labor endowment of an economy
4Oslington (2002) considers the case in which an economy is forced to stop production in the labor-intensive
sector.
5Thereby, the implementation of the minimum wage demolishes the source of gains from trade as goods prices
do not adjust.
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is a non-binding constraint and variations of it directly translate into changes in the number
of unemployed workers. Both features make the framework highly tractable and allow to study
employment effects of international trade.
While not directly addressed in Brecher (1974), the setting furthermore allows to investigate
labor market linkages in open economies. Against the background of distinctively different in-
stitutions and outcomes on the labor market in the US and Europe, the question of potential
spillover effects of unilateral policy reforms on the labor market has inspired passionate dis-
cussions. In a very prominent contribution, Davis (1998) addresses the issue using the setup of
Brecher (1974). He considers a world in which one country (Europe) imposes a binding minimum
wage floor while the other country (US) maintains a flexible wage. Using the so-called integrated
equilibrium,6 the study identifies conditions under which free trade in commodities alone is suf-
ficient to attain the same equilibrium as would occur if the two countries would constitute one
combined closed economy with perfect mobility in goods and factors. One central assumption
for this result is the absence of trade costs which implies factor price equalization in diversified
equilibrium. Then, the crucial question that arises is, whether diversification is consistent with
the existence of a minimum wage in one location. It is consistent if the world unemployment rate
is the same as in the integrated equilibrium. Since unemployment can not occur in flexible-wage
US, this directly implies that Europe has to carry the whole burden of unemployment. This is
the key feature of the model and has two main implications. First, low-skilled workers in the US
benefit from a higher minimum wage in Europe, and, second, any macroeconomic shock will be
completely absorbed by the minimum wage European labor market, implying that US workers
are insulated from exogenous shocks if Europe introduces a binding minimum wage.
To illustrate this and from the background of China’s rise in the world economy, Davis (1998)
extends the analysis by a third country. Thereby, he considers Home (OECD) to consist of two
countries (Europe and US) that are completely identical except of their labor market regimes,
freely trade with each other and now open up for trade with a third country, China, which is
a net exporter of the labor-intensive commodity. The trade effects are illustrated in figure 2.2,
which is a modified version of figure 2.1.
Quadrant I hosts the GMZP locus that represents all combinations of 1/w and the aggregate
capital intensity of the OECD that are compatible with zero profit conditions in both sectors
and goods market clearing. The fourth quadrant again illustrates the definition of capital inten-
sity with the slight modification that it now represents the combined OECD economy. Finally,
the third quadrant illustrates the LL locus, the distribution of employment across the US and
Europe. We see that imposing a minimum wage in Europe (EU), implies an aggregate capital
intensity kO and aggregate OECD-wide employment at the level LO. It can be split up into em-
ployment in the flexible-wage US (L¯US) and rigid-wage EU (L˜EU ) and reveals that the burden of
unemployment is solely carried by the EU itself. Moving to free trade with labor-abundant China
shifts the GMZP locus outwards, which means that for the fixed European minimum wage, the
capital-intensity in the OECD has to increase. Given the exogenous capital stock this can only
6The concept of an integrated equilibrium originates from Samuelson (1949) and was further developed by
Dixit and Norman (1980). As Davis and Weinstein (2000) conclude: "The central idea is that a world with
imperfect mobility of productive factors across regions or countries may replicate the essential equilibrium of
a fully integrated economy, provided that goods are perfectly mobile."
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Figure 2.2: The two-country equilibrium with a minimum wage
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be achieved by reducing aggregate employment in the OECD and is completely absorbed by a
one-to-one increase in European unemployment. This is the prominent and heavily discussed
"insulation result" from above.7
Efficiency wage. In the face of its strong implications, it is no surprise that the work by
Davis (1998) has evoked a lot of controversy. Aside of the already mentioned qualifications from
Oslington (2002) and Meckl (2006), an important contribution regarding the predictions on labor
market linkages in open economies comes from Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006). Instead of a
minimum wage they introduce an efficiency wage model into the otherwise standard Heckscher-
Ohlin world. Kreickemeier (2008) explains the main mechanism informally with the help of figure
2.3 and demonstrates the new effects compared to the minimum wage model described above.
The crucial difference is the introduction of an upward sloping EW (efficiency wage) curve in
the third quadrant. Workers can influence the effort level they are providing on the job. The
better are the outside opportunities of workers the higher is the wage a firm has to pay in order
7Of course, the inferred implications are very controversial and have therefore received a lot of attention. One
important qualification comes from Meckl (2006). He relies on the same framework, including factor price
equalization, but accounts for differences in productivities within and between different skill groups of labor.
This assumption generates differences in individual demand for education and thereby endogenizes the relative
labor supply. If workers are paid according to their individual productivity, the effective wage (the firms’ costs
per unit of effective labor input) is then separated from the hourly wage (the wage per physical unit of labor).
Since the latter is the only wage that can be fixed by legislation, an exogenously imposed wage floor does
then not tie down all prices for goods and factors all over the world as in Davis (1998). Instead, this setting
preserves key findings from a standard Heckscher-Ohlin world and extends them to unemployment effects and
endogenous adjustment of relative skill supplies.
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to motivate a worker to supply the requested effort level, which is assumed to be exogenous
and normalized to one.8 Hence, if unemployment is low and, thus, ceteris paribus workers are
scarce, then firms are willing to pay a higher wage. This intuition explains the upward sloping
EW curve. The EW curve can also be used to implement a relation between the relative price
of the commodities and aggregate capital intensity, resulting in an upward sloping ZPEW locus
in the first quadrant that represents all combinations of p and k that are compatible with the
zero profit condition and the efficiency wage curve. From quadrant III we know that a higher
employment level increases the wage rate. This reduces the relative price of the capital-intensive
commodity as is illustrated in quadrant II. At the same time, for a given stock of capital a
reduction in unemployment reduces capital intensity. Both effects together explain the upward
sloping ZPEW curve in quadrant I. The intersection of the ZPEW curve with the GM curve
determines the equilibrium values of the economy.9
Figure 2.3: The equilibrium with an efficiency wage
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We are now able to look at the trade effects. For convenience, we stick to the assumption
that the country under consideration is capital-abundant and therefore a net supplier of the
capital-intensive good. As we already know, opening up for trade therefore shifts the GM locus
outwards. This leads to a new equilibrium (see figure 2.3) which is characterized by both,
lower wages and higher unemployment. Two important comparisons can be drawn. First, the
outcome can be easily contrasted to a standard Heckscher-Ohlin model with fully flexible wages as
8This can be constructed by a fair wage model as in Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006).
9In stark contrast to the minimum wage model, the wage rate and thus the relative price of commodities is
endogenous. Furthermore, an increase in labor endowment shifts out the EW curve, affects the equilibrium
and does not increase unemployment one-to-one.
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described above. In that case, for the given endowment of capital and labor, the vertical difference
between the GM and GM’ curve determines by how much the wage rate has to decrease to restore
equilibrium. Comparing this equilibrium with the one that is determined by the intersection of
ZPEW with GM’ it becomes apparent that the wage decrease is less pronounced in case of
efficiency wages. This could lead one to argue that this kind of labor market imperfection
prevents the increase in income inequality to be as severe as in the case of a frictionless economy.
However, one has to keep in mind, that trade rises unemployment when accounting for the
distortion on the labor market. Therefore, the total effect on inequality compared to the perfect
Heckscher-Ohlin world is not clear. Second, comparing the scenario of an efficiency wage to a
country that has imposed a minimum wage, a couple of interesting features can be noticed. First
of all, we see that the wage rate and accordingly the commodity prices are no longer tied down but
determined endogenously. It follows that the increase in unemployment is less pronounced since
part of the adjustment occurs through a decrease in the wage rate. Furthermore, considering
efficiency wages, the traditional source of welfare gains is still present: goods prices adjust as in
the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin world. Whether this is still enough to increase welfare depends
on the counteracting employment effect. In other words, it is not clear that opening up for trade
leads to welfare losses as predicted by the minimum wage model. Instead, the welfare effects of
trade in the efficiency wage model depend on the relative size of the traditional gains of trade
and the newly introduced employment effects.
To qualify Davis’ insulation result, one can also consider a three-country world, but with a
less-pronounced asymmetry between the two OECD countries US and Europe. In this setting,
unemployment exists in both countries due to the presence of efficiency wages in both locations.
The constraint is however country-specific and therefore the unemployment rate differs between
the US and Europe. By stark contrast to the minimum wage model, considering efficiency wages
in both countries, employment is now endogenous in both locations. Therefore, the US economy
is no longer shielded against macroeconomic shocks (like a trade liberalization with China) but
also suffers from a reduction in employment and lower wages.
Search and matching. The books by Davidson and Matusz (2004, 2010) provide a com-
prehensive picture of their own work as well as major other contributions in the field. Most of
their studies rely on the introduction of labor market frictions in form of search-and-matching
unemployment along the lines of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). A baseline model is presented
in Davidson and Matusz (2004). They construct a simple model with homogeneous workers as
the only input factor. Workers need to decide whether they want to work in the low-wage sector
(sector 1) that offers many job opportunities or in the high-wage sector (sector 2) where vacancies
are scarce. Employment in the first sector can be found immediately whereas job search takes
time in sector 2. The production technology is different in both sectors. Diminishing returns to
labor are present in the low-wage sector, while a linear production technology is assumed in the
high-wage sector. Workers maximize their lifetime utility and thereby compare expected lifetime
income in the two sectors. As jobs in sector 1 can be found immediately, workers in that sector
are never unemployed. By contrast, in the high-wage sector, jobs are created at some rate e and
destroyed at some rate b. These two job-turnover rates are the crucial variables and determine
expected lifetime income in the second sector (VE). Of course, in a steady-state equilibrium
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expected lifetime income of being unemployed (VU ) has to equal expected lifetime income when
working in the low-wage sector (V1), since otherwise either an unemployed would choose to take
a job in the low-wage sector or a worker from the low-wage sector would quit his job to find a
better paid job in the other sector. Finally, to close the model the number of employed workers
that lose their jobs has to equal the number of searching unemployed that find a new job.
Using the concepts of relative supply and relative demand, the simple model shows that the
autarky equilibrium price is solely determined by the turnover rates, b and e. It is then straight-
forward to show how they influence the trade pattern. To make this point clear, consider two
countries that are completely identical except of their labor market frictions. A country then
has a comparative advantage in the production of the search sector if (i) it has the more efficient
search technology (higher e) and/or (ii) it has the more durable search sector (lower b). The
intution for this is easy to understand. If it becomes more difficult to find a job in sector 2, then
a worker is only willing to look for a job if the output price and thus his return is increasing
as well. Therefore, a country with a higher probability to find a new job, i.e. a more efficient
search technology, will have a lower autarky price for the second commoditiy and, thus, be the
net exporter of the search commodity. The same logic inversely applies to the breakup rate,
b. Unfortunately, the real world is not always as simple as theory. It may be the case that a
country has a generally less dynamic labor market (i.e. low values for both turnover rates) than
its trading partner. Hence, there exist two opposing forces and the comparative advantage in the
search sector depends on the relative strength of these forces. Having derived the structure of the
trade patterns let us turn towards the employment effects of trade. In fact, given the structure
of the model unemployment occurs only through workers that are seeking a job in sector two.
Hence, the level and the rate of unemployment severly depends on the size of this sector. The
bigger is the full-employment sector one, the lower is unemployment. Hence, when trade leads
to an increase in the price of the second commodity, this sets an incentive for more workers to
search for employment in this sector which leads to higher wages and rises unemployment. In
sum, one can therefore conclude that unemployment goes up in the country with the compar-
ative advantage in the search sector, since production of the search commodity increases while
the opposite is true in the other country.
It turns out that the propositions of the simplified model are robust when considering more
realistic assumptions like in Davidson, Martin, and Matusz (1999), who endogenized the turnover
rate, introduced capital as second input factor and assume search frictions in both sectors. While
not changing the predictions regarding the trade pattern and unemployment, the introduction
of a second input factor is a necessary ingredient to revisit the predictions of the classic Stolper-
Samuelson theorem regarding the distributive effects of trade liberalization.10 They use a general
equilibrium model of international trade with two countries, that both consist of two sectors and
two types of agents (workers and entrepreneurs). Both agents are endowed with one unit of
input (labor and capital) that can be supplied in the production process. At each instant, labor
(capital) is either employed (active) or unemployed (idle). Furthermore, both input factors are
nationally fully mobile and, hence, will choose a sector to search for a job (rental) opportunity.
The production of one unit of output requires one unit of each input, which implies that an un-
10A similar approach is taken in Davidson, Martin, and Matusz (1988) and Hosios (1990).
11
2 Literature Review
employed worker looks for an entrepreneur with idle capital. Such a match will then be created
and will last until an exogenous shock forces the partners to separate. The break-up rate is as-
sumed to be country- and sector-specific thereby allowing the duration of a match to vary across
countries and sectors. Furthermore, it is also assumed that it is harder to create a match in one
sector. For instance, if the labor-intensity is high in one sector, then it becomes more difficult
for an unemployed worker to find an employment, whereas, on the other hand, it becomes easier
for idle capital to find a match. The countries being equal in all other respects, the structure
of the labor market is the sole source of comparative advantage and determines the pattern of
trade, similar to the previously described benchmark model. Beyond the analysis of the trade
pattern, the framework is also used to analyze the impact of trade on the returns to workers and
entrepreneurs. In that respect, the study severely distinguishes between searching and employed
factors. As searching factors are perfectly mobile, they respond immediately to changes in world
prices. Thereby, they act in the same manner as proposed by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, i.e.
the real return to the unemployed factor used intensively in the expanding sector rises while the
real return to the unemployed factor used intensively in the shrinking sector decreases. While
this result has already been derived by Hosios (1990), the new finding from the analysis by David-
son, Martin, and Matusz (1999) consists in the effects for employed factors. It turns out that
the impact of trade on the employed factors is ambiguous and determined by Stolper-Samuelson
and Ricardo-Viner forces. Four scenarios can be distinguished: (i) A factor being employed and
used intensively in the exporting industry will gain from trade; (ii) a factor employed and used
intensively in the importing sector will lose from trade; (iii) a factor employed in the exporting
industry but used intensively in the importing industry gains from the Ricardo-Viner force of
being matched in the expanding industry but loses due to Stolper-Samuelson forces; (iv) finally,
a factor employed in the importing industry but used intensively in the exporting industry gains
from Stolper-Samuelson forces but loses due the the Ricardo-Viner force. In sum, the total im-
pact of trade on the real return of employed factors is therefore ambiguous.
Trade Unions. A different approach to implement unemployment into the traditional trade
theory was taken by Brecher and Long (1989). They consider a standard trade model with
two commodities, fixed endowment of two inputs (capital and labor), constant-returns-to-scale
technology and perfect competition in the goods market. Home is considered as a large open
economy in which an economy-wide trade union sets wages unilaterally (monopoly union model)
to maximize rents. While the resulting unemployment is hence voluntary from the perspective
of the union, it is involuntary from the perspective of each individual worker. This setting
then allows to determine an equilibrium with consistent combinations of employment and wages.
Assuming a world equilibrium with diversification, the world price determines the real wage,
and, thereby, a level of employment in Home that is consistent with the clearing of world goods
markets. A higher real wage set by unions corresponds to a fall in the relative price of the
capital-intensive good according to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Consequently, applying the
Rybcyznski theorem, this implies a smaller level of employment in the large open economy of
Home.
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2.3 Intra-industry trade models with monopolistic competition
While the models discussed in the previous sections have helped to increase our understanding of
how trade integration may affect the distribution of income and unemployment, the availability
of new data provoked a series of new questions and challenges. Concerning the trade pattern
itself, studies by Grubel and Lloyd (1971) showed that the majority of international trade occurs
within one and the same industry between industrialized countries. Since this type of trade is
not captured in the traditional theories it required some theoretical explanation. The seminal
contribution came from Krugman (1979, 1980) who constructed a model of monopolistic com-
petition, in which homogeneous firms produce a differentiated good under increasing returns to
scale and consumers have love-of-variety preferences. In this setting, trade liberalization may
force some firms to drop out of the market due to the increase in international competition but
increases the total amount of available varieties which is welfare-enhancing.11
While the Nobel-price awarded approach by Krugman was a milestone in explaining intra-
industry trade and has been applied extensively in the field of international economics, it has
had a relatively small impact concerning the questions of unemployment and inequality. For
instance, Davis (1998) discusses the robustness of his results when considering a Krugman-type
trade model. He shows that an increase in the European minimum wage would imply an effi-
ciency loss and reduce aggregate goods demand which would force firms from both countries to
exit the market. Furthermore, however, the cost increase would render European firms to move
to lower-cost US which is beneficial for US workers so that the key insights from the baseline
model remain unaffected by considering a model variant with intra-industry trade between mo-
nopolistically competitive firms. A further notable exception comes from Matusz (1996) who
introduces shirking à la Shapiro-Stiglitz into a Krugman-type model to show that trade rises
employment in both countries. In contrast to efficiency wages in the Heckscher-Ohlin world,
trade increases the variety of available intermediates which implies an increase in the division of
labor. This leads to higher productivity and therefore higher real wages. As a consequence, the
efficiency-wage constraint is relaxed and, hence, employment increases.
The research frontier was shifted again by new stylized facts in the 1990s. With respect
to the trade pattern, Bernard and Jensen (1997) have documented that exporting firms are
distinctively different from pure domestic firms and share a number of key characteristics: they
are larger, more productive and pay higher wages than their domestic counterparts.12 This
finding was a big challenge since in the Krugman-model firms are considered to be homogeneous.
The seminal work that presented a clear theoretical answer to this puzzle stems from Melitz
(2003). He has introduced heterogeneous firms à la Hopenhayn (1992) into the international trade
literature. His seminal work extends the monopolistic competition framework by Krugman (1979,
1980) by allowing for firm heterogeneity due to firm-specific productivity levels. The following
discussion and presentation of the model is closely linked to the summary in Harrison, McLaren,
and McMillan (2011). In the Melitz-world consumers have constant elasticity of substitution
11This mechanism is only present in the original Krugman (1979) paper. In Krugman (1980), the only variable
of adjustment is the number of goods consumed, leaving the number of active firms constant.
12Similar results were documented for other countries like Taiwan (cf. Aw and Hwang, 1995) and Germany (cf.
Bernard and Wagner, 1997). An excellent survey on this topic is provided by Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and
Schott (2011).
13
2 Literature Review
preferences over a continuum of potential commodities. In general, anyone can start up a new
firm if he/she is able to cover a fixed cost fe for developing a new product. Once the fixed cost
is paid, firms can start production, facing a decreasing returns to scale technology. Output q in
each period, in which the firm is active, is given by
q = (l − f)φ (2.1)
where l, f is total and fixed labor input, respectively, and φ is the marginal product of labor.
While the fixed cost of prodution is the same for all producers, φ is firm-specific and determined
in a lottery, in which potential entrants can participate by paying the initial fixed cost fe (in
units of labor). Since the outcome of the lottery is random, some entrants have to realize that
their productivity is not sufficiently high for breaking even given the fixed production cost f
and, thus, have to exit the market. The autarky equilibrium is therefore determined by two key
values. On the one hand, the number of firms that enter the market by paying the fixed cost
of the "lottery ticket", fe, and cutoff productivity φ∗a that allows them to break-even and stay
in the market. The "zero cutoff profit" condition requires that variable (operating) profits of a
firm with the cutoff productivity φ∗a have exactly to equal the fixed cost f . This implies that
any firm with a lower realization of productivity, i.e. with φ < φ∗a, will remain inactive and any
firm with a higher realization of productivity, i.e. with φ > φ∗a will not only stay in the market
but even make positive profits. Melitz (2003) considers a model in which firms have an infinite
time horizon and face a common exogenous probability of exit. In a steady-state equilibrium,
potential entrants - who are uncertain about the outcome of the productivity lottery - must
be indifferent between entering and not entering the lottery. This requires that the expected
present value of profits has to equal the market lottery fixed costs, fe, so that ex-ante profits of
(potential) entrants are equal to zero. This is a standard free entry condition.
In the open economy, there exist n + 1 identical countries, i.e. there are no sources of com-
parative advantage. Any firm can export to any country in the world by incurring a fixed cost
of exporting fx. Furthermore, exporting firms also have to pay "iceberg" trade costs, which
means that a share of the output melts away in transit to the foreign countries. The fixed cost
of exporting implies that it is not reasonable to export only a small amount of the commodity.
As a consequence, only high-productive firms are able to start penetrating foreign markets. The
open-economy equilibrium is therefore characterized by three values: the number of exporting
firms that enter into the foreign market, a cutoff productivity φ∗ that allows to stay in the
market after facing the high-productive foreign competitors, and a cutoff productivity φ∗x that
allows firms to break-even when penetrating the foreign market. Provided that the fixed cost
of exporting is sufficiently high, the model implies φ∗x > φ
∗. In this case, any firm with φ < φ∗
will drop out of the market whereas firms with φ > φ∗x will start exporting and any firm with
a productivity level between those two cutoffs will just produce for the domestic market. Since
exporting generates additional labor demand, the least productive firm under autarky can no
longer survive in the open economy, then as a key result the model generates φ∗ > φ∗a which
implies that active firms in the open economy are on average more productive than active firms
under autarky. While this selection effect and the increase in productivity give rise to a new
channel for welfare gains of trade, the model per se has nothing to contribute to income distri-
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bution and/or unemployment since it assumes a perfect labor market. While the model does not
provide a discussion on these topics, it can serve as a point of departure to study trade effects for
income distribution and/or unemployment. In the following I will present different prominent
approaches that have addressed these issues.
Efficiency wage. One prominent approach comes from Egger and Kreickemeier (2009). Like
Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006) they propose the idea that workers care about fair wages along
the lines of Akerlof and Yellen (1990), i.e. the effort level of workers depends on the perceived
fairness of their wages. A key assumption of Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) is that workers
who are employed in more productive and, thus, more profitable firms feel entitled to higher
wages. This assumption generates wage inequality of homogeneous workers who are employed
by heterogeneous firms. To be more specific, a fair remuneration from the perspective of workers
must be at least as high as the reference wage
wˆ(φ) = φθ[(1− U)w¯]1−θ (2.2)
with wˆ for the reference wage, U for aggregate unemployment and θ for a parameter that indicates
how important the firm’s productivity is to the worker’s evaluation of the fair wage. As in Melitz
(2003), φ is firm-specific productivity and w¯ labels the average wage of employed production
workers. The term [(1−U)w¯] expresses the average income of the economy, taking into account
that part of the workforce is unemployed and in the absence of unemployment benefits has zero
income. A high value of θ indicates that a worker in a high-productive firm feels entitled to a
high wage, regardless of the outside economic environment. This implies that wage inequality
increases in θ. An effort function relates effort provision to the wage the worker receives relative
to the reference wage. Workers that receive at least the reference wage supply full effort which
is normalized to one whereas workers that get paid a wage lower than the reference wage will
reduce the effort proportionally. Therefore, no firm has an incentive to pay a lower wage than
the reference wage. In principle, it would be possible that firms have to pay more than the
fair reference wage. But this is only possible if unemployment is zero. Focussing on parameter
configurations which lead to involuntary unemployment in equilibrium, it is clear that firms
in this model pay exactly the reference wage. This is the case we focus on in the subsequent
discussion, implying that the wage payment depends endogenously on unemployment and the
average wage. The key innovation relative to other contributions to the fair-wage literature is
that the wage is now firm-specific due to the differences in the firm-level productivity. As in the
basic Melitz-framework, the autarky equilibrium is characterized by two variables: a productivity
cutoff and a number of entrepreneurs entering the market.
When opening up for trade, the basic mechanism is still at work. Again, marginal firms are
forced to exit the market, while firms at the other end of the productivity distribution start
exporting. However, considering fair wages as a source of labor market imperfection adds some
new features to the analysis of trade effects. First, unemployment rises. On the one hand,
trade increases aggregate output and therefore increases the demand for labor which reduces
unemployment. On the other hand, though, trade leads to an increase in productivity which
lowers the demand for workers for any given level of output. It is the second effect that is
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stronger and therefore trade leads to an increase in unemployment. Second, since firms in
the open economy are more productive on average, the average real wage of employed workers
increases. And, last but not least, when measuring wage income inequality as the ratio of the
average wage for employed workers to the lowest wage for employed workers, w¯/wˆ(φ∗), trade
leads to rising wage income inequality. This result may seem at odds with the intuition given
that the average real wage increases and low-productivity firms are squeezed out of the market.
The forces at work are however easy to understand. First of all, the mere truncation of a
distribution does not necessarily lower inequality, and especially not in the assumed case of a
Pareto distribution. Therefore, the drop-out of low-productivity firms does not reduce wage
income inequality. Furthermore, the wage that is paid by two firms is a function of the firm’s
productivity levels and not their realized profits. Hence, comparing two firms, this ratio ceteris
paribus does not change after opening up for trade. The key mechanism is therefore in the
reallocation of ressources that is due to trade. In order to penetrate foreign markets, high-
productivity firms increase their output which forces them to hire more workers. Of course, the
opposite happens in firms that are squeezed out of the market. This implies that the share of
workers with a job in high-productivity firms increases and this is instrumental for an increase
in w¯. In other words, the higher employment share of high-productivity firms relative to low-
productivity firms is responsible for the rise in wage inequality. Of course, when additionally
accounting for the increased number of unemployed workers with zero wage, the increase of the
gap in wage income of ex-ante homogeneous worker becomes even more pronounced.
A related approach of introducing labor market imperfections in the model of heterogeneous
firms is presented by Davis and Harrigan (2011). They also introduce labor market frictions
in the form of efficiency wages but in a substantially different form. They follow the idea by
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) that workers can shirk on the job and need to be restrained from
doing so by the threat to get fired if they are caught shirking. In the dynamic textbook variant of
the so-called shirking model, all firms were identical and had the same exogenous probability to
monitor and catch a shirker in each time period. In equilibrium, each firm therefore pays exactly
the lowest wage that prevents workers to shirk given the monitoring ability of the firm. Building
upon the Melitz-framework with heterogenous firms, in Davis and Harrigan (2011) firms do not
only differ in their marginal product of labor, φ, but also in the probability m to detect shirking
of their employees. This assumption gives rise to firm-specific wage rates since the lowest wage
any firm is willing to pay depends on the firm-specific ability to monitor its workforce. Hence,
firms that are good at catching shirking workers (i.e. firms with a high m) will pay lower wages
than firms that are bad in monitoring. Jobs at firms with low detection probability are labeled as
"good jobs" since the wage is high. Trade liberalization forces low-productivity firms and firms
with a small probability to detect shirking to exit the market. This however implies, that free
trade may destroy "good jobs", i.e. high-wage jobs, if these jobs are associated with high labor
costs. More specifically, if m and φ are not strongly negatively correlated, the firms with the low
wages tend to be those with the small marginal costs, which are therefore the bigger ones, and
the ones that export. However, such an outcome seems at oods with empirical evidence which
documents that exporters are more productive, larger and pay higher wages.
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Search and matching. Another strand of the literature has introduced search frictions
into the Melitz framework for studying the impact of intra-industry trade with heterogeneous
firms on employment and income distribution. The most prominent contribution doing so is
by Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010). In their model, workers search for a job and find
employment with a probability that depends on the tightness of the labor market, i.e. the
ratio of job searchers and open vacancies. Workers are assumed to have an idiosyncratic match
quality for any employer. Better matches increase the productivity on the job, and hence, any
firm tries to hire workers that constitute good matches. Since neither firms nor job seekers are
informed about the match-specific quality of applicants prior to recruitment, firms systematically
screen all of their applicants to identify whether the quality is above a certain threshold level,
which itself is endogenous and depends on the screening intensity. Workers above this threshold
level will be hired and start wage-bargaining with the employer. Workers below the required
minimum match quality do not receive a job offer and get unemployed with zero income. In
equilibrium, more productive firms set a higher threshold for the match quality, and thus invest
more into the screening/recruitment process. This follows from the assumption that it is costly
to set a higher threshold-level and, hence, only more productive firms can afford to pay these
(fixed) costs. Therefore, a worker that passes the test at a high-productivity firm will be highly
productive at that employer. This provides a positive link between a firm’s baseline productivity
and the surplus of employment with the latter being divided between firms and workers in a
Nash bargain. At the end, although the underlying mechanism is substantially different to
Egger and Kreickemeier (2009), this setup also implies that workers in larger, more productive
firms receive a higher wage than workers employed in small, low-productive firms. Opening
up for trade furthermore intensifies these effects. High-productivity firms have the opportunity
to export and therefore screen even more extensively. Marginal firms that survive the foreign
competition but do not export themselves have lower incentives to screen and therefore will pay
lower wages. This leads to an increase in wage inequality due to trade liberalization. With
respect to unemployment, the model predicts a lower employment level in the open economy.
High-productivity firms do produce more due to the export activity but they also become more
picky in hiring new workers, which, together with the drop-out of some domestic firms rises
unemployment.
Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011a) also introduce search unemployment à la Pissarides
into the Melitz setup but do not consider idiosyncratic match quality nor screening activity
of the employer to reveal the firm-specific productivity of an applicant. Instead, they allow
for individual or collective bargaining. The well-known selection effect forces firms to exit the
market and thereby decreases the cost of vacancy posting relative to the productivity of the
average firm. Consequently, the cost reduction increases the ratio of job openings to unemployed
workers which results in a decrease of unemployment. In contrast to Helpman, Itskhoki, and
Redding (2010) wages do not depend on the individual productivity of a firm but on aggregate
productivity. Hence, this setup does not give rise to wage inequality but leaves all workers with
the same return despite being employed at firms with different productivity levels.
A similar form of labor market imperfection in a trade model with heterogeneous firms is
considered by Helpman and Itskhoki (2010). In stark contrast to the other two papers though,
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they construct a setup with two sectors, one of which produces homogenous goods under perfect
competition while the other produces differentiated goods under monopolistic competition with
heterogeneous firms. Common to both sectors is the exposure to search and matching frictions
in the labor market and wage bargaining which leads to equilibrium unemployment. The world
consists of two countries that are identical in all respects except of the labor market institution.
The matching efficiency and costs for posting vacancies can be different across sectors in the two
locations. While trade generates welfare gains for both countries, the impact on unemployment
is ambiguous and depends on the severeness of the labor market frictions in the two sectors. If
the differentiated-goods sector is characterized by low (high) labor market frictions, trade raises
(lowers) the rate of unemployment.
Trade Unions. Another approach to implement wage inequality is by Montagna and Nocco
(2013). They develop a model along the lines of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) with heterogeneous
firms and firm- and market-specific markups in which wages are set via bargaining between firms
and unions. While collective bargaining was already considered in the previously discussed
work by Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011a), that study could not address the issue of
wage inequality due to an iso-elastic demand structure. This becomes different when relying
on the setup by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). The Melitz-Ottaviano framework uses different
preferences that generate linear demand. This modification still generates the predictions of
the standard Melitz framework but additionally adds two interesting features: (i) trade affects
the toughness of competition and (ii) trade affects the average mark-ups. Enriched with the
idea of firm-level collective bargaining, this setting gives rise to firm-specific wages and is used
to study how unionization and trade liberalization affect intra-industry selection and thereby
wage inequality. Considering endogenous markups, however, the rent that accrues to workers
via union activity does not only depend on the productivity of a firm but also on the firm-
specific market power. As more efficient firms have a stronger market power, unions can extract
a bigger part of the economic rents than in less efficient firms. The imposed market power is
furthermore market-specific due to market segmentation. Therefore, an exporting firm has two
independent profit-centres, one for the domestic and one for the foreign sales. Switching towards
a system with wage bargaining at level of the profit-centres instead of the firm-level discriminates
wages according to the activities of the firm. A union is willing to moderate wages to improve
the firm’s competitiveness on the export market. This implies that opening up for trade can
influence within-group wage inequality along two dimensions. On the one hand, it affects the
competitive selection across firms, and, on the other hand, it changes wages within firms between
the two profit centres.13
Union activity has also been addressed in a trade model with heterogeneous firms by Eckel
and Egger (2009). Their focus is however on the incentives of firms to invest abroad for improv-
ing their bargaining position when negotiating wages with unions. This improvement is reached
13Relying on the same framework but focusing on a closed economy, Braun (2011) investigates how different
degrees of centralization in wage bargaining affect productivity and firm performance. He shows that the wage
bargaining regime implies a trade-off between product variety and average productivity. More centralized
bargaining forces low-productivity firms to exit the market, reduces the number of available varieties while in-
creasing average productivity. Less-centralized bargaining, by contrast, allows less-productive firms to survive
in the market at the expense of a lower average productivity.
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because multinational firms in this setup shift production abroad in case of disagreement in the
wage bargaining with a local union. This improves the outside opportunity of firms vis-à-vis
unions and reduces the wage payments. If labor markets are not unionized or wages are mo-
nopolistically set by unions, the firm decision to penetrate the foreign market via exports or
foreign direct investment depends on the proximity-concentration trade-off. If, however, firms
and unions negotiate about wages, then multinational firms are able to realize a wage discount
due to the possibility to shift production abroad in case of disagreement. Unions fear the loss of
jobs and are willing to agree on lower wages. As a consequence, in that case, trade liberalization
further improves the bargaining position of firms since it becomes cheaper to reimport the foreign
production into the domestic market.
Minimum wage. The question of potential spillover effects of unilateral policy reforms has
already been discussed in this section when presenting the minimum wage model by Davis (1998)
which predicted that bad labor market institutions in the foreign country can be beneficial for
the domestic economy. However, since empirical evidence for this hypothesis has been missing
and new theories of international trade have been developed, Egger, Egger, and Markusen (2012)
have readdressed the question of labor market linkages in open economies. The innovation of the
study is the introduction of a minimum wage into a trade model with heterogeneous firms. To
be more precise, the paper assumes a model with firms producing and supplying differentiated
goods under monopolistic competition along the lines of Ethier (1982) and Markusen (1989). The
production of intermediate goods requires labor as the only input factor while the intermediate
goods are aggregated into a homogeneous final good. Furthermore, following Melitz (2003), it is
assumed that the producers in the intermediate sector have firm-specific productivities. Both,
production of intermediate goods and heterogeneous firms give rise to two channels for gains
from trade. First, the positive external scale effect by having access to a greater variety of in-
termediate inputs and, second, due to the selection effect of only the productive firms surviving
the competition from abroad. It turns out that the second effect (selection effect) is crucial for
the analysis of the impact of trade liberalization on a minimum wage economy. To highlight
this second effect, the study sets trade costs equal to zero. Furthermore, the countries under
consideration are assumed to be completely symmetric except of the level of the minimum wage.
Opening up for trade then establishes a link between domestic and foreign marginal costs of
production in the sector of intermediate goods. If firms in this sector would be homogeneous
as in Krugman (1980) the minimum wage could only be binding in one economy whereas full
employment would occur in the other one. If, for instance Home has a higher binding minimum
wage than Foreign, then Home firms could not compete with its Foreign competitors and there-
fore had to exit the market whereas new intermediate goods producers would enter in Foreign
due to lower production costs. At the end of this adjustment process all workers in Foreign would
be employed and wages would have increased to the level of the minimum wage in Home, just
like in the original work by Davis (1998) as long as still some firms are active in Home.14 How-
ever, things become crucially different when assuming heterogeneous firms due to productivity
differences. In that case, opening up for trade still equalizes the marginal costs of production
14In fact, a brief analysis of a minimum wage in a Krugman (1980)-type trade model has already been presented
by Davis (1998).
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but only of the marginal firms in both locations. This implies that countries can still have dif-
ferent binding minimum wages as long as these differences are compensated by difference in the
productivities of the marginal firms. Taking the example from above, a higher minimum wage
in Home leads to an efficiency loss and thereby lowers aggregate world demand for intermediate
goods. Ceteris paribus, such a shock hits both economies and firms from both locations will
exit the market. As before, there is a second, counteracting effect. Since the unilateral policy
reform is conducted in Home, firms relocate from Home to Foreign. However, contrary to a
model with homogeneous firms, this second effect is not as strong because the relocation of firms
implies that the productivity of the marginal firm in Foreign shrinks while the productivity of
the marginal firm in Home increases. This adjustment process is the key innovation relative
to the previous literature. As a result, an increase in the minimum wage in one country may
lower employment in both countries. To put it in a more general perspective, the analysis us-
ing such a framework predicts that bad labor market institutions in one country may also hurt
the trading partner which stands in stark contrast to the predictions of the work by Davis (1998).
Empirical evidence. All of the papers mentioned above address the question of distributive
and/or employment effects of international trade and can be linked with empirical evidence from
the literature. While the theoretical predictions concerning the employment effects of trade are
mixed, there seems to be an unambiguous trend in the empirical evidence. Independent from each
other, Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b) and Dutt, Mitra, and Ranjan (2009) document
a negative relationship between trade openness and unemployment. For instance, using OECD
data Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b) report for their benchmark specification that a
ten percentage points increase in openness leads to a reduction in aggregate unemployment by
about three quarters of one percentage point. With respect to the linkage between openness and
inequality studies by Katz and Autor (1999), Barth and Lucifora (2006) and Autor, Katz, and
Kearney (2008) showed that a special form of inequality, within-group inequality, has become
very important and risen tremendously. Before the work by Melitz (2003) there was no theoretical
argument why and how trade liberalization could contribute to the increase in this special form
of inequality.15 The presented contributions then became even more convincing, however, when
further empirical evidence by Hildreth and Oswald (1997) and Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller
(1999) showed that firm-specific factors are highly relevant for explaining wage inequality. An-
other study by Bernard and Jensen (1997) revealed that the large rise in average skilled wage
premia stems from intra-industry shifts instead of inter-industry shifts or within-plant shifts.
Amiti and Davis (2012) provide some confirmation for the findings from the theoretical papers
by Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) and Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010) by showing that
trade liberalization increases the wages for workers employed in most productive firms and lowers
the wages for firms that are only serving domestic consumers. Finally, focusing on the impact of
spillover effects of unilateral policy reforms on the labor market for the trading partner, a study
by Felbermayr, Larch, and Lechthaler (2013) document empirical support for the predictions
by Egger, Egger, and Markusen (2012) and Helpman and Itskhoki (2010). They show that a
reduction in the domestic distortion in the labor market is beneficial for both countries even
15Instead the literature put the emphasis on technological progress and organizational change (cf. Galor and
Moav, 2000; Aghion et al., 2002; and Egger and Grossmann, 2005).
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more so, the more they are trading with each other.
2.4 Intra-industry trade models with oligopolistic competition
The fear of an increase in the income gap between workers and firm owners ranks prominently
in the public perception about globalization. One strand of literature that is particularly well
suited to tackle this issue is the literature on unionized oligopoly in an international context.
Oligopolistic competition gives rise to pure rents in the form of firm profits. The generated
economic rents can be shared between a firm and its workforce via unions. Originally, the
literature concerning rent-sharing in an unionized oligopoly was based on work by Brander (1981)
and Brander and Krugman (1983), who were the first to study intra-industry trade between
oligopolistic competitors. The baseline model considers an economy with two sectors and labor
as the only input factor. One sector is perfectly competitive, whereas in autarky only one
monopoly firm is active in the other sector. Considering market segmentation and abstracting
from the possibility of new entrants to the market, the profit-maximizing monopoly firm is
charging a mark-up on the price, generating positive profits and producing less than would be
socially optimal. Moving from autarky to free trade with a symmetric country, implies a switch
from monopoly to duopoly. The increase in competition stimulates production, lowers consumer
prices and creates a new source for welfare gains from trade.16
Despite its intuitive appeal, the approach of oligopolistic competition to explain intra-industry
trade has not received as much attention as the approach of monopolistic competition following
Krugman (1979, 1980) for homogeneous firms and Melitz (2003) for heterogeneous firms. One
potential drawback is that due to the choice of quasi-linear preferences changes in aggregate
income exhibit no feedback effects on the imperfectly competitive goods market or labor. There-
fore, Neary (2010) calls this only half a theory of trade since it neglects the general equilibrium
feedback effects which are typical and a central piece of theories on international trade. Due to
this drawback, the literature on unionized oligopoly is also not well suited to investigate aggre-
gate labor market effects of trade such as adjustments in unemployment. This has changed with
a recent paper by Neary (2003, 2009) who designed a tractable model of general oligopolistic
equilibrium (GOLE). Before presenting the details of this more sophisticated framework, I will
first present important insights from partial equilibrium settings with oligopolistic competition
in the goods market and imperfect labor markets, distinguishing between models that consider
symmetric countries and models that allow countries to differ in their labor market institutions.
Hereby, the focus will be on union wage setting as the prevailing source of labor market imper-
fection.
Partial equilibrium with asymmetric countries. Brander and Spencer (1988) were the
first to use an intra-industry trade model of oligopolistic competition to study the effects of
unionization. They use a simple oligopolistic model along the lines of Brander and Krugman
(1983) to analyze the effects of unionization on international markets. Union activity is modeled
in the form of a right-to-manage setting, i.e. firms and unions bargain over wages while the firms
16The basic model excludes any form of trade costs. Relaxing this assumption by considering iceberg transporta-
tion costs, one finds that they need to be sufficiently low for welfare gains to exist.
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remain the right to manage the level of employment. Their study shows that rising bargaining
power of labor reduces output and welfare and they shed light on how the presence of unions may
influence the optimal strategic trade policy. Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991) extend the analysis
by Brander and Spencer (1988) and qualify the result of a reduction in output and welfare. They
consider a model with efficient bargaining, i.e. firms and unions bargain over wages and employ-
ment, and argue that if a union is employment-oriented instead of wage-oriented, then a rise in
its bargaining power increases both output and welfare. An employment-oriented union renders
the domestic firm more aggressive in the Cournot game on the product market which induces a
shift in the economic rents from the foreign to the domestic firm. Furthermore, their study also
emphasizes the ability to shift production abroad in case of disagreement in wage bargaining.
This improves the fallback profit of the multinational firm and, thus, leads to a lower negotiated
wage, similar to Eckel and Egger (2009).
Partial Equilibrium with symmetric countries. Huizinga (1993) and Sørensen (1993)
show independent from each other that in a symmetric two-country model with unionized labor
markets in both countries, the wage under free trade is lower than in autarky. When opening up
for trade, competition on the product market increases which exerts a disciplining effect on the
wage claims by unions and thus reduces wages. Naylor (1998, 1999) uses the same framework as
Huizinga (1993) and Sørensen (1993) and looks at the complementary question how small changes
in trade barriers impact the union wage setting. He shows that in a situation of restricted trade,
a further reduction in trade barriers increases wages. Finally, Munch and Skaksen (2002) allow
for and distinguish between fixed and variable trade costs. Their study shows that the wage
effect of international trade in this kind of unionized oligopoly setting is sensitive as to which of
the trade costs are lowered. Thereby, their study is able to explain the different results in the
beforementioned contributions and nests them in a unified framework.
An innovative contribution comes from Zhao (1995) who develops a unionized international
oligopoly framework to study foreign intra-industry investment, similar to Mezzetti and Dinopou-
los (1991). However, in extension to their study, he considers a framework with two symmetric
countries and shows that cross-hauling foreign direct investment causes the negotiated wage to
decrease and that the existence of labor unions provides an incentive for firms to invest abroad
in order to improve their position in the bargain with local unions. In contrast to Eckel and
Egger (2009), the study abstracts from any form of trade and investment costs which implies
that exporting is never a profitable alternative compared to FDI activity.
General equilibrium. A new interest in unionized oligopoly was initiated by the seminal
work by Neary (2009). He developed a model of oligopolistic competition in general equilibrium.
Earlier approaches to modelling such a framework have been problematic for a number of reasons.
One important obstacle was to make sure, that no agent in the economy has enough market power
to influence aggregate variables. The approach by Neary avoids this problem in a very neat and
simple way. It assumes a continuum of industries with an exogenous number of firms in each
sector competing under Cournot competition. This implies that firms have market power within
their own industry, but are small on the aggregate and therefore cannot influence aggregate
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variables. In this model trade does not only increase competition but also labor demand. For
a given labor endowment this leads to an increase in wages. Positive welfare effects only occur
if countries are asymmetric and/or productivities are industry-specific but not in a featureless
economy of full symmetry.
Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) were the first to apply this setup for studying the linkage
between international trade and union wage-setting behavior. They extend the GOLE framework
by considering union activity in a subset of industries, while the firms in the residual sectors
pay the competitive wage rate. A movement from autarky to free trade doubles the number of
competitors in each industry, which ceteris paribus lowers profits and, thus, wage claims of unions
by means of a standard rent-sharing mechanism. Furthermore, the mass of consumers doubles
as well. This renders both consumer and labor demand more elastic and further reduces union
wage claims. In sum, wages decline and employment in unionized firms increases when a country
opens up to trade. This finding is well in line with previous work on international trade in partial
equilibrium unionized oligopoly models (see Huizinga, 1993; Sørensen, 1993) – although there is
an additional general equilibrium effect in the GOLE setting, as consumer demand adjusts in
response to income changes. However, aside from this consumer demand channel, there arises
an additional general equilibrium effect due to adjustments in the labor market. If all unionized
firms increase their employment level, economy-wide labor demand is stimulated. In a model
with labor market clearing, this induces a change in the competitive wage, which must increase
in order to restore the labor market equilibrium. The surge in the competitive wage then leads
to an increase in the union wage claim and, as pointed out by Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009),
this second-round adjustment may be strong enough to dominate the partial equilibrium impact
effect, so that the union wage rate can actually increase relative to its autarky level.
2.5 Summary and own contribution
While the theoretical work on heterogenous firms can help shedding light on the increasing im-
portance of firm-specific factors in the determination of wage inequality, these approaches are
less suited to explain why industry-specific factors have become a less important determinant
of inequality (cf. Faggio, Salvanes, and Van Reenen, 2010). On the other hand, partial equi-
librium models with oligopolistic competition and unionized labor markets as well as GOLE
models with union activity in only a subset of sectors cannot explain changes in unemployment.
Therefore, the first essay (chapter 3) constructs a model of oligopolistic competition in general
equilibrium à la Neary (2009) with sector-specific productivities and a unionized labor market.
The study shows that globalization in the form of free trade between symmetric countries lowers
the wage claims of unions and reduces unemployment as well as intra-group inequality of workers.
Furthermore, labor market institutions differ substantially between countries. The literature
has addressed many different forms of imperfections in the labor market. However, the role of
union activity as a source of competitive advantage has not been systematically investigated
in previous contributions. The second essay (chapter 4) develops a framework that is suited
to examine the impact of differences in the wage bargaining regime for explaining differences
in macroeconomic performance measures like employment and welfare as well as group-specific
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well-being. Moreover, it sheds light on the question of how different forms of globalization may
change these performance measures due to the prevailing differences in wage setting regimes.
Finally, while the literature has shown that exporting firms are distinctively different from non-
exporting ones and that only the most productive firms start exporting, there is relatively little
empirical knowledge on the underlying determinants for the selection into exporting. Following
the idea by Harrigan and Reshef (2011) we investigate the role of unit labor costs as a driving
force for the export activity of German plants. Our estimations provide supportive evidence for
the idea that labor costs are an important measure of competitiveness and that there exists a
positive correlation between competitiveness and export activity. This correlation is shown to
be stronger at the extensive than at the intensive margin.
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Welfare, and Income Distribution in
Unionized General Oligopolistic
Equilibrium
3.1 Introduction
The distributional effects of international trade are of major concern to the general public and
policy makers alike. The common fear is that market integration improves the outside oppor-
tunities of firm owners, and hence limits the possibility of workers to skim a fair share of the
rents arising from economic activity (OECD, 2007). This issue has been prominently discussed
in a large literature on union wage setting in an international oligopoly (see, e.g., Mezzetti and
Dinopoulos, 1991; Naylor, 1998; Lommerud, Meland, and Sørgard, 2003). However, by focussing
on rent sharing at the firm or industry level in a partial equilibrium environment, this literature
is not well equipped for analyzing the implications of trade on the economy-wide distribution
of profit and wage income, an issue that is of primary interest for policy makers who are con-
cerned about the impact of trade on inequality and social justice (Bernanke, 2007; OECD, 2007).
Furthermore, by considering a competitive outside sector that absorbs all workers who do not
find a job in unionized industries, existing studies in this literature ignore a key channel through
which trade affects inequality, namely changes in the unemployment rate. When being interested
in a comprehensive picture of inequality, this seems to be a major shortcoming, since even in
countries that offer generous unemployment compensation those who do not find a job are at
the lower tail of the income distribution, so that changes in the unemployment rate have serious
distributional consequences.1
It is the aim of this paper to provide a detailed discussion of how opening up to trade affects
rent sharing and thereby the economy-wide distribution of profit and wage income as well as
involuntary unemployment. A prerequisite for studying these effects is a model in which firms
can make pure profits in equilibrium, and considering a unionized oligopoly seems promising
in this respect as it relates the results to a well-established literature on rent sharing in an
international trade context. On the other hand, the model should allow for economy-wide effects,
and hence we have to embed the unionized oligopoly into a general equilibrium framework.
1Since getting unemployed is usually associated with a significant social decline it is not surprising that the risk
of job loss is the main concern of workers, regarding the labor market implications of trade liberalization (see
Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). In view of such observations, Davidson, Martin, and Matusz (1999, p. 272) claim
that “trade economists should begin to seriously consider environments in which unemployment is carefully
modeled.”
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Neary’s (2009) general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) model seems to be a suitable framework
for this purpose. With a continuum of industries, a small and exogenous number of symmetric
firms within each sector, Cournot competition between these firms, and labor as the only factor
of production, it captures in a theoretically convincing way the intuitively appealing idea that
firms are large and have market power in their own industry, but at the same time are small in
the aggregate (and thus can rationally ignore their impact on economy-wide variables), without
relying on the common approach of introducing a competitive outside sector that rules out, by
construction, any general equilibrium feedback effects of labor market adjustments. Assuming in
the GOLE model that industries differ in their technology and that all producers are confronted
with wage claims of firm-level unions, we get a tractable theoretical framework, in which the
interaction of industry-specific factors and rent sharing between firms and unions generate income
inequality along multiple lines.2 In particular, the resulting framework features inter-group
inequality between firm owners and workers as well as intra-group inequality within these two
groups of agents, and, of course, involuntary unemployment.3
After introducing the main model ingredients, characterizing the closed economy equilibrium
and shedding light on the role of unemployment compensation for aggregate employment, wel-
fare and income distribution, we study in detail the consequences of a country’s movement from
autarky to free trade. To keep the analysis simple, we first look at trade between two fully
symmetric countries, while the role of country asymmetries is addressed in an extension to this
benchmark scenario. Thereby, we consider two forms of asymmetry, namely size and Ricardian
technology differences. With respect to the role of country size differences, there is a presump-
tion from previous work that trade effects are less pronounced in larger economies. We analyze
whether such insights extend to a model in which both product and labor markets are imper-
fectly competitive. With respect to the role of Ricardian technology differences, we know from
previous research that in an otherwise identical model with perfectly competitive goods and labor
markets, trade leads to full specialization in the production of the two economies (see Dornbusch,
Fischer, and Samuelson, 1977). This is no longer true if consumers are served by quantity-setting
oligopolistically competitive producers. In this case, we can expect co-existence of domestic and
foreign producers over a large subset of industries and, as pointed out by Neary (2009), either
country’s production even remains fully diversified in the open economy if the prevailing tech-
nology differences are not too large. This is the case we are focussing on in our paper, and we
analyze within this full diversification framework how the insights from the benchmark model of
identical countries have to be modified when allowing for technological dissimilarity.
2There is clear supportive evidence for the idea that this interaction is indeed a key determinant of income
inequality. For instance, see Dickens and Katz (1987), Krueger and Summers (1988), Katz and Summers
(1989), and Grey (1993). More recent evidence is provided by Du Caju, Katay, Lamo, Nicolitsas, and Poelhekke
(2010). Using the European Structure of Earning Survey, an internationally harmonized matched employer-
employee data set, these authors document the existence and persistence of inter-industry wage differentials
in European industries, and they conclude that these differentials are consistent with rent sharing.
3Our model is not the first one that introduces labor unions into a GOLE model along the lines of Neary (2009).
Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) use such a framework to show that general equilibrium feedback effects through
labor market adjustments are important and that accounting for these feedback effects can change the impact
of trade on wages in unionized industries in a qualitative way. However, Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009)
assume that unions are only active in a subset of industries, so that involuntary unemployment does not
materialize in their setting. Furthermore, they do not address the role of rent sharing for the economy-wide
distribution of income, an issue that is in the center of this paper’s interest.
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As a first result of our analysis we find that trade exerts a union-disciplining effect and thus
reduces union wage claims, similar to a partial equilibrium setting (see Huizinga, 1993; Sørensen,
1993). The fall in union wage claims provides an employment stimulus which lowers involuntary
unemployment and raises welfare. In the case of fully symmetric trading partners or countries
that only differ in their market size, all firms are equally exposed to foreign competition despite
prevailing differences in labor productivity across sectors, and the welfare stimulus arises from
a proportional increase in output and thus consumption of all industrial goods. With Ricardian
technology differences, the positive welfare effect is reinforced as countries (partially) specialize
their production according to the law of comparative advantage, while employment declines in re-
sponse to the relocation of economic activity. For high degrees of technological dissimilarity, this
second-round employment reducing effect can be more pronounced than the initial employment
stimulus of trade between symmetric countries, so that trade may aggravate the unemployment
problem. However, this is not possible if technology differences are sufficiently small, so that
trade between industrialized economies can be expected to have a positive employment effect – a
result that seems to be well in line with empirical evidence (see Dutt, Mitra, and Ranjan, 2009;
Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer, 2011a).
With respect to the outcome of rent sharing, we find that the average worker may gain or
lose relative to the average firm owner, with the respective result depending crucially on the
market power of producers. To be more specific, we show that, on average, firm owners gain
relative to production workers if the market power of firms within their own industry is large. For
instance, if the autarky equilibrium is characterized by a monopolistic or a duopolistic sectoral
market structure, the ratio of average profits to average wages (the profit-wage ratio, in short)
definitely goes up in the benchmark case of fully symmetric countries. Furthermore, we find
that an increase in the profit-wage ratio is more likely if a country opens up for trade with a
smaller trading partner, whereas Ricardian technology differences do not exert a clearcut effect
on the profit-wage ratio. Aside from looking at the impact of trade on aggregate measures of rent
sharing between firm owners and workers, we also study its impact on the distribution of income
within these two groups of agents. In this respect, we show that the distribution of profit income
across firm owners does not change in response to trade liberalization if the two countries are
fully symmetric or only differ in size. The reason is that all firms are equally exposed to foreign
competition and thus experience a proportional output increase in this case. Things are different
if countries are technologically dissimilar. In particular, under the plausible assumption that
countries have a comparative advantage in their high-productivity industries, they experience a
more than proportional expansion of output and thus start exporting in those sectors, in which
profits have already been high under autarky. This raises income inequality among firm owners.4
4That access to trade can have a significant impact on the distribution of profits has also been highlighted
by a recent literature on heterogeneous firms (see Melitz, 2003, and consecutive work on the matter). This
literature assumes that firms within the same industry differ in productivity and it emphasizes that due to this
heterogeneity only the most productive firms within an industry start exporting in the open economy, while
the least productive ones cease production in face of foreign competition. These two forms of selection effects
provide a relocation of economic activity from less productive to more productive firms, so that inequality of
profit income increases even if trade occurs between two fully symmetric countries. In contrast, our results point
to a surge in profit income inequality that arises due to a relocation of economic activity between industries if
trading partners differ in their technology. Hence, the insights from our analysis are complementary to those
from the literature on heterogeneous firms in a Melitz (2003)-type framework.
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Regarding the impact of trade on income inequality among production workers, we can distin-
guish two principle sources of influence, namely changes in the wage differential and changes in
the relative employment across industries. If countries are fully symmetric or only differ in their
size, a movement from autarky to free trade does not affect the composition of workers across
industries. However, it lowers the wage differential between sectors with differing productivity
levels and therefore renders the distribution of wage income more equal in the open economy.
Things are more complicated if we allow for technological dissimilarity of countries. While we
are not able to identify a clearcut effect of technological dissimilarity on the distribution of wage
income, insights from numerical simulation exercises indicate that if technological differences of
countries are sufficiently pronounced trade does not necessarily lead to lower wage inequality.
These results upon the impact of trade on the distribution of labor income contribute to a rel-
atively new literature that addresses the consequences of trade for intra-group wage inequality
(see, for instance, Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009; Egger and Meland, 2011; Helpman, Itskhoki,
and Redding, 2010; Davis and Harrigan, 2011). Existing studies to this literature point to self-
selection of the most-productive firms into export status (and exit of the least productive ones)
as a key rationale for explaining observations from both sides of the Atlantic that intra-group
wage inequality not only accounts for a substantial part of overall wage inequality but also has
significantly increased in recent years (see Katz and Autor, 1999; Barth and Lucifora, 2006;
Autor, Katz, and Kearney, 2008).
This selection mechanism is well in line with two empirical regularities, namely the relevance of
firm-specific factors for explaining wage inequality (see, for instance, Hildreth and Oswald, 1997;
Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller, 1999) and the observation that exporters are more productive
and pay higher wages than non-exporters (see Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2007a, and the
literature cited there). However, by focussing on the differential impact that trade exerts on
heterogeneous firms within an industry, existing models in this literature are not capable to
explain the decline in the relevance of industry-specific factors for individual wage payments
over the last few decades (Faggio, Salvanes, and Van Reenen, 2010). A rationale for the latter
observation can be inferred from our analysis, which shows that given productivity differences
between industries have a smaller impact on sectoral wage payments in an open economy if
trade occurs between two countries that are not too different with respect to their production
technologies. This suggests that the respective decline in the relevance of industry-specific factors
for the wage distribution can at least be partially explained by the significant decline in trade costs
over the same period. We can thus conclude that our results upon the impact of trade on intra-
group inequality among production workers are complementary to those from the literature on
heterogeneous firms within an industry and may therefore be helpful for drawing a comprehensive
picture about the channels through which distributional effects of trade can materialize.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the main model ingre-
dients and sets up the theoretical framework. Section 3.3 characterizes the autarky equilibrium
and provides insights on how changes in unemployment compensation affect the outcome in the
closed economy. Section 3.4 considers trade between two fully symmetric countries and shows
how the opening up to trade affects aggregate employment, welfare, the rent sharing between
firm owners and workers as well as the distribution of income within these two groups of agents.
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In Section 3.5 we consider trade between two asymmetric countries. The last section concludes
with a brief summary of the most important results.5
3.2 The model set-up
We conduct our analysis in a general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) framework, in which firms
are small enough to rationally ignore their influence on aggregate variables, while they are large in
their own industry, and hence engage in strategic interaction with their competitors. Production
and consumption are modeled along the lines of Neary (2009), who presents a workhorse model
of the GOLE theory. However, we deviate from the baseline model by accounting for labor
market imperfections due to the presence of labor unions (see Bastos and Kreickemeier, 2009).
Furthermore, we distinguish between two types of agents: firm owners who receive profit income
and workers who receive wage income if employed and unemployment benefits, otherwise. Details
on our modeling strategy are outlined in Subsections 3.2.1-3.2.3.
3.2.1 Preferences and consumer demand
Preferences of the representative consumer are given by an additively separable utility function
over a continuum of different goods, with the sub-utility function for each of these goods being
quadratic. Denoting consumption of good z by x(z), utility can be written as6
U [{x(z)}] =
∫ 1
0
[
ax(z)−
1
2
bx(z)2
]
dz. (3.1)
The budget constraint of the representative consumer is given by
∫ 1
0
p(z)x(z)dz ≤ I, (3.2)
where p(z) denotes the price of good z, and I is aggregate income. Maximizing utility (3.1)
subject to a binding budget constraint (3.2) gives the inverse demand function for good z:
p(z) =
1
λ
[a− bx(z)], (3.3)
where λ represents the Lagrangian multiplier of the respective optimization problem. The La-
grangian multiplier equals the marginal utility of income, which in this model is a function of
the first and the second moment of prices,
µp1 ≡
∫ 1
0
p(z)dz and µp2 ≡
∫ 1
0
p(z)2dz, (3.4)
5In the interest of readability we do not present derivation details in the main text, but relegate them to the
appendix.
6As discussed in detail in Neary (2009), the preferences underlying the utility function in (3.1) are quasi-
homothetic. This allows us to apply the concept of a representative consumer to aggregate consumer demand
of heterogeneous agents.
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respectively, as well as aggregate income, I. Solving Eq. (3.3) for x(z) and substituting the
resulting expression into (3.2), we can reformulate the binding budget constraint to obtain
λ[{p(z)}, I] =
aµp1 − bI
µp2
. (3.5)
Furthermore, substituting x(z) into (3.1), we can determine indirect utility, which, ignoring
constants, can be expressed as U˜ = −λ2µp2.
7
3.2.2 Technology and production
We associate each good z with a separate production sector and, therefore, consider a large
number – or more precisely a continuum – of industries. Firms in all industries use labor to
produce a homogeneous output and compete in quantities with the other firms in their industry.
Output is linear in the labor input: y = l/α(z), with α(z) denoting the labor input coefficient
in industry z. We abstract from investment costs for establishing the production facility and
consider an exogenous number of firms, n, which is the same in each industry.
Since the number of competitors within each industry is finite (or small), firms anticipate that
they can influence industry-level variables, whereas they rationally take aggregate, economy-
wide variables as given. As a consequence, they treat λ parametrically and therefore face linear
demand functions, according to (3.3). However, λ is endogenous for the economy as a whole. In
what follows, we choose the representative consumer’s marginal utility as numéraire and set λ
equal to one. This choice of numéraire has become standard in the GOLE literature, as it proves
particularly useful from a modeling point of view. However, it implies that income variables
in our setting, such as profits and wages, have to be interpreted as real profits or wages at the
margin and that changes of these variables do not have direct implications for utility (see Neary,
2009).
Considering product market clearing,
∑n
i=1 yi = x(z), and accounting for demand function
(3.3), we can then write profits of firm j in sector z as
πj =
[
a− b
n∑
i=1
yi − cj(z)
]
yj , (3.6)
where cj(z) = α(z)wj denotes unit production costs. Throughout our analysis we focus on the
case of positive supply of all firms and, therefore, restrict our attention to parameter configura-
tions that lead to a > cj(z) for all j and z. Without loss of generality, we assume that industries
are ranked such that α(z) is increasing in z.
7Notably, the analysis in this subsection builds upon two assumptions: (i) non-satiation and (ii) participation
regarding each agent’s consumption of any good z. This requires inter alia a positive income level of all agents
and sufficiently small price differences between all goods, which in our model can be established by sufficiently
small differences in labor productivity. We assume that the relevant parameter constraints are fulfilled, and
hence only focus on interior solutions throughout our analysis.
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3.2.3 Labor market and factor endowment
Regarding the determination of factor return wj , we abandon the assumption of a perfectly
competitive labor market as in Neary (2009) and assume that each industry is populated by n
firm-level unions, which unilaterally set wages, while firms keep the right-to-manage employment
and choose lj = α(z)yj to maximize profits (3.6) conditional on wj .8 The objective function of
the labor union is given by9
Vj = (wj − w¯)lj , (3.7)
with w¯ denoting exogenous and constant unemployment benefits, which are financed by a pro-
portional income tax that applies the same tax rate to all types of income, including wages,
profits, and unemployment benefits (see Davidson and Matusz, 2006, for a similar assumption).
This tax is a lump-sum instrument and does neither distort the firm’s profit-maximizing output
choice (see above), nor does it influence the outcome of union wage setting. Hence, the wage
chosen by the union does not depend on whether the union objective is formulated in pre-tax or
after-tax notation, and it is therefore meaningful to choose pre-tax notation in order to save on
parameters. Due to our choice of numéraire, the assumption of a constant w¯ implies that unem-
ployment compensation is continuously adjusted by policy makers to keep it constant relative
to the inverse of the representative consumer’s marginal utility of income, λ−1. This assump-
tion is useful for analytical tractability and has the nice implication that nominal unemployment
benefits are increasing in aggregate income, which is well in line with empirical evidence. To com-
plete the characterization of the labor market in our model, we finally assume that the country
is populated by L identical workers, each of them endowed with one unit of labor.
3.3 Equilibrium in the closed economy
The equilibrium outcome is determined by the solution of a two-stage problem with unions setting
wages at stage one, and firms deciding upon output (employment) and purchases taking place at
stage two. In Subsection 3.3.1, we solve the two-stage problem through backward induction and
determine firm-level and industry-level variables. In Subsection 3.3.2 we solve for the general
equilibrium and characterize economy-wide variables.
3.3.1 Solving for firm-level and industry-level variables
At stage 2, firms choose profit-maximizing output (employment) levels. With firms anticipating
that all their competitors in industry z are identical and set the same output level, yi = yk
8In a previous version of this manuscript, we have considered a slightly more general framework with wage
negotiations between firms and unions. However, since our main results do not hinge on the relative bargaining
strength of firms and unions, we decided to stick to the more parsimonious model in which unions have all the
bargaining power and therefore set wages unilaterally.
9Eq. (3.7) can either be interpreted as a Stone-Geary objective function, with unions simply maximizing rents
and workers being perfectly mobile across firms and industries (see Bastos and Kreickemeier, 2009), or it can be
interpreted as a utilitarian objective function, with union membership being predetermined. In the latter case,
it is commonly assumed that workers are assigned in a way such that each union has some unemployed members
and at the same time can prevent outsiders from being hired by the firm before its unemployed members get
a job (see Alesina and Perotti, 1997; Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003). Furthermore, the assignment can be
such that expected labor income of individual workers is the same in all unions. For an overview on different
objective functions, see Oswald (1985).
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∀i, k 6= j, the solution to the profit-maximization problem of firm j is given by
yj =
a+ (n− 1)α(z)wi − nα(z)wj
b(n+ 1)
, lj =
α(z) [a+ (n− 1)α(z)wi − nα(z)wj ]
b(n+ 1)
, (3.8)
according to (3.6), and, as mentioned above, both of these variables are independent of the
common tax rate, as proportional income taxation is non-distortionary in our setting. To solve
the wage-setting problem of union j, we substitute lj from (3.8) in (3.7) and maximize the
respective expression. Furthermore, considering symmetry, i.e. wj = wi, in the first-order
condition dVj/dwj = 0, we obtain10
wj =
a+ nα(z)w¯
α(z)(n+ 1)
≡ w(z) (3.9)
for the pre-tax wage income of workers in industry z. While all firms within a single industry use
the same technology and thus pay identical wages, it follows from (3.9) that sectors with higher
labor productivity, i.e. a lower α(z), pay higher wages. This is intuitive, because firms in more
productive sectors realize higher profits, all other things equal, and unionized labor participates
in these higher profits due to a rent-sharing mechanism.11
The relative wage paid in two industries z1, z2, with α(z1) > α(z2) is given by
w(z2)
w(z1)
=
α(z1) [a+ nα(z2)w¯]
α(z2) [a+ nα(z1)w¯]
≡ ω21. (3.10)
It is immediate that ω21 > 1, because firms in sector z2 use a more productive technology than
firms in sector z1. However, the sectoral wage differential, ω21, is smaller than the prevailing
productivity differential, due to the existence of unemployment compensation. Put differently,
unemployment compensation leads to wage compression in our model. The impact of w¯ on
the wage differential in (3.10) is monotonic. A higher unemployment benefit raises the fallback
income of workers. This leads to higher wage claims of unions, with the respective effect being
stronger in sectors with lower productivity, according to (3.9). As a consequence, the wage
differential ω21 shrinks if w¯ goes up. Finally, income taxation does not exert an impact on the
wage differential, as long as the same tax rate is applied to all factor returns.
Substituting the wage rate from (3.9) in (3.8), gives equilibrium output and employment levels:
y(z) ≡
n[a− α(z)w¯]
b(n+ 1)2
, l(z) ≡
nα(z)[a− α(z)w¯]
b(n+ 1)2
. (3.11)
10Two remarks are in order here. First, rent sharing implies w(z) > w¯ if firms have market power and, thus, make
positive profits. In the limiting case of n→∞, the model approaches to one with perfect competition in the
product market, with zero profits, and hence w(z) = w¯ – provided the firms can hire the profit-maximizing
amount of labor at w¯. Second, substituting w(z) from (3.9) into condition a > c(z), it is immediate that
a > α(1)w¯ is sufficient for an interior solution with a positive output level in all industries.
11There is indeed strong empirical support for the idea that more productive firms pay higher wages (see Hildreth
and Oswald, 1997). This finding also survives if one controls for individual-specific factors, like education or
experience. Furthermore, existing results suggest that a substantial part of the prevailing wage differential
is still due to industry effects, even though the role of these effects has continuously declined in recent years
(see Faggio, Salvanes, and Van Reenen, 2010). For instance, Blanchflower, Oswald, and Sanfey (1996, p. 241)
conclude that “[c]hanges in industries’ levels of prosperity have large effects upon workers’ remuneration.”
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The equilibrium price level then follows from (3.3):
p(z) =
(2n+ 1)a+ n2α(z)w¯
(n+ 1)2
. (3.12)
Higher unemployment benefits, w¯, lead to higher wage claims and thus lower output and em-
ployment at the firm level. This reduces competition in the goods market and leads to higher
prices in all industries, according to (3.12). Comparing two firms with differing labor input
coefficients (and thus two firms from different industries), we find that the firm with the higher
input coefficient α(z) has higher production costs for a given wage rate, but at the same time
pays lower wages, due to more moderate wage claims of unions. The first effect dominates in
our setting, so that the firm with the higher α(z) faces higher unit production costs and thus
a lower output level y(z). Since within an industry all firms are symmetric, sectoral output
is lower and prices are higher in less productive industries. This is in line with Neary (2009).
However, the respective output and price differential across industries is smaller if labor markets
are unionized. Regarding employment, we can again distinguish two counteracting effects of a
higher α(z). On the one hand, it lowers output and thereby employment, l(z), all other things
equal. On the other hand, more labor is needed to produce a given level of output. In general,
it is not clear which of the two counteracting effects dominates. To be more specific, we find
that dl(z)/dα(z) >,=, < 0 if a >,=, < 2α(z)w¯. Hence, comparing firms from two industries
with differing labor input coefficients, α(z1) > α(z2), we find that an outcome with a higher
employment level in the more productive firm, i.e. l(z2) > l(z1), is the more likely the higher is
the level of unemployment benefits, w¯. This is intuitive as higher unemployment compensation
lowers the wage differential ω21, according to (3.10), and therefore increases the output differ-
ential y(z2) − y(z1), according to (3.11). Leaving the employment requirement for producing a
given level of output unaffected, an increase in w¯ therefore raises the employment differential
l(z2)− l(z1) in favor of the more productive firm.
In a final step, we can now substitute wage (3.9) for wj and output (3.11) for yj in (3.6), to
determine equilibrium (pre-tax) profits π(z). With linear demand, these profits are proportional
to the square of output, π(z) = by(z)2, so that it is immediate from our analysis above that profits
are higher in more productive industries and decreasing in the level of unemployment benefits
w¯. Since all sectors are populated by the same exogenous number of producers, these insights
also extend to industry-wide profits. This completes our discussion on firm- and industry-level
variables.
3.3.2 Unemployment, welfare, and income distribution
With the insights from Subsection 3.3.1 at hand, we can now solve for the general equilibrium and
characterize the economy-wide variables. Thereby, we need to keep in mind that the income tax
introduced for financing unemployment benefits adjusts endogenously if we impose the common
assumption of a balanced budget of the public sector. However, due to the lump-sum character
of a proportional income tax, we do not need to analyze these adjustments in detail, as the
respective changes in the tax rate do not feed back on the general equilibrium variables of
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interest: unemployment, welfare and income distribution.12
The mass of unemployed agents can be determined by adding up employment over all firms and
subtracting the resulting expression from total labor endowment. This gives uL = L−
∫ 1
0 nl(z)dz,
where u denotes the unemployment rate. Substituting for l(z) from (3.11), we thus obtain
uL = L−
n2 (aµ1 − w¯µ2)
b(n+ 1)2
, (3.13)
with
µ1 =
∫ 1
0
α(z)dz, µ2 =
∫ 1
0
α(z)2dz (3.14)
being the first and (uncentred) second moments of the technology distribution. From (3.13),
we can deduce that total employment (1 − u)L is independent of labor supply, implying that
aggregate unemployment uL increases one-for-one with L. Provided that L is sufficiently large,
labor supply is thus a non-binding constraint in our setting. This is in line with Brecher’s (1974)
model on minimum wages in a traditional trade framework, and it is the case we are focussing
on in the subsequent analysis. As noted in the last subsection, higher unemployment benefits
lead to higher wage claims and to lower employment at the firm level. From (3.13), we see that
this effect translates into lower aggregate labor demand and thus higher unemployment. This
is intuitive and well in line with the existing literature on labor unions in general equilibrium
models (see, for instance, Layard and Nickell, 1990).
A further aggregate variable of interest is welfare, which in a model with a representative
consumer can be expressed by this consumer’s indirect utility. Recollecting λ = 1 and ignoring
costants, welfare can be written as U˜ = −µp2. In view of (3.12), we obtain:
U˜ = −
∫ 1
0
[
(2n+ 1)a+ n2α(z)w¯
(n+ 1)2
]2
dz. (3.15)
It is immediate that U˜ depends negatively on unemployment benefits w¯. However, as pointed out
by a referee, one needs to be careful when discussing the welfare effects of changes in unemploy-
ment compensation in a model that lacks the main reason for introducing such a compensation:
a public insurance against the income loss when getting unemployed in a world with risk averse
agents.
The final aggregate variable of interest is income inequality which allows us to assess how the
rents of production are distributed between firm owners and workers as well as within these two
12While a change in the income tax per se does not have a direct effect on aggregate welfare, it of course alters
individual welfare, which depends on the net income of the respective agent. For that reason and in view of
the fact that there is a continuum of income groups in our setting, it is cumbersome to determine individual
welfare changes in the comparative-static experiments studied below. We therefore infer insights upon how
agents from different income groups are affected in our comparative-static experiments from looking at the
relative change in these agents’ income, instead of comparing their welfare levels. This has the advantage of
easier analytical tractability and, in addition, allows us to compare the results from our analysis with findings
from other theoretical or empirical work on the matter. In particular, empirical studies provide evidence on
the evolution of income inequality, while, lacking detailed information on preferences, they do not offer insights
on how the welfare of individual agents adjusts over time. On the other hand, by focussing on relative income
changes, we cannot determine whether aggregate welfare increases are associated with gains of all agents or
involve losses of a subgroup of them. This should be kept in mind, when interpreting our results.
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groups of agents from an economy-wide point of view. Thereby, we have to be careful when
deciding upon how to measure inequality. Due to our choice of numéraire, it is not meaningful to
study absolute differences in income levels, as they only allow insights into real income inequality
at the margin – without direct implications for utility (see Neary, 2009). However, we can look
at relative income measures, as they do not depend on the choice of numéraire and have the
additional attractive feature of being unaffected by changes in the proportional income tax. Put
differently, looking at changes in the relative return of certain income groups provides insights on
how these groups’ real income has changed in relative terms, despite choosing utility as numéraire
in our analysis.
To get an idea about how production rents are distributed between firm owners and workers,
we can look at the ratio of average profits to average wages, which is given by
ξ =
n2
b(n+ 1)3
[
a2 − 2aw¯µ1 + w¯
2µ2
]
[aµ1 − w¯µ2]
a2 + (n− 1)aw¯µ1 − nw¯2µ2
. (3.16)
This ratio approaches zero if firms have no market power, i.e. in the limiting case of n →
∞. With perfect competition firms make zero profits, while the common wage rate equals the
unemployment compensation, w¯. Otherwise, ξ is strictly positive and it may exceed one if both
the unemployment compensation and the number of competitors are not too high. This is the
empirically relevant case and the one we are focussing on in the subsequent analysis. A higher
w¯ raises union wage claims and lowers profits, implying that the profit-wage ratio in (3.16) falls
if unemployment compensation becomes more generous.
For a comprehensive picture of income inequality, we additionally account for the cross-sectoral
distribution of profits and the personal income distribution of workers, as two measures of intra-
group income inequality. With a continuous distribution of profit and wage income, it is a
necessary first step to find an adequate summary statistics. The two most commonly used
metrics in this respect are the Gini index and the Theil index. Both of these indices share
one important property: they are based on the Lorenz curve. Hence, instead of choosing one
particular index, we can directly look at the Lorenz curve in the subsequent analysis.13
We start with analyzing the Lorenz curve for profit income, which is given by
J(z¯) ≡
a2z¯ − 2aw¯
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)dz + w¯
2
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)
2dz
a2 − 2aw¯µ1 + w¯2µ2
(3.17)
and depicted in Figure 3.1. It ranks sectors according to their profit income and measures the
share of profits that is attributable to industries z ≥ 1 − z¯, which are the z¯ industries with
the lowest rank in the profit distribution. A higher w¯ lowers J(z¯) for any given z¯ ∈ (0, 1), and
thus raises cross-sectoral profit inequality. Higher unemployment benefits induce higher wage
claims, according to (3.9), which reduces profits in any sector. However, with firms differing in
productivity, the negative profit effect is not equally strong in all industries. As outlined above,
unemployment benefits lead to wage compression, so that the increase in union wage claims as
well as the decline in profits are more pronounced in industries with low productivity, i.e. a high
α(z). This makes the cross-sectoral profit distribution more unequal.
13Details on how the inequality measures in this subsection are determined and a formal discussion of their
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Figure 3.1: The Lorenz curve for profit income
The Lorenz curve for wage income is slightly more complicated than the one for profit income
and characterized by the following two equations:
L(z¯) ≡
a2z¯ + (n− 1)aw¯
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)dz − nw¯
2
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)
2dz
a2 + (n− 1)aw¯µ1 − nw¯2µ2
(3.18)
and
ρ(z¯) ≡
a
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)dz − w¯
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)
2dz
aµ1 − w¯µ2
, (3.19)
where the former equation determines the share of wage income that accrues to workers in
industries z ≥ 1 − z¯, while the latter equation determines the share of production workers
employed in industries z ≥ 1 − z¯: ρ¯ ≡ ρ(z¯). Substituting ρ−1(ρ¯) from (3.19) for z¯ in (3.18),
gives the Lorenz curve for labor income M(ρ¯) ≡ L(z¯(ρ¯)), which is depicted in Figure 3.2. If
firms differ in their productivity level, the existence of labor unions leads to cross-sectoral wage
inequality among ex ante identical workers. In this case, unemployment compensation becomes
a crucial determinant of the wage distribution and an increase in w¯ affects the Lorenz curve
through two different channels of influence. On the one hand, higher unemployment benefits
lead to higher wage payments in all sectors, with the respective increase being more pronounced
in less productive industries (see Eqs. (3.9) and (3.10)). This lowers the cross-sectoral wage
differential, and hence renders the wage distribution more equal. On the other hand, the higher
labor costs lead to a decline of employment in all sectors, with the relative employment between
two industries increasing in favor of the more productive one. This increases the cross-sectoral
wage inequality ceteris paribus. Unfortunately, we are not able to determine the total impact
of a higher w¯ on the distribution of wage income for arbitrary levels of unemployment benefits.
However, in the appendix we show that slightly increasing a small w¯ unambiguously lowers wage
properties are deferred to the appendix.
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income inequality.14 This completes our discussion of the closed economy.
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Figure 3.2: The Lorenz curve for wage income
3.4 Trade between two fully symmetric countries
In this section, we consider trade between two countries, whose economies are as described
in Section 3.2. We abstract from any trade impediments and assume that goods markets are
fully integrated, while labor markets remain internationally segmented and workers are immobile
between countries. Furthermore, we assume that the two countries under consideration are fully
symmetric in all respects and defer a discussion of country asymmetries to Section 3.5.
In the open economy, aggregate demand for output of sector z can be determined by maxi-
mizing utility of the representative world consumer subject to his/her budget constraint. This
gives inverse demand for good z:
p(z) =
1
λ
[
a−
b
2
x(z)
]
, (3.3′)
where x(z) now refers to global consumption of good z. Comparing the latter with (3.3), we
see that consumer demand is more elastic in the open economy than under autarky. With this
insight at hand, we can now study the open economy equilibrium. Again, we start our analysis
with the characterization of firm- and industry-level variables and compare our findings for the
trade regime with the respective results under autarky.
14In order to see whether this result holds more generally, we have conducted a set of numerical simulation
exercises for different specifications of α(z), including α(z) = ez and α(z) = 1 + zγ , γ ∈ {0.5, 1, 2}. These
simulation exercises indicate that, at least for the considered specifications, the inequality reducing effect of
an increase in w¯ extends to larger levels of unemployment benefits.
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3.4.1 Firm-level and industry-level variables in the open economy
Solving the maximization problem of firm-level unions gives wage rate
wt(z) =
a+ 2nα(z)w¯
α(z)(2n+ 1)
. (3.9′)
Comparing (3.9′) with (3.9), it is immediate that wt(z) < wa(z), where superscripts t and a are
introduced in order to distinguish between trade and autarky variables, respectively. There are
three effects that can be distinguished. First, the number of competitors as well as the mass of
consumers doubles when a country starts trading with a symmetric partner economy. In line with
textbook oligopoly models, we can thus conclude that for given wages the opening up to trade
leads to higher output and higher labor demand at the firm level. All other things equal, this
provides an incentive for unions to set higher wages. Second, the increased competition in the
goods market lowers profits, and hence wage claims of unions by means of a standard rent-sharing
argument. Third, labor demand is more elastic in the open economy. This affects the trade-off
between higher wages and higher employment in union objective (3.7) and implies that a given
increase in union wage claims causes a stronger negative employment effect than in the closed
economy. All other things equal, this reduces the incentives of unions to set excessive wages.
In sum, the latter two effects dominate the former one, so that trade liberalization disciplines
unions and leads to more moderate wage setting. However, this does not mean that unionized
workers are worse off in the open economy. On the one hand, w(z) measures real wages at the
margin (see Neary, 2009), so that changes in these wages do not have direct welfare implications.
On the other hand, w(z) refers to pre-tax wages, so that a decline in w(z) does not account
for endogenous adjustments in the income tax rate, which gives rise to a general equilibrium
feedback on net labor income in our model.
For both of these reasons, it is not meaningful to put too much emphasis on changes in levels,
but rather one should infer insights on how trade affects union wage setting from changes in wage
ratios. In this respect, we can note that the strength of the wage dampening effect is industry-
specific and depends on the prevailing productivity level. For instance, the wage differential
between two industries z1 and z2, with α(z1) > α(z2) is given by
ωt21 =
α(z1) [a+ 2nα(z2)w¯]
α(z2) [a+ 2nα(z1)w¯]
(3.10′)
in the open economy. Comparing the latter with the respective ratio in the closed economy, we
get ωt21 < ω
a
21, implying that the cross-sectoral wage differential shrinks if an economy opens
up to trade. This is intuitive, as the existence of unemployment compensation causes wage
compression, so that the decline in wages due to the opening up to trade is less pronounced in
industries with low productivity. To substantiate this argument, it is worth noting that, in view
of (3.10) and (3.10′), ωt21 = ω
a
21 = α(z2)/α(z1) holds in the borderline case of w¯ = 0. From
this, we can deduce that the social security system does not only determine the extent of income
inequality but also affects the way in which relative factor returns respond to international trade.
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Regarding output and employment in the open economy, we can calculate
yt(z) =
4n[a− α(z)w¯]
b(2n+ 1)2
, lt(z) ≡
4nα(z)[a− α(z)w¯]
b(2n+ 1)2
. (3.11′)
On the one hand, firms expand activity at given wages and, on the other hand, wages decline.
Since both effects go into the same direction, it is immediate that firms operate at a larger scale
in the open economy. Substituting x(z) = 2nyt(z) from (3.11′) in (3.3′), we can conclude that
the price in the open economy is given by
pt(z) =
(4n+ 1)a+ 4n2α(z)w¯
(2n+ 1)2
(3.12′)
and lower than under autarky. This confirms the key finding of Brander (1981) that trade
exhibits a pro-competitive effect if an oligopolistic structure with firms competing in quantities
prevails in the product market.
In a final step, we investigate the impact of trade on profit income. While changes in income
levels per se do not exert direct welfare implications (see above), the comparison of (pre-tax)
profits in autarky and free trade is still instructive as it highlights one important channel through
which trade can alter the distribution of income in our setting. To be more specific, we will
see in the next section that changes in profit income and changes in union wage-setting fully
characterize the impact of trade on the profit-wage ratio. With linear demand, firm-level profits
are proportional to the square of output, implying πa(z) = b [ya(z)]2 and πt(z) = (b/2)
[
yt(z)
]2
for the closed and the open economy, respectively. Substituting the output levels from (3.11)
and (3.11′), the following result is immediate. Firm-level profits are higher in the free trade
equilibrium than under autarky if the number of competitors is sufficiently small.15 There are
two counteracting effects at work. On the one hand, there is stronger competition in the open
economy, implying that firm-level profits shrink. For given wages, this effect is counteracted
but not dominated by the increase in the number of consumers. On the other hand, unions
set lower wages in the open economy, thereby providing an additional source for profit gains.
It turns out that the second effect is stronger than the first one if the market power of firms
is sufficiently large. Since the number of local producers stays constant in either economy, the
respective firm-level profit effects translate one-to-one into industry-level profit effects.
3.4.2 Aggregate variables in the open economy
In this subsection, we close the general equilibrium model and characterize aggregate variables
in the open economy. Thereby, we focus on unemployment, welfare and the three measures of
inequality, while leaving a detailed discussion on the income tax rate open to the interested
reader. The unemployment rate, is determined in analogy to the closed economy and, using lt(z)
15Note first that pit(z) >,=, < pia(z) is equivalent to 8/(2n+1)4 >,=, < 1/(n+1)4, according to (3.11), (3.11′) and
the respective expressions for firm level profits under autarky and free trade. Noting that 8(n+1)4/(2n+1)4 = 1
has a unique solution in R+ at n¯ ≈ 2.14261, with 8(n + 1)4/(2n + 1)4 >,=, < 1 if n¯ >,=, < n, confirms the
respective result in the text. Restricting n to integer values, we can thus conclude that firm owners are better
off in the free trade equilibrium if either a monopolistic (n = 1) or a duopolistic (n = 2) market structure
prevails in the autarky equilibrium. This result is akin to findings by Huizinga (1993) and Naylor (2002).
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from (3.11′) instead of la(z) from (3.11), it can be expressed as
utL = L−
4n2 [aµ1 − w¯µ2]
b(2n+ 1)2
. (3.13′)
Intuitively, due to a positive employment stimulus at the firm level, the unemployment rate
is lower under free trade than under autarky. This is in line with empirical evidence from
cross-country studies (see Dutt, Mitra, and Ranjan, 2009; Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer,
2011b) but differs from recent theoretical insights from the heterogeneous firms literature. This
literature emphasizes the selection effects of trade, which imply that those firms with the lowest
productivity level leave the market while the most productive producers expand production and
start exporting. In a model with labor market imperfection, this generates two counteracting
effects on total employment. And total employment may actually shrink in response to trade
with a fully symmetric trading partner, if the employment stimulus from exporting is dominated
by the employment drop due to firm exit (see Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009). In our model,
firms in a particular industry are homogeneous and all producers expand their production when
a country moves from autarky to free trade with a fully symmetric trading partner, because
access to international trade exerts a pro-competitive effect which lowers union wage claims and
raises firm-level employment.
Changes in aggregate employment and output also exhibit an impact on welfare. Noting from
above that welfare is measured by the representative consumer’s indirect utility, U˜ = −µp2, we
obtain
U˜ t = −
∫ 1
0
[
(4n+ 1)a+ 4n2α(z)w¯
(2n+ 1)2
]2
dz (3.15′)
according to (3.12′). Comparing U˜ t and U˜a, proves existence of gains from trade due to a fall
in consumer prices, i.e. pt(z) < pa(z) ∀z. While this result is well in line with the positive
welfare effects in Neary (2009), there remains a crucial difference between the mechanisms at
work. With perfect labor markets, there are no gains from trade if (i) the two economies are
identical in all respects and (ii) all industries utilize the same production technology. In such
a featureless economy, international trade stimulates competition in the product market and,
thus, shifts income from firm owners to workers, while it leaves aggregate output and welfare
unaffected. In our framework, opening up to trade lowers union wage claims, and hence reduces
involuntary unemployment. This increases output and lowers consumer prices, thereby providing
a welfare stimulus even if all domestic and foreign industries make use of the same production
technology.16
We summarize our findings upon the employment and welfare effects of trade in the following
16The welfare effects in this paper also differ from those in Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009), who – similar to us –
consider union wage setting in a general oligopolistic equilibrium model. However, with unions being active only
in a subset of industries, all workers find a job, implying that, by construction, aggregate employment effects
cannot materialize in their setting. Nonetheless, there are gains from trade in the Bastos and Kreickemeier
(2009) framework, even if countries are identical and all industries use the same technology. The reason is
that if sectors differ in their labor market institutions, their wage costs and prices differ as well. In such a
setting, the opening up to trade reduces the wage premium in unionized industries, so that the variance of
consumer prices across sectors declines. This raises welfare even though aggregate output and employment
stay constant in the Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) framework.
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proposition
Proposition 1 A shift from autarky to free trade with a fully symmetric partner country stim-
ulates aggregate employment and welfare.
Of course, the insight that positive employment effects are an important channel through which
gains from trade can materialize is not entirely new. In particular, in a setting in which labor
market distortions are the only source of market imperfection, an employment stimulus brings
an economy closer to its production possibility frontier with positive consequences for efficiency
and welfare. This effect is well understood from the seminal work by Brecher (1974), and
the respective insight has been extended to models that feature monopolistic competition and
thus almost efficient product markets (see Matusz, 1996; Egger and Etzel, 2012a). However,
in a setting with an oligopolistic market structure and union wage setting, there exists a non-
trivial interplay of product and labor market imperfections, so that the welfare implications of
higher employment are not immediate. In this respect, our analysis provides the novel insight
that previous findings upon gains from trade due to an employment stimulus extend to general
oligopolistic equilibrium models with Cournot competition in the product market and union wage
setting in the labor market.
While a comparison of (3.15) and (3.15′) reveals that the economy as a whole is better off in
the open than the closed economy, this does not mean that all individuals equally benefit from a
movement towards free trade. In particular, trade changes rent sharing between firm owners and
workers and thus inter-group inequality. To determine this effect, we can look at the profit-wage
ratio, which in the open economy is given by
ξt =
8n2
b(2n+ 1)3
[
a2 − 2aw¯µ1 + w¯
2µ2
]
[aµ1 − w¯µ2]
a2 + (2n− 1)aw¯µ1 − 2nw¯2µ2
. (3.16′)
Comparing Eqs. (3.16) and (3.16′), we can conclude that inter-group inequality is larger in the
open than in the closed economy, i.e. ξt > ξa, if the number of competitors in either economy
is small. As formally shown in the appendix, n ≤ 2 is sufficient for an increase in inter-group
inequality after trade liberalization. This is intuitive, as we already know from Subsection 3.4.1
that the opening up to trade lowers real wages at the margin, while it raises real profits at
the margin if the market power of incumbent firms is large. On the contrary, if the number of
competitors is sufficiently high, not only profit income but also inter-group inequality is reduced
by a shift from autarky to free trade.
The following proposition summarizes our insights regarding the impact of trade on inter-group
inequality.
Proposition 2 A shift from autarky to trade with a fully symmetric partner country, does not
provide a clearcut effect on inter-group inequality between firm owners and production workers.
This effect depends on the market power of firms in the closed economy. If competition in the
closed economy is strong (weak), firm owners will lose (gain) relative to production workers when
a country opens up to trade.
To the extent that firm owners are better educated than production workers, the insights from
Proposition 2 contribute to the controversial debate upon the role of trade for explaining the
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surge in the US skill premium during the 1980s. Empirical evidence suggests that trade had
just a minor impact (see Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz and Murphy, 1992), and following
the reasoning from traditional theory this can be explained by the relatively small extent of
North-South trade in the respective period (Krugman, 2000). Our analysis offers an additional
explanation: in a setting with intra-industry trade between two advanced countries, the outcome
of rent-sharing between firm owners and workers may be biased towards the former group if
trade barriers are abolished, even though the respective trade cost reduction may exert just a
small stimulus on actual trade flows if the two countries are similar and the world market is
fully integrated ex post. Hence, it is not the observed pattern of trade that matters for the skill
premium, but rather the increase in competition when a country opens up for trade according
to our analysis.
In a final step of our analysis, we now look at the impact of trade on the distribution of income
within the group of firm owners and the group of production workers, respectively. As formally
shown in the appendix, access to trade does not affect the Lorenz curve for profit income.
To understand this invariance result, it is worth noting that with linear demand profits are
proportional to the square of output (or employment), and hence we can infer insights regarding
relative profit effects from insights upon relative employment effects. With respect to relative
employment across industries, we can distinguish two effects of trade. On the one hand, firms in
more productive industries produce at a less elastic segment of the labor demand curve than firms
in industries with a high α(z). This implies that a proportional reduction in wages induces a less
than proportional expansion of employment in industries with a small α(z). On the other hand,
wages fall more than proportionally in high-productivity industries, according to Eq. (3.10′).
This counteracts and exactly offsets the former effect, so that relative employment and output
levels remain unaffected when a country moves from autarky to free trade (see Eqs. (3.11) and
(3.11′)). However, with relative output remaining constant, relative profits do not change either,
and hence the cross-sectoral profit distribution under autarky must be equal to the respective
distribution under free trade.
Income inequality within the group of production workers is captured by the Lorenz curve
for labor income. To determine the respective curve in the open economy, we proceed as under
autarky and combine the Lorenz curve for cross-sectoral wage inequality, which is given by
Lt(z¯) ≡
a2z¯ + (2n− 1)aw¯
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)dz − 2nw¯
2
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)dz
a2 + (2n− 1)aw¯µ1 − 2nw¯2µ2
, (3.18′)
with the employment distribution across industries, which is characterized by the same ρ(z¯) as
in the closed economy, because – as noted above – relative employment between any two sectors
remains unaffected when a country opens up to trade. Intuitively, since relative employment of
any two industries stays constant, while the wage premium paid by more productive industries
shrinks, according to (3.10′), intra-group wage inequality must fall when two fully symmetric
countries move from autarky to free trade.
This concludes the formal discussion, and we summarize our insights regarding the impact of
trade on intra-group inequality in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 A shift from autarky to free trade with a fully symmetric partner country does not
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affect income inequality among firm owners, while it lowers income inequality among production
workers.
The results in Proposition 3 have to be interpreted with care. For instance, the finding that trade
does not affect the distribution of income within the group of firm owners crucially depends on the
proportional increase of firm-level output in all industries when a country moves from autarky
to free trade. This invariance result is therefore an immediate implication of our assumption
that the two countries are fully symmetric, which rules out a relocation of production across
industries. Once we allow for country asymmetry, trade will alter relative employment of firms
from different industries and thus the distribution of profit income. Whether this will lead to more
or less inequality is analyzed in the next section. Furthermore, the finding that trade renders
the distribution of labor income more equal should not be understood as a general claim that
trade reduces labor income inequality, since our model closes several important channels through
which trade can affect the distribution of wages. For instance, by assuming that all firms within
a particular industry are identical, we abstract from distributional effects that materialize due
to self-selection of just the best producers into export status (see Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009;
Egger and Meland, 2011; Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding, 2010) and thus ignore an important
mechanism through which trade can increase wage inequality. However, our analysis points out
that trade lowers the relevance of industry-specific factors for the remuneration of workers and
therefore adds a new facet to the discussion upon the distributional effects of trade – one that
seems to be well in line with the empirical observation that the role of industry-specific factors
for explaining individual wage income has continuously declined over the last few decades (see
Faggio, Salvanes, and Van Reenen, 2010), a period in which trade costs have fallen significantly.
3.5 Trade between two asymmetric countries
In the previous section, we have considered the impact of a country’s movement from autarky
to trade with a symmetric partner country on welfare, unemployment, and income distribution.
We now analyze whether the main results from this analysis extend to the case of asymmetric
economies. In principle, there can be many sources of asymmetry, and it is of course beyond the
scope of a single paper to study all of them. However, we can at least look at two specific forms
of asymmetry that feature prominently in the international economics literature, namely country
size and technology differences. From existing work on international trade between otherwise
identical economies, we have a presumption that the effects of trade are more pronounced in
smaller countries, as these countries ceteris paribus get access to a relatively larger market when
opening up for trade.17 In our model, a simple way to study the role of foreign market size for
the effects of trade liberalization, is by assuming that the economy under consideration opens
up for trade vis-á-vis k > 0 identical trading partners (see Eckel and Neary, 2010, for a similar
comparative static experiment). A small foreign market can then be associated with low levels
of k (for instance, k < 1), while a large foreign market can be associated with high levels of k
(for instance, k > 1). Insights upon the role of foreign market size can then be inferred from a
17Such an effect is, for instance, present in Krugman (1980), where consumers from smaller countries get access
to more imported varieties and thus benefit disproportionately from trade with a large economy.
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comparative-static analysis of changes in k. As shown in detail in a technical supplement, which
is available from the authors upon request, country size has the expected effects in our model:
The larger a country is relative to its trading partner, the smaller are the trade effects on the
variables of interest. However, pure size differences do not change the results from Section 3.4
in a qualitative way.18
A second form of asymmetry we are interested in are Ricardian technology differences. Since
such differences change some of our results in a qualitative and non-trivial way, it is worth dis-
cussing them in detail. To highlight the specific role of technology differences, we follow the
approach in Neary (2009) and keep the two countries identical with respect to their labor en-
dowments, L, the number of firms, n, and the first and (uncentred) second moments of their
technology distributions, µ1, µ2. While this makes countries symmetric in key aggregate vari-
ables, it still allows for differences between the two economies in the labor input coefficients of
at least some of their industries. To put it formally: Using an asterisk to refer to variables of the
foreign economy, we assume α(z) 6= α∗(z) for some z. With this asymmetry at hand, it is useful
to specify the (uncentred) covariance of input coefficients
γ ≡
∫ 1
0
α(z)α∗(z)dz. (3.20)
Using the standard property that µ2+ µ∗2 ≥ 2γ, we have µ2 ≥ γ, in view of our assumption that
µ2 = µ
∗
2, and we can thus define δ ≡ µ2−γ > 0 as a measure of technological dissimilarity or the
countries’ comparative advantage (see Neary, 2009).19 With the first and the second moment
of the technology distribution being identical in the two economies, countries have on average a
comparative advantage in those industries in which they have an absolute productivity advantage
over the trading partner. In this respect, our technology assumptions are more restrictive than
those imposed by Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977) in their seminal study on Ricardian
technology differences in a traditional trade model with a continuum of industries. On the other
hand, in view of the oligopolistic market structure, our model allows for co-existence of domestic
and foreign firms over a broad range of industries. And there is even full diversification in the
production of both economies if technology differences between the two countries are not too
large. This is the case we are focussing on throughout our analysis.
Finally, to fix ideas we think of the two countries as ones that possess a comparative ad-
vantage in their respective high-productivity industries, and we capture this idea by assuming
dα(z)/dz > 0, dα∗(z)/dz < 0. As will become clear below, this assumption does not influence
the impact of trade on welfare, employment, and the distribution of income between firm owners
and production workers, and it is therefore innocent in this respect. However, it implies that
workers move towards high productivity industries when production is relocated according to
the law of comparative advantage and therefore pre-determines to a certain extent the impact
18Of course, the effects of country size differences are not straightforward when considering inter-group inequality.
With the effect of trade on this inequality measure being not clearcut in the benchmark scenario of fully
symmetric countries, we cannot expect a clearcut result if countries differ in size. However, we can show that
a positive impact on the profit-wage ratio is more likely if a country opens up for trade with a smaller trading
partner.
19In the special case of α(z) = α∗(z) in all industries z, we have δ = 0 and the model degenerates to the benchmark
scenario of fully symmetric economies in Section 3.4.
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that technological dissimilarity exerts on the distribution of income within the groups of firm
owners and production workers. While being aware of these implications, we think that asso-
ciating industries in which a country possesses a comparative advantage, with industries that
have a relatively high labor productivity is a good point of departure for modeling technological
dissimilarity in our setting.
Equipped with these assumptions, we can now follow the analysis in Section 3.4 step by step
in order to calculate the main variables of interest. Instead of presenting all formal details
of this analysis, we focus on the main equations and discuss the consequences of allowing for
technological dissimilarity in an intuitive way, while readers who are interested in the formal
details of our analysis are referred to a technical supplement, which is available from the authors
upon request. As a first variable of interest, we can calculate the union wage rate
wt(z) =
(4n+ 1) [a+ 2nα(z)w¯] + 2n2 [α∗(z)− α(z)]
α(z)(2n+ 1)(4n+ 1)
. (3.9′′)
Comparing Eqs. (3.9′) and (3.9′′), we can conclude that union wages in industry z are higher
than in the benchmark model with identical countries if and only if labor productivity in this
industry is higher than in the foreign economy. The reason for this outcome is that domestic
firms have a larger market share if competing with less productive foreign producers and thus
will end up with higher profits, ceteris paribus. Since workers participate in this profit gain due
to union wage setting, it is clear that domestic wages in all industries with α∗(z) > α(z) increase
relative to the benchmark scenario in which all domestic and foreign firms of industry z share
the same productivity. Of course, the opposite reasoning applies to industries in which domestic
firms have a productivity disadvantage as compared to their foreign competitors, and, in view
of our assumptions regarding the ranking of α(z) and α∗(z) across industries, we can therefore
conclude that technological dissimilarity leads to a steeper wage profile across industries in our
setting. Similarly, the relocation of economic activity from industries with low productivity to
industries with high productivity lead to a steeper employment profile across industries, which
can be confirmed by comparing firm-level employment
lt(z) =
4nα(z)
{
(4n+ 1)[a− α(z)w¯] + 2n2w¯[α∗(z)− α(z)]
}
b(2n+ 1)2(4n+ 1)
(3.11′′)
with the respective expression in Eq. (3.11′).
With these firm-level effects at hand, we can now look at the impact of technological dissimi-
larity on aggregate economic variables. The first of these variables is involuntary unemployment,
which is now determined by
utL = L−
4n2
[
(4n+ 1) (aµ1 − µ2w¯)− 2n
2δw¯
]
b(2n+ 1)2(4n+ 1)
. (3.13′′)
As pointed out above, technological dissimilarity of the two countries induces a relocation of
employment according to the law of comparative advantage, and this effect turns out to be
instrumental for a negative aggregate employment effect, as can be formally confirmed by com-
paring Eqs. (3.13′) and (3.13′′). To understand this result, it is worth noting that a higher δ
45
3 The Impact of Trade on Employment, Welfare, and Income Distribution in UGOLE
raises profits in export-oriented industries and lowers profits in import-competing ones. Unions
respond to these profit changes by raising their wage claims in the former and reducing them
in the latter industries. However, the reduction of wage claims in import-competing industries
is mitigated by the common unemployment benefit, implying that the labor market distortion
becomes more pronounced if δ increases. We can also show that the employment-reducing effect
of technological dissimilarity can in principle be strong enough to entirely eliminate the posi-
tive employment stimulus from a country’s opening up to trade with a fully symmetric trading
partner. Put differently, the finding of ut < ua does not extend to arbitrarily high levels of δ.
Hence, the model with technological dissimilarities seems better suited for capturing the concern
of workers in industrialized countries that globalization increases the risk of job loss.
Welfare in the open economy is now given by
U˜ t = −
∫ 1
0
[
(4n+ 1)a+ 2n2w¯[α(z) + α∗(z)]
(2n+ 1)2
]2
dz, (3.15′′)
and solving Eqs. (3.15′) and (3.15′′), we can show that technological dissimilarity increases welfare
by U t
∣∣
δ>0
− U t
∣∣
δ=0
= 8n4w¯2δ/(2n + 1)4 > 0. This implies that gains from trade are further
increased when countries (partially) specialize their production pattern according to the law of
comparative advantage, which is well in line with insights from traditional trade models that
have pointed to the gains from comparative advantage as the main channel through which a
country benefits from opening up to trade.
The following proposition summarizes the main insights regarding the role of technological
dissimilarity for the impact of trade on welfare and employment.
Proposition 4 Technological dissimilarity that is sufficiently small to leave both countries’ pro-
duction patterns fully diversified in the open economy increases the gains from trade and lowers
the employment stimulus from trade relative to the benchmark scenario with two fully symmetric
countries. Negative employment effects of trade cannot be ruled out for high levels of technological
dissimilarity.
To determine how technological dissimilarity affects the distribution of economic rents between
firm owners and production workers, we can compare the profit-wage ratio for this scenario with
the one from the benchmark case of fully symmetric countries.20 This comparison does not
provide a clearcut ranking of ξt
∣∣
δ>0
and ξt
∣∣
δ=0
, because there are two counteracting effects of
a higher degree of technological dissimilarity on the profit-wage ratio. On the one hand, higher
levels of δ lead to a shift of economic activity from industries with relatively low profit margins to
industries with relatively high ones, thereby triggering an increase in the average return to firm
owners. On the other hand, wages are linked to profits by a rent-sharing mechanism, so that the
average return to production workers also increases in response to a higher δ-level. Since it is in
general not clear which of these two effects dominates, we can conclude that the total impact of
a higher δ on ξt is ambiguous. Together with the insights from Section 3.4 regarding the impact
of trade on the profit-wage ratio in the benchmark scenario with symmetric countries, we can
20Since the solutions for the three distributional measures give lengthy and complicated expressions, we decided
against presenting them in the main text, and refer the interested reader to the technical supplement mentioned
above.
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therefore conclude that trade does not exert a clearcut effect on inter-group inequality, with the
respective outcome crucially depending on the market power of incumbent producers and the
degree of technological dissimilarity between the two economies.
To get insights on how a positive level of δ affects income inequality among firm owners, we
can note from above that technological dissimilarity leads to a shift of economic activity towards
sectors in which firms have a higher profit margin. As formally shown in the technical supplement
to the analysis in this section, this induces an increase in profit income inequality as captured
by Jt(z¯)
∣∣
δ=0
> Jt(z¯)
∣∣
δ>0
for any possible z¯ ∈ (0, 1). Combining this insight with the finding
from Section 3.4 that trade does not alter profit income inequality if the two countries are fully
symmetric, we can conclude that the invariance is just a knife-edge result that changes if one
accounts for technological dissimilarity of countries. In the latter case, we can expect trade
to render the distribution of profit income less equal, which implies a downward shift of the
respective Lorenz curve in Figure 3.1.
Regarding the impact of technological dissimilarity on the distribution of wage income, we
can distinguish two effects. On the one hand, technological dissimilarity induces a relocation
of workers towards high-wage industries, which lowers inequality ceteris paribus. This effect is
captured by ρt(z¯)
∣∣
δ>0
< ρt(z¯)
∣∣
δ=0
. On the other hand, a larger share of labor income is realized
in high-wage industries if countries differ in their technology, and this raises income inequality
for a given allocation of workers. This effect is captured by Lt(z¯)
∣∣
δ>0
< Lt(z¯)
∣∣
δ=0
. Since the
two effects counteract, we are not able to rank the Lorenz curve in the benchmark scenario
and the one for technologically dissimilar countries, without imposing additional assumptions
regarding the α(z) profile across industries. Furthermore, we have found a numerical example
where opening up for trade between two technologically dissimilar countries does not lower labor
income inequality according to the Lorenz criterion. Hence, there must be a counteracting effect
on labor income inequality, which is not present when trade occurs between two fully symmetric
countries, and we can expect that this counteracting effect, if it exists, is the stronger, the higher
is δ. We therefore should be warned against simply transferring the results from Section 3.4
regarding the impact of trade on intra-group wage inequality to a North-South context, where
technological dissimilarities can be substantial.
We summarize the main insights upon the consequences of technological dissimilarity for the
distributional effects of trade in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Technological dissimilarity that is sufficiently small to leave both countries’ pro-
duction patterns fully diversified in the open economy increases profit income inequality relative
to the benchmark scenario with two fully symmetric countries, provided that the two countries
relocate production towards their high-productivity industries in the open economy. The impact
of technological dissimilarity on the two other measures of income inequality are not clearcut in
general.
While technological dissimilarity does not change the distributional effects of trade in a clearcut
way, there is still an important lesson to learn from our analysis above. By changing the way rents
are shared between firm owners and workers, trade uncouples the distribution of profit income
from the distribution of labor income and may thus trigger different distributional consequences
for these two income groups. For instance, it is possible that trade raises inequality between firm
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owners, while, at the same time, it reduces inequality among production workers. The possibility
of such differential effects must be taken into account by future empirical research that aims at
estimating the impact of trade on intra-group inequality.
3.6 Concluding remarks
This paper presents a general oligopolistic equilibrium model with a unit mass of heterogeneous
industries, a small number of identical quantity-setting firms in either sector and imperfect labor
markets due to the existence of firm-level unions. In this framework, we investigate how a
movement from autarky to free trade with a fully symmetric partner country affects the product
and labor market outcome. In particular, we show that trade lowers the scope of unions for
excessive wage claims, while firms increase their output levels in the open economy. Beyond
that, we analyze how these adjustments at the firm level affect aggregate variables in the general
equilibrium. Thereby, we show that an opening up to trade, by lowering union wage claims,
raises economy-wide employment and welfare. Aside from this positive efficiency effect, access to
international trade reduces income inequality among production workers, while it leaves income
inequality among firm owners unaffected. Finally, the impact of trade on inter-group inequality
between firm owners and production workers is not clearcut in general. On the one hand, product
market competition is stimulated, while, on the other hand, unions lower their wage claims in
the open economy. Which of these two counteracting effects dominates depends on the degree of
product market competition. More specifically, we show that inter-group inequality increases in
response to trade liberalization if not more than two domestic firms are active in either industry.
In order to see to what extent the results from our analysis hinge on the assumption of two
fully symmetric trading partners, we consider two forms of country asymmetries in an extension
to our benchmark model. As a first source of asymmetry, we consider country size differences.
In this respect, our model leads to the expected result that a smaller economy experiences
larger effects from trade, as it gets access to a larger foreign market than an otherwise identical
economy of larger size. However, pure country size differences do not affect the main results
from our analysis in a qualitative way. As a second source of asymmetry, we consider Ricardian
technology differences between the two trading partners, and we show that these differences
may affect the results from our analysis in a qualitative way. To be more specific, by relocating
production according to the law of comparative advantage, technologically dissimilar economies
face an additional channel through which gains from trade materialize, implying that the welfare
stimulus of trade identified in the setting with fully symmetric trading partners is reinforced
if countries differ in their technology. However, the relocation of economic activity towards a
country’s comparative advantage industries lowers aggregate employment and this effect may
be sufficiently strong to induce a total negative employment effect of trade if the technological
dissimilarity is sufficiently pronounced. Finally, if countries relocate production towards their
high-productivity industries, technological dissimilarity fosters income inequality among firm
owners, while its impact on inter-group inequality between firm owners and workers and intra-
group inequality among production workers turns out to be not clearcut in general. However,
the distributional effects of trade between two technologically dissimilar countries indicate that
trade uncouples the distribution of profits from the distribution of wages even though union wage
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setting leads to rent sharing in our setting.
In the working paper version of this manuscript, we have extended the benchmark model
in two further dimensions in order to check robustness of our results. In a first extension, we
have given up the assumption of constant unemployment benefits and considered benefits that are
proportional to the average wage rate as an alternative compensation scheme and, in a second one,
we have looked at industry-level instead firm-level unions. Since these modifications do not affect
the main results from our analysis in a significant way, we decided against presenting them in this
paper. Another possible extension that may be worthwhile to consider in future research is the
analysis of marginal trade liberalization. While there are of course different possibilities to model
partial trade liberalization in our setting, assuming that just a subset of industries opens up for
free trade would be a particularly attractive option from the perspective of analytical tractability.
In a benchmark model without productivity differences across industries, it is immediate that
profit and wage inequality vanish in the closed as well as the open economy with full trade
liberalization. However, there is inequality in both of these dimensions for intermediate levels of
trade liberalization, implying that an increase in the share of open sectors exerts a non-monotonic
impact on intra-group inequality in this baseline scenario. Things are more complicated in a
sophisticated model variant that allows for productivity differences across industries. In this case,
the impact of marginal trade liberalization crucially depends on which sectors are newly exposed
to international trade and no general result can be derived without an additional assumption
regarding the sector ranking in the time line of globalization. Deriving more detailed results in
this respect as well as extending the model in other possible directions is beyond the scope of
this paper but may be a worthwhile task for future research.
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3.7 Appendix
Derivation details for Eq. (3.8)
Maximizing the profits in (3.6) for output yj gives the first-order condition
∂πj
∂yj
= a− b
n∑
i 6=j
yi − cj(z)− 2byj = 0. (3.21)
Solving for yj , we further obtain the best response function of firm j to output decisions of all
other producers:
yj =
a− b
∑
i 6=j yi − cj(z)
2b
. (3.22)
In a similar vein, we can determine the the best response function of firm k 6= j:
yk =
a− b
∑
i 6=k yi − ck(z)
2b
. (3.23)
Now, if firm j rationally anticipates that all competitors within its industry face the same costs
and thus set identical output levels, i.e. ci(z) = ck(z) and yi = yk for all i 6= j, we can rewrite
(3.22) and (3.23) in the following way: 2byj = a− b(n− 1)yi − cj(z) and bnyi = a− byj − ci(z).
Combining the latter two, accounting for cj(z) = αj(z)wj , ci(z) = αi(z)wi, and solving the
resulting expression for yj gives the output in (3.8). Furthermore, accounting for lj = aj(z)yj
gives the respective employment level.
Derivation details for Eq. (3.9)
Substituting lj from (3.8) into (3.7) and maximizing the resulting expression for wj gives the
first-order condition for union wage-setting:
dVj
dwj
=
α(z) [a+ (n− 1)α(z)wi − nα(z)wj ]
b(n+ 1)
−
nα(z)2(wj − w¯)
b(n+ 1)
= 0, (3.24)
which can be simplified to a+ (n− 1)α(z)wi − 2nα(z)wj + nα(z)w¯ = 0. Since the wage-setting
problem is the same for all firm-level unions, we can now set wj = wi and solve the latter equation
for the union wage. This gives the respective expression in (3.9).
Derivation details for Eq. (3.16)
Substituting yj = y(z) from (3.11) into (3.6) and accounting for cj(z) = α(z)w(z), with w(z)
being given by (3.9), we obtain πj = b[y(z)]2 ≡ π(z), or, equivalently,
π(z) =
n2 [a− α(z)w¯]
(n+ 1)4
. (3.25)
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Adding π(z) over all industries we get economy-wide average profits per firm
π˜ =
n2
[
a2 − 2aw¯µ1 + w¯
2µ2
]
b(n+ 1)4
. (3.26)
Furthermore, multiplying w(z) and nl(z) gives the total wage bill of industry z:
W (z) =
n2
[
a2 + (n− 1)aw¯α(z)− nw¯2α(z)2
]
b(n+ 1)3
, (3.27)
according to (3.9) and (3.11). Adding W (z) over all industries and dividing the resulting expres-
sion by (1− u)L, gives the average wage income of production workers
w˜ =
[
a2 + (n− 1)aw¯µ1 − nw¯
2µ2
]
(n+ 1) [aµ1 − w¯µ2]
, (3.28)
Dividing (3.26) by (3.28) gives ξ ≡ π˜/w˜ in (3.16).
The Lorenz curve for profit income in the closed economy: J(z¯)
To determine the Lorenz curve for profit income, we first calculate aggregate profit income
accruing to firms with a labor input coefficient higher than or equal to firms in industry 1 − z¯.
Substituting y(z) from (3.8) in π(z) = by(z)2, it is immediate that total profits in industry z,
Π(z) ≡ nπ(z), are given by
Π(z) =
n3 [a− α(z)w¯]2
b(n+ 1)4
. (3.29)
Adding up Π(z) over all industries z ≥ 1− z¯ gives
Π¯(z¯) =
∫ 1
1−z¯
Π(z)
=
n3
[
a2z¯ − 2aw¯
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)dz + w¯
2
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)
2dz
]
b(n+ 1)4
, (3.30)
with Π = Π¯(1) denoting economy-wide profit income. Since the number of firms is the same in
all industries, 1 − z¯ denotes the fraction of firms with profits lower than π(1 − z¯). Hence, the
Lorenz curve for profit income is given by J(z¯) = Π¯(z¯)/Π, which can be reformulated to (3.17).
Differentiating J(z¯) and defining α¯ ≡ α(1− z¯), gives
dJ(z¯)
dz¯
=
a2 − 2aw¯α¯+ w¯2α¯2
a2 − 2aw¯µ1 + w¯2µ2
> 0,
d2J(z¯)
dz¯2
= −
2w¯[a− α¯w¯]
a2 − 2aw¯µ1 + w¯2µ2
×
dα(1− z¯)
dz¯
> 0,
(3.31)
which proves that the Lorenz curve J(z¯) has the standard properties: It is positively sloped and
convex (in z¯).
To determine the impact of an increase in unemployment compensation w¯ on J(z¯), we differ-
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entiate dJ(z¯)/dz¯ with respect to w¯. This gives
d2J(z¯)
dz¯dw¯
= −2
(
aα¯− α¯2w¯
) (
a2 − 2aw¯µ1 + w¯
2µ2
)
− (aµ1 − w¯µ2)
(
a2 − 2aw¯α¯+ w¯2α¯2
)
[a2 − 2aw¯µ1 + w¯2µ2]
2 ,
which can be further simplified to
d2J(z¯)
dz¯dw¯
= −
2aα¯ (a− w¯α¯)
[a2 − 2aw¯µ1 + w¯2µ2]
2G(α¯), (3.32)
with
G(α¯) ≡ a
(
1−
µ1
α¯
)
− w¯α¯
(µ1
α¯
−
µ2
α¯
)
=
∫ 1
0
[a− w¯α(z)]
(
1−
α(z)
α¯
)
dz. (3.33)
From this, we can conclude that d2J(z¯)/dz¯dw¯ >,=, < 0 if 0 >,=, < G(α¯). Notably, G(α¯) > 0 if
α¯ = α(1) or, equivalently z¯ = 0, while G(α¯) < 0 if α¯ = α(0), or equivalently z¯ = 1. Furthermore,
from differentiating (3.33) we can deduce that G′(α¯) > 0, and hence G′(α¯) × dα¯/dz¯ < 0. This
however implies that G(α¯) = 0 has a unique solution in z¯ ∈ (0, 1), which we denote by z¯∗.
As a consequence, G(α¯) > 0 and thus d2J(z¯)/dz¯dw¯ < 0 if z¯ < z¯∗, while G(α¯) < 0 and thus
d2J(z¯)/dz¯dw¯ > 0 if z¯ > z¯∗. From this we can deduce that the Lorenz curve for w¯1 lies below
the Lorenz curve for w¯0 if w¯1 > w¯0, implying that higher unemployment benefits make the profit
income distribution more unequal. This confirms the respective result in the text.
The Lorenz curve for wage income in the closed economy: M(ρ¯)
To determine the Lorenz curve for wage income, we need to combine two elements: the distribu-
tion of wage payments and the distribution of workers across industries. Starting with the first
element, we can note that total wage payments of industry z are given by W (z) ≡ nl(z)w(z). In
view of (3.9) and(3.11), this implies
W (z) =
n2
[
a2 + (n− 1)aα(z)w¯ − nα(z)2w¯2
]
b(n+ 1)3
(3.34)
Since industries are ranked according to their wages, with more productive industries paying
higher ones, we can conclude that the cumulative wage income of workers who are employed in
industries z ≥ 1− z¯, is given by
W¯ (z¯) ≡
∫ 1
1−z¯
W (z)dz
=
n2
[
a2z¯ + (n− 1)aw¯
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)dz − nw¯
2
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)
2dz
]
b(n+ 1)3
, (3.35)
with W = W¯ (1) denoting economy-wide labor income. The ratio of labor income accruing to
workers in industries z ≥ 1− z¯ is determined by L(z¯) ≡ W¯ (z¯)/W , which can be reformulated to
(3.18).
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The second element we need to determine is the distribution of workers across industries. Total
employment in industry z is given by L(z) ≡ nl(z). Substituting l(z) from (3.11), we obtain
L(z) ≡
n2α(z)[a− α(z)w¯]
b(n+ 1)2
(3.36)
Hence, cumulative employment in industries z ≥ 1− z¯ is given by
L¯(z¯) ≡
∫ 1
1−z¯
L(z¯)dz
=
n2
[
a
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)dz − w¯
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)
2dz
]
b(n+ 1)2
, (3.37)
with L(1) being equal to economy-wide employment
(1− u)L =
n2 [aµ1 − w¯µ2]
b(n+ 1)2
(3.38)
(see (3.13)). The ratio of workers who are employed in industries z ≥ 1− z¯ is then represented
by ρ(z¯) in (3.19). Denoting the function value of ρ(z¯) by ρ¯ and considering the inverse function
z¯ = ρ−1(ρ¯) in (3.18) – with the properties of this inverse function following from (3.19) – finally
gives the Lorenz curve for wage income M(ρ¯).
Differentiating M(ρ¯) yields
dM(ρ¯)
dρ¯
=
dL(z¯)
dz¯
×
dz¯
dρ¯
=
a2 + (n− 1)aα¯w¯ − nα¯2w¯2
a2 + (n− 1)aµ1w¯ − nµ2w¯2
×
aµ1 − w¯µ2
aα¯− w¯α¯2
, (3.39)
and
d2M(ρ¯)
dρ¯2
= −
[aµ1 − w¯µ2]
2 [aα¯2w¯2 + a2 (a− 2w¯α)]
[a2 + (n− 1)aw¯µ1 − nw¯2µ2]
2 [aα− w¯α¯2]3
×
dα¯
dz¯
, (3.40)
where α¯ = α(1 − z¯) has been considered. Noting dα¯/dz¯ < 0, the latter two equations confirm
that M(ρ¯) is a positively sloped and convex function of ρ¯.
To determine the impact of higher unemployment compensation on the distribution of labor
income, we differentiate dM(ρ¯)/dρ¯ with respect to w¯, which yields
d2M(ρ¯)
dρ¯dw¯
=
d2L(z¯)
dz¯dw¯
×
dz¯
dρ¯
+
dL(z¯)
dz¯
×
d2z¯
dρ¯dw¯
=
a2
[
(n− 1)a (α¯− µ1)− 2nw¯
(
α¯2 − µ2
)]
− nw¯2(n− 1)a
(
µ1α¯
2 − α¯µ2
)
[a2 + (n− 1)aµ1w¯ − nµ2w¯2]
2 ×
aµ1 − w¯µ2
aα¯− w¯α¯2
+
a2 + (n− 1)aα¯w¯ − nα¯2w¯2
a2 + (n− 1)aµ1w¯ − nµ2w¯2
×
aα¯ (µ1α¯− µ2)
[aα¯− w¯α¯2]2
.
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Evaluating the latter expression at w¯ = 0, we obtain
d2M(ρ¯)
dρ¯dw¯
∣∣∣∣
w¯=0
=
G˜(α¯)
aα¯
, (3.41)
with
G˜(α¯) ≡ nα¯µ1 − (n− 1)µ
2
1 − µ2
= α¯
∫ 1
0
[(n− 1)µ1 + α(z)]
(
1−
α(z)
α¯
)
dz. (3.42)
Notably, G˜(α¯) > 0 if α¯ = α(0), i.e. if z¯ = 1, while G˜(α¯) < 0 if α¯ = α(1), i.e. if z¯ = 0.
Furthermore, G˜′(α¯) > 0, and hence G˜′(α¯) × dα¯/dz¯ < 0. We can therefore safely conclude that
G˜(α¯) = 0 has a unique solution in z¯ ∈ (0, 1), which we denote by z¯∗∗. Then, d2M(ρ¯)/dρ¯dw¯
∣∣
w¯=0
>
0 if z¯ < z¯∗∗, while d2M(ρ¯)/dρ¯dw¯
∣∣
w¯=0
< 0 if z¯ > z¯∗∗. This however implies that increasing
unemployment benefits from zero to a small positive level lowers wage income inequality according
to the Lorenz curve criterion, thereby confirming the respective result in the main text.
Derivation details for Eq. (3.9′)
Firm j’s profits in the open economy are given by
πj =
[
a−
b
2
2n∑
i=1
yi − cj(z)
]
yj . (3.43)
Maximizing these profits for output yj gives the first-order condition
∂πj
∂yj
= a−
b
2
2n∑
i 6=j
yi − cj(z)− 2
b
2
yj = 0. (3.44)
Following the analysis for the closed economy step-by-step and noting that, in view of our
symmetry assumption, firm j foresees that all domestic and foreign competitors set the same
wage wi, we can explicitly solve for firm j’s profit-maximizing output level as a function of its
own and all other firms’ wages
yj =
2 [a+ (2n− 1)α(z)wi − 2nα(z)wj ]
b(2n+ 1)
. (3.45)
Noting that lj = α(z)yj , substituting the resulting expression into (3.7), and maximizing for
wj gives the first-order condition for union wage-setting:
dVj
dwj
=
2α(z) [a+ (2n− 1)α(z)wi − 2nα(z)wj ]
b(2n+ 1)
−
4nα(z)2(wj − w¯)
b(2n+ 1)
= 0, (3.46)
which can be simplified to a+(2n−1)α(z)wi−4nα(z)wj+2nα(z)w¯ = 0. Since the wage-setting
problem is the same for all firm-level unions, we can now set wj = wi and solve the latter equation
for the union wage in (3.9′).
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Derivation details for Eq. (3.16′)
Substituting yj = y(z) from (3.11′) into (3.43) and accounting for cj(z) = α(z)w(z), with w(z)
being given by (3.9′), we obtain πj = b[y(z)]2 ≡ π(z), or, equivalently,
πt(z) =
8n2 [a− α(z)w¯]
b(2n+ 1)4
. (3.47)
Adding π(z) over all industries we get economy-wide average profits per firm in the open economy
π˜t =
8n2
[
a2 − 2aw¯µ1 + w¯
2µ2
]
b(2n+ 1)4
. (3.48)
Furthermore, multiplying wt(z) and nlt(z) gives the total wage bill of industry z:
W t(z) =
4n2
[
a2 + (2n− 1)aα(z)w¯ − 2nα(z)2w¯2
]
b(2n+ 1)3
(3.49)
according to (3.9′) and (3.11′). Adding W t(z) over all industries and dividing the resulting
expression by (1− ut)L, gives the average wage income of production workers
w˜t =
[
a2 + (2n− 1)aw¯µ1 − nw¯
2µ2
]
(2n+ 1) [aµ1 − w¯µ2]
, (3.50)
Dividing (3.48) by (3.50) gives ξt in (3.16′).
A comparison of ξa and ξt
From a comparison of (3.16) and (3.16′), we can conclude that ξt >,=, < ξa is equivalent to
8
(2n+ 1)2 [a2 + (2n− 1)aw¯µ1 − 2nw¯2µ2]
>,=, <
1
(n+ 1)2 [a2 + (n− 1)aw¯µ1 − nw¯2µ2]
. (3.51)
Rearranging terms and defining
A(n) ≡
(
2n+ 2
2n+ 1
)3
, B(n) ≡
a2 + (2n− 1)aw¯µ1 − 2nw¯
2µ2
a2 + (n− 1)aw¯µ1 − nw¯2µ2
, (3.52)
we can further note that ξt >,=, < ξa is equivalent to A(n) >,=, < B(n). In order to determine
how the ranking of A(n) and B(n) depends on firm number n, we have to characterize the
properties of these two functions. Straightforward calculations give A(0) = 8, limn→∞A(n) = 1
and A′(n) < 0. Furthermore, we find B(0) = 1, limn→∞B(n) = 2 and B′(n) > 0. This
however implies that A(n) = B(n) has a unique solution in n, which we denote by n∗. Then,
A(n) > B(n) and thus ξt > ξa if n < n∗, whereas A(n) < B(n) and thus ξt < ξa if n > n∗.
To confine the possible values of n∗, we can can evaluate A(n) and B(n) at n = 2. This yields
A(2) = 216/125 = 1.728 and
B(2) =
a2 + 3aw¯µ1 − 4w¯
2µ2
a2 + aw¯µ1 − 2w¯2µ2
, (3.53)
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respectively. Rearranging terms, we find that A(2) >,=, < B(2) is equivalent to
0, 728a (a− w¯µ1) >,=, < 0, 544w¯µ1
(
a− w¯
µ2
µ1
)
. (3.54)
However, noting a > w¯µ1 and µ2 > µ21, it is immediate that the right-hand-side of the latter
expression is smaller than its left-hand side, so that A(n) > B(n) or, equivalently, ξt > ξa if
n ≤ 2 This confirms the respective result in the main text.
The Lorenz curve for profit income in the open economy: Jt(z¯)
To determine the Lorenz curve for profit income in the open economy, we follow the respective
steps in the closed economy and first calculate
Πt(z) =
8n3 [a− α(z)w¯]2
b(2n+ 1)4
. (3.55)
Adding up over all industries z ≥ 1− z¯ further implies
Π¯t(z¯) ≡
∫ 1
1−z¯
Π(z)
=
8n3
[
a2z¯ − 2aw¯
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)dz + w¯
2
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)
2dz
]
b(2n+ 1)4
, (3.56)
with Πt = Π¯t(1) being aggregate profit income in the open economy. Hence, the Lorenz curve
for profit income is given by Jt(z¯) = Π¯t(z¯)/Πt, which can be reformulated to (3.17) and, thus,
confirms that the Lorenz curve for profit income remains unaffected by the movement from
autarky to free trade.
The Lorenz curve for wage income in the open economy: Mt(ρ¯)
In analogy to the closed economy, we first calculate total wage payments of industry z, which in
views of (3.9′) and (3.11′) is given by
W t(z) =
4n2
[
a2 + (2n− 1)aα(z)w¯ − 2nα(z)2w¯2
]
b(2n+ 1)3
(3.57)
With industries being ranked according to their wages, the cumulative wage income of workers
who are employed in industries z ≥ 1− z¯, is given by
W¯ t(z¯) =
4n2
[
a2z¯ + (2n− 1)aw¯
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)dz − 2nw¯
2
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)
2dz
]
b(2n+ 1)3
, (3.58)
where W t = W¯ t(1) determines aggregate labor income in the open economy. The ratio of labor
income accruing to workers in industries z ≥ 1 − z¯ is determined by Lt(z¯) ≡ W¯ (z¯)/W , which
can be reformulated to (3.18′).
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Furthermore, considering (3.11′), total employment in industry z can be written as
Lt(z) ≡
4n2α(z)[a− α(z)w¯]
b(2n+ 1)2
(3.59)
and cumulative employment in industries z ≥ 1− z¯ is given by
L¯t(z¯) =
4n2
[
a
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)dz − w¯
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)
2dz
]
b(2n+ 1)2
. (3.60)
The ratio of workers who are employed in industries z ≥ 1 − z¯ is given by ρ(z¯) in (3.19) and,
thus, equals the respective ratio in the closed economy. Combining (3.18′) and (3.19), finally
gives the Lorenz curve for wage income Mt(ρ¯).
Noting that the distribution of workers across industries, ρ(z¯), is the same in the closed and
the open economy, it follows from (3.18) and (3.18′) that the movement from autarky to free
trade affects the Lorenz curve only through an increase in the number of competitors (which
doubles). Therefore, we can learn the impact of trade liberalization on wage income inequality
from differentiating (3.39) with respect to n. This gives
d2M(ρ¯)
dρ¯dn
=
[
aw¯α¯− w¯2α¯2
] [
a2 + (n− 1)aµ1w¯ − nµ2w¯
2
]
[a2 + (n− 1)aµ1w¯ − nµ2w¯2]
2 ×
aµ1 − w¯µ2
aα¯− w¯α¯2
−
[
aw¯µ1 − w¯
2µ¯2
] [
a2 + (n− 1)aα¯w¯ − nα¯2w¯2
]
[a2 + (n− 1)aµ1w¯ − nµ2w¯2]
2 ×
aµ1 − w¯µ2
aα¯− w¯α¯2
(3.61)
Tedious but straightforward calculations yield
d2M(ρ¯)
dρ¯dn
=
aw¯α¯ (a− w¯α¯)G(α¯)
[a2 + (n− 1)aµ1w¯ − nµ2w¯2]
2 ×
aµ1 − w¯µ2
aα¯− w¯α¯2
, (3.62)
with G(α¯) being defined in (3.33). Considering the properties of G(α¯) from above, we can there-
fore conclude that a higher n lowers wage income inequality according to the Lorenz criterion.
This confirms the respective result concerning the impact of trade liberalization on wage income
inequality in the main text.
Asymmetric countries
This supplement provides formal details for the analysis of asymmetric countries in Section 3.5.
In a first step, we analyze the case of country size differences, while technological dissimilarities
are considered in a second step.
Country size differences
As outlined in the main text, we infer insights upon the role of country size differences by studying
a country’s opening up for trade with k > 0 fully symmetric trading partners. Assuming that
product markets are fully integrated in the open economy, we can associate higher levels of k
with a larger foreign market size, and therefore obtain insights upon the role of market size for
the consequences of trade by studying the comparative-static effects of changes in k.
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If there is trade between k fully symmetric countries, global demand can be calculated by
adding consumption in the home and the k foreign countries. Doing this, we find that indirect
world demand is given by21
p(z) = a−
b
1 + k
x(z), (3.63)
where x(z) refers to world-wide consumption of good z. Applying the goods market clearing
condition, we can therefore write domestic firm j’s profits as follows
πj =

a− b (1+k)n∑
i=1
yi − cj(z)

 yj . (3.64)
Maximizing these profits for yj and following the same line of reasoning as in the main text,
we can calculate the profit-maximizing output of firm j as function of its own wage, wj and all
competitors’ wages, which, in view of our symmetry assumption, are identical (irrespective of
their home country) and denoted by wi:
yj(z) =
(1 + k) {a+ [(1 + k)n− 1]α(z)wi − (1 + k)nα(z)wj}
b[1 + (1 + k)n]
. (3.65)
To solve union j’s optimization problem, we can substitute lj(z) = α(z)yj(z) together with
(3.65) into (3.7), and maximize the respective expression for wj . This gives the first-order
condition
dVj
dwj
=
(1 + k)α(z) {a+ [(1 + k)n− 1]α(z)wi − (1 + k)nα(z)wj}
b[(1 + k)n+ 1]
−
(1 + k)2nα(z)2(wj − w¯)
b[(1 + k)n+ 1]
= 0, (3.66)
which can be simplified to a+[(1+k)n−1]α(z)wi−2(1+k)nα(z)wj+(1+k)nα(z)w¯ = 0. Since
the wage-setting problem is the same for all firm-level unions, we can now set wj = wi and solve
the latter equation for the union wage rate in sector z. This gives
wt(z) =
a+ (1 + k)nα(z)w¯
α(z)[1 + (1 + k)n]
. (3.67)
Differentiating wt(z) with respect to k, gives dwt(z)/dk < 0. Noting further that the wage rate
in (3.67) equals the autarky wage rate in (3.9) if k = 0, we can conclude that trade exerts a
union-disciplining effect irrespective of the size of k. Furthermore, noting that the case of two
fully symmetric countries is captured by k = 1, we can also conclude that the union-disciplining
effect is weaker (stronger) than in the benchmark scenario if k < 1 (k > 1).
Substituting wt(z) into (3.68), we can calculate
yt(z) =
(1 + k)2n[a− α(z)w¯]
b[1 + (1 + k)n]2
and lt(z) =
α(z)(1 + k)2n[a− α(z)w¯]
b[1 + (1 + k)n]2
(3.68)
21Since we consider trade between 1 + k symmetric countries, all countries have, by construction, the same λ-
value. Hence, by setting λ = 1 in the home country, it will be equal to one as well in all other countries. It is
this feature of our analysis, which renders the way we capture country size differences so attractive from the
viewpoint of analytical tractability.
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which are both higher than under autarky and smaller (larger) than in the benchmark scenario
of Section 3.4 if k < 1 (k > 1). In view of (3.63), it is thus immediate that, due to an expansion
of firm-level output, trade always lowers consumer prices relative to the autarky scenario, with
the respective effect being the stronger the larger is k. This can be confirmed by comparing
pt(z) =
[2n(1 + k) + 1]a+ n2(1 + k)2α(z)w¯
[1 + (1 + k)n]2
(3.69)
to the respective findings in (3.12) and (3.12′). In a final step, we can note from the main text
that profits are proportional to output, πt(z) = [b/(1 + k)][yt(z)]2, which gives
πt(z) =
(1 + k)3n2 [a− α(z)w¯]2
b[1 + (1 + k)n]4
. (3.70)
We do not compare πt(z) directly to the respective results under autarky and the benchmark
scenario of trade between two fully symmetric countries as this comparison is tedious and not in
the center of our interest. Rather we now proceed with studying economy-wide variables
To characterize welfare, we can substitute (3.69) into U˜ t = −µp2, which yields
U˜ t = −
∫ 1
0
[
[2n(1 + k) + 1]a+ n2(1 + k)2α(z)w¯
[1 + (1 + k)n]2
]2
dz. (3.71)
Since trade lowers all industrial goods prices for any k > 0, it always exerts positive welfare
effects irrespective of the prevailing market size differences. However, since the price-reducing
effect is less (more) pronounced if k < 1 (k > 1), we can conclude that a country that opens
up for trade with a large partner experiences a higher welfare gain than an otherwise identical
country that opens up for trade with a small partner. A similar conclusion can be drawn for the
impact of trade on unemployment, which is determined by
utL = L−
(1 + k)2n2 (aµ1 − µ2w¯)
b[1 + (1 + k)n]2
, (3.72)
if trade involves transactions between 1 + k symmetric partners. Comparing the latter to (3.13)
and (3.13′), we can conclude that trade lowers unemployment, irrespective of the size of k, while
the respective effect turns out to be less (more) pronounced than in the benchmark scenario of
trade between two identical economies if k < 1 (k > 1).
With respect to the distributional effects of trade, we first look at its impact on the profit-wage
ratio. To determine this ratio, we need to divide average profits22
π˜t =
(1 + k)3n2[a2 − 2aµ1w¯ + µ2w¯
2]
b[1 + (1 + k)n]4
(3.73)
22Average profits can be calculating by adding up pit(z) from (3.70) over all industries z.
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by the average wage rate23
w˜t =
a2 + [(1 + k)n− 1]aµ1w¯ − (1 + k)nµ2w¯
2
[1 + (1 + k)n][aµ1 − w¯µ2]
. (3.74)
The profit-wage ratio is therefore given by
ξt =
(1 + k)3n2[aµ1 − w¯µ2][a
2 − 2aµ1w¯ + µ2w¯
2]
b[1 + (1 + k)n]3 {a2 + [(1 + k)n− 1]aµ1w¯ − (1 + k)nµ2w¯2}
. (3.75)
Differentiating the latter with respect to k, we can show that dξt/dk >,=, < 0 if
q(n, k) ≡ 3a(a− µ1w¯) + (1 + k)nw¯ [2− (1 + k)n] [aµ1 − µ2w¯] >,=, < 0. (3.76)
Noting q(1, 0) > 0, limn→∞ q(n, 0) = −∞ and ∂q(·)/∂n < 0 for any n ≥ 1, k > 0, we can conclude
that q(n, 0) = 0 has a unique solution in n > 1, which we denote n0. Thus, q(n, 0) >,=, < 0 if
n0 >,=, < n. Noting further that ∂q(·)/∂k < 0 holds for any n ≥ 1, k > 0, and recollecting that
ξt equals the autarky ratio if k = 0, it is immediate that the profit-wage ratio unambiguously
falls in response to trade if n ≥ n0. We therefore focus on a parameter domain with n ∈ [1, n0) in
the subsequent analysis. In this case, ξt has a unique maximum at k = k˜(n) > 0, with k˜′(n) < 0,
which is implicitly determined by q(n, k) = 0. To see how changes in k affect the probability
of an increase in the profit-wage ratio when a country moves from autarky to trade, it is worth
considering the ξt/ξa−k patterns for different levels of n, as depicted in Figure 3.3.24 According
to this figure, we can draw two conclusions. First, whenever trade induces an increase in the
profit wage ratio for k = 1 it must also increase the profit-wage ratio for k < 1. Second, it is
possible that trade increases the profit-wage ratio if k < 1, while it decreases the ratio for k = 1.
In view of these two insights, we can conclude that trade has more likely a positive impact of ξ
if k < 1, i.e. if the country opens up for trade with a smaller partner country.
In a next step, we can now look at the Lorenz curve for profit income. To determine this
curve, we first need to calculate total profits in sectors z ≥ 1− z¯. Substituting πt(z) from (3.70)
into Π¯t(z¯) =
∫ 1
1−z¯ nπ
t(z)dz, we get
Π¯t(z¯) =
n3(1 + k)3[a2z¯ − 2aw¯
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)dz − w¯
2
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)
2dz]
b[1 + (1 + k)n]4
. (3.77)
Noting that economy-wide profits are given by Πt = Π¯t(1), and evaluating Jt(z¯) = Π¯t(z¯)/Πt,
it is easily confirmed that the Lorenz curve does not change when a country opens up for k
identical trading partner. From this, we can infer that the respective invariance result in Section
3.4 extends to the case of trade between two countries that only differ in their size.
For calculating the Lorenz curve for wage income, we need to combine the cross-sectoral of
23To determine firm-level wage payments, we have to multiply the wage rate in (3.67) with the employment level
(3.68). Multiplying the resulting expression by n then gives the wage bill of industry z: W t(z). Adding up
W t(z) over all industries and dividing the resulting expression by (1− ut)L, according to (3.72), finally gives
w˜.
24For drawing this figure, we have made use of the following properties: (i) ξt/ξa = 1 if k = 0; (ii) limk→∞ ξ
t/ξa =
0; (iii) q(1, 1) > 0 and thus dξt/dn > 0
∣∣
n=1,k≤1
> 0. Furthermore, the line denoted n > 2 has been drawn for
a n ∈
(
n∗, n0
)
, where n∗ is the unique solution to ξt = ξa if k = 1 (see appendix).
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✲
✻
k
ξt/ξa
1
1
n = 1
n = 2
n > 2
n > n0
Figure 3.3: ξt/ξa − k patterns for different levels of n
industry-wide wage payments, Lt(z¯), with the cross-sectoral employment distribution, ρt(z¯). To
characterize the latter, we first substitute lt(z) from (3.68) into L¯t(z¯) =
∫ 1
1−z¯ nl
t(z)dz. This gives
the total employment in sectors z ≥ 1− z¯, which are the z¯ sectors with the lowest wage income:
L¯t(z¯) =
(1 + k)2n2
[
a
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)dz −
∫¯ 1
1−z¯α(z)
2dz
]
b [1 + (1 + k)n]2
. (3.78)
Noting that economy-wide employment, (1 − ut)L, equals L¯t(1), we can calculate the share of
workers with a job in industries z ≥ 1 − z¯: ρt(z¯) = L¯t(z¯)/[(1 − ut)L]. This gives the same
expression as under autarky. Hence, similar to the analysis in Section 3.4, trade with k > 0
fully symmetric economies does not change the cross-sectoral composition of the workforce.
To determine Lt(z¯), we first add industry-wide wage payments over all industries z ≥ 1 −
z¯. For this purpose, we can substitute wt(z) from (3.67) and lt(z) from (3.68) into W¯ t(z) =∫ 1
1−z¯ nw
t(z)lt(z)dz, which gives
W¯ t(z¯) =
(1 + k)2n2
{
a2z¯ + [(1 + k)n− 1] aw¯
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)dz − n(1 + k)w¯
2
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)
2dz
}
b [1 + (1 + k)n]3
, (3.79)
with W t = W¯ t(1) being economy-wide labor income. Dividing W¯ t(z¯) by W t, then gives
Lt(z¯) =
a2 + [(1 + k)n− 1]aw¯
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)dz − (1 + k)nw¯
2
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)
2dz
a2 + [(1 + k)n− 1]aw¯µ1 − (1 + k)nw¯2µ2
. (3.80)
Since the employment ratio across all industries stays constant, we can infer insights upon the
role of k for the Lorenz curve for labor income from analyzing the impact of changes in k on
Lt(z¯). However, by noting that an increase in k exerts qualitatively the same impact on Lt(z¯) as
an increase in n, we do not need further calculations but instead can conclude from the respective
insights in the appendix that – similar to an increase in n – an increase in k lowers inequality
among production workers. With k = 0 referring to the autarky scenario, this implies that trade
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lowers labor income inequality, irrespective of the size of k, while the respective effect is the less
pronounced the smaller is the trading partner (i.e. the smaller is k). This completes our formal
analysis of trade between countries of different size.
Ricardian technology differences
Since the assumptions for the model variant with Ricardian technology differences are discussed
in detail in the main text, we do not repeat them here. Furthermore, because the two countries
only differ in technology, world-wide consumer demand in (3.3′) remains the same as in the
baseline scenario. In view of product market clearing, we can thus write profits of a domestic
firm j in the following way25
πj =
[
a−
b
2
(
n∑
i=1
yi +
n∑
i=1
y∗i
)
− cj(z)
]
yj , (3.81)
where an asterisk has been introduced to refer to foreign country variables. Substituting cj(z) =
αj(z)wj and maximizing profits πj gives the first-order condition
dπj
dyj
= a−
b
2
∑
i 6=j
yi −
b
2
n∑
i=1
y∗i − byj − α(z)wj = 0. (3.82)
Doing the same for domestic firm k and foreign firm f , we obtain
dπk
dyk
= a−
b
2
∑
i 6=k
yi −
b
2
n∑
i=1
y∗i − byk − α(z)wk = 0 (3.83)
and
dπ∗f
dy∗f
= a−
b
2
n∑
i=1
yi −
b
2
∑
i 6=f
y∗i − by
∗
f − α
∗(z)w∗f = 0, (3.84)
respectively. Since the maximization problem is symmetric for all domestic firms and all foreign
firms, respectively, we can set k = i, for all i 6= j domestic firms, and f = i for all i foreign firms
in (3.83) and (3.84). Doing this, we can calculate
yi =
a− (b/2)yj − (n+ 1)α(z)wi + nα
∗(z)w∗i
bn
, (3.85)
y∗i =
a− (b/2)yj + (n− 1)α(z)wi − nα
∗(z)w∗i
bn
. (3.86)
Substituting these two expressions into (3.82) and accounting again for the aforementioned sym-
metry, we get domestic firm j’s output as a function of its own wage, wj and the domestic and
foreign competitors’ wage rates, wi and w∗i , respectively:
yj =
2 [a− 2nα(z)wj + (n− 1)α(z)wi + nα
∗(z)w∗i ]
b(2n+ 1)
. (3.87)
25Since the same rationale applies when calculating domestic and foreign variables, we concentrate on domestic
ones and only discuss foreign variables, where this is necessary for the derivation of our results.
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Substituting the latter together with lj = α(z)yj into objective function (3.7) and maximizing the
resulting expression for wj , gives the first-order condition for the union’s optimization problem:
dVj
dwj
=
2α(z)
b(2n+ 1)
[a− 4nα(z)wj + (n− 1)α(z)wi + nα
∗(z)w∗i + 2nα(z)w¯] = 0 (3.88)
Noting that the optimization problem is the same for all unions, we can now set wj = wi and
solve the first-order condition for the common domestic wage in industry z, wt(z), as a function
of the common foreign wage in the same industry, w∗t(z):
wt(z) =
a+ nα∗(z)w∗t(z) + 2nα(z)w¯
α(z)(3n+ 1)
. (3.89)
Following exactly the same line of reasoning for the foreign country, we can calculate
wt∗(z) =
a+ nα(z)wt(z) + 2nα∗(z)w¯
α∗(z)(3n+ 1)
. (3.90)
We thus have a system of two equations that allows us to explicitly solve for the two wage rates.
This gives
wt(z) =
(4n+ 1)a+ 2nw¯[(3n+ 1)α(z) + nα∗(z)]
α(z)(2n+ 1)(4n+ 1)
(3.91)
wt∗(z) =
(4n+ 1)a+ 2nw¯[(3n+ 1)α∗(z) + nα(z)]
α∗(z)(2n+ 1)(4n+ 1)
. (3.92)
Substituting wages (3.91) and (3.92) into (3.87) and accounting for lt(z) = α(z)yt(z), we can
calculate
yt(z) =
4n
{
(4n+ 1)[a− α(z)w¯] + 2n2w¯[α∗(z)− α(z)]
}
b(2n+ 1)2(4n+ 1)
(3.93)
lt(z) =
4nα(z)
{
(4n+ 1)[a− α(z)w¯] + 2n2w¯[α∗(z)− α(z)]
}
b(2n+ 1)2(4n+ 1)
. (3.94)
Doing the same for the foreign country and substituting the output of domestic and foreign firms
into (3.3′), we obtain the equilibrium world market price for industrial good z:
pt(z) =
(4n+ 1)a+ 2n2w¯[α(z) + α∗(z)]
(2n+ 1)2
. (3.95)
Finally, firm-level profits are given by πt(z) = (b/2)
[
yt(z)
]2
, while industry-wide profits equal
Πt(z) = nπt(z). This completes our discussion on firm- and industry-level variables and we now
turn to solving for economy-wide variables.
The first of these variables is unemployment, which can be calculated by adding up employment
over all firms and industries and subtracting the resulting expression from exogenous labor supply
L. In view of (3.94), this gives for the home country (3.13′′). Furthermore, substituting the world
price from (3.95) into U˜ t = −µp2 gives welfare (3.15
′′). To compare the welfare levels in (3.15′)
and (3.15′′), it is useful to solve the respective integrals. In the benchmark scenario with fully
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symmetric countries, this gives
U˜ t
∣∣∣
δ=0
= −
(4n+ 1)2a2 + 8n2(4n+ 1)aµ1w¯ + 16n
4µ2w¯
2
(2n+ 1)4
, (3.96)
while under technological dissimilarity, we obtain
U˜ t
∣∣∣
δ>0
= −
(4n+ 1)2a2 + 8n2(4n+ 1)aµ1w¯ + 16n
4µ2w¯
2 − 8n4w¯2δ
(2n+ 1)4
. (3.97)
The welfare differential is thus equal to U˜ t
∣∣∣
δ>0
− U˜ t
∣∣∣
δ=0
= 8n4w¯2δ/(2n+1)4 > 0, which confirms
the respective finding in the main text.
In order to characterize inter-group income inequality, we calculate the profit-wage ratio. Av-
erage profits are obtained by aggregating profits πt(z) over all industries. This gives26
π˜t =
8n2
[
(4n+ 1)2(a− 2aw¯µ1 + w¯
2µ2) + 4n
2(2n2 + 4n+ 1)w¯2δ
]
b(2n+ 1)4(4n+ 1)2
. (3.98)
For determining average wage income, we need to add up total wage payments of domestic firms in
all industries and divide the respective expression by economy-wide employment as characterized
by (3.96). In view of (3.91) and (3.94), this gives27
w˜t =
(4n+ 1)2[a2 + (2n− 1)aw¯µ1 − 2nw¯
2µ2]− 2n
2(4n2 − 2n− 1)w¯2δ
(2n+ 1)(4n+ 1)2[aµ1 − w¯µ2]− 2n2(2n+ 1)(4n+ 1)δw¯
. (3.99)
Dividing (3.98) by (3.99), gives the profit-wage ratio for the case of technological dissimilar
countries
ξt =
8n2
b(2n+ 1)3(4n+ 1)
[
(4n+ 1) (aµ1 − w¯µ2)− 2n
2w¯δ
]
(4n+ 1)2[a2 + (2n− 1)aw¯µ1 − 2nw¯2µ2]− 2n2(4n2 − 2n− 1)w¯2δ
×
[
(4n+ 1)2(a2 − 2aw¯µ1 + w¯
2µ2) + 4n
2(2n2 + 4n+ 1)w¯2δ
]
(4n+ 1)2[a2 + (2n− 1)aw¯µ1 − 2nw¯2µ2]− 2n2(4n2 − 2n− 1)w¯2δ
(3.100)
In order to analyze the effect of productivity differences on inter-group inequality, we can note
that ξt in (3.100) equals the respective ratio for symmetric countries in (3.100) if δ = 0. Hence, we
can infer insights on how technological dissimilarity affects the profit-wage ratio, by differentiating
(3.100) with respect to δ. In view of ξt = π˜t/w˜t, this gives
dξt
dδ
=
1
w˜
[
dπ˜
dδ
−
dw˜
dδ
ξt
]
. (3.101)
26Noting that profits are proportional to the square of output, i.e. pit(z) = b[yt(z)]2, we can calculate
pit(z) =
8n2
{
(4n+ 1)[a− α(z)w¯] + 2n2w¯[α∗(z)− α(z)]
}2
b(2n+ 1)4(4n+ 1)2
.
Substituting the latter into p˜it =
∫
1
0
pit(z)dz, gives the expression in (3.98).
27Substituting the wage from (3.91) and employment from (3.94) into W t =
∫
1
0
nwt(z)lt(z)dz, gives
W t =
4n2{(4n+ 1)2[a2 + (2n− 1)aµ1w¯ − 2nw¯
2µ2]− 2n
2(4n2 − 2n− 1)δw¯2}
b(2n+ 1)3(4n+ 1)2
.
Dividing the latter by (1− ut)L, according to (3.96), we obtain (3.99).
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Noting
dw˜
dδ
=
2n2w¯2(4n+ 1)2(2n+ 1)
[
(4n+ 1)a (a− w¯µ1) + (2n+ 1)
2
(
aw¯µ1 − w¯
2µ2
) ]
{(2n+ 1)(4n+ 1)2[aµ1 − w¯µ2]− 2n2(2n+ 1)(4n+ 1)δw¯}
2 > 0, (3.102)
d2w˜/dδ2 > 0 as well as
dπ˜
dδ
=
8n2
b(2n+ 1)4
4n2(2n2 + 4n+ 1)w¯2
(4n+ 1)2
> 0, (3.103)
d2π˜/dδ2 = 0, it is tedious but straightforward to show that
dξt
dδ
∣∣∣∣
δ=0
=
16n4w¯2
b(2n+ 1)4(4n+ 1)2w˜
{
2(2n2 + 4n+ 1)
−
[
(4n+ 1)a (a− w¯µ1) + (2n+ 1)
2
(
aw¯µ1 − w¯
2µ2
)] (
a2 − 2aw¯µ1 + w¯
2µ2
)
(aµ1w¯ − w¯2µ2) [a2 + (2n− 1)aw¯µ1 − 2nw¯2µ2]
}
.
(3.104)
Rearranging terms, we can conclude that dξt/dδ
∣∣
δ=0
>,=, < 0 if
(4n2 + 8n+ 2)
(
aµ1w¯ − w¯
2µ2
)[
a2 + (2n− 1)aw¯µ1 − 2nw¯
2µ2
]
>,=, <
[
(4n+ 1)a (a− w¯µ1) + (2n+ 1)
2
(
aw¯µ1 − w¯
2µ2
) ](
a2 − 2aw¯µ1 + w¯
2µ2
)
or, equivalently, if
(2n+ 1)(4n2 + 8n+ 2)
[
aw¯µ1 − w¯
2µ2
]2
>,=, < (4n+ 1)
[
a2 − 2aw¯µ1 + w¯
2µ2
]2
. (3.105)
Since it is in general not clearcut, whether the left-hand side or the right-hand side of the latter
expression is larger, we can conclude that the impact of technological dissimilarity on the profit-
wage ratio is not clearcut, either.
To get insights on the role of profit income inequality, we have to determine Jt(z¯) for the case
of δ > 0. For this purpose, we follow the formal steps in the main text and first characterize
total profit income of firm owners in industries z ≥ 1 − z¯. Substituting sector-wide profits in
industry z
Πt(z) =
8n3
b(2n+ 1)4(4n+ 1)2
{
(4n+ 1)2
(
a2 − 2aα(z)w¯ + α(z)2w¯2
)
+ 4n2(4n+ 1)w¯
[
a
(
α∗(z)− α(z)
)
− α(z)α∗(z)w¯ + α(z)2w¯
]
+ 4n4w¯2
[
α∗(z)2 − 2α(z)α∗(z) + α(z)2
]}2
(3.106)
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into Π¯t(z¯) =
∫ 1
1−z¯ Π
t(z)dz, we get
Π¯t(z¯) =
8n3
b(2n+ 1)4(4n+ 1)2
{
(4n+ 1)2
(
a2z¯ − 2aw¯
∫ 1
1−z¯
α(z)dz + w¯2
∫ 1
1−z¯
α(z)2dz
)
+ 4n2w¯
∫ 1
1−z¯
{
(4n+ 1)
[
a− w¯α(z)
]
+ n2w¯
[
α∗(z)− α(z)
]} [
α∗(z)− α(z)
]
dz (3.107)
Noting that economy-wide profits are given by Πt = Π¯t(1), we can calculate the share of profit-
income that is realized in industries z ≥ 1− z¯:
Jt(z¯) =
(4n+ 1)2
[
a2z¯ − 2aw¯
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)dz + w¯
2
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)
2dz
]
(4n+ 1)2(a2 − 2aw¯µ1 + w¯2µ2) + 4n2(2n2 + 4n+ 1)w¯2δ
+
4n2w¯
∫ 1
1−z¯
{
(4n+ 1)
[
a− w¯α(z)
]
+ n2w¯
[
α∗(z)− α(z)
]} [
α∗(z)− α(z)
]
dz
(4n+ 1)2(a2 − 2aw¯µ1 + w¯2µ2) + 4n2(2n2 + 4n+ 1)w¯2δ
.
(3.108)
This is the Lorenz curve for profit income in an open economy with trade between two technolog-
ical dissimilar countries. Differentiating Jt(z¯) and accounting for α¯ ≡ α(1− z¯), α¯∗ ≡ α∗(1− z¯),
gives
dJt(z¯)
dz¯
=
[
(4n+ 1) (a− w¯α¯) + 2n2w¯ (α¯∗ − α¯)
]2
(4n+ 1)2(a2 − 2aw¯µ1 + w¯2µ2) + 4n2(2n2 + 4n+ 1)w¯2δ
(3.109)
which is unambiguously positive. Furthermore, noting that dα¯/dz¯ < 0 and dα¯∗/dz¯ > 0, it is
easily confirmed that the Lorenz curve is convex.
To analyze the effect of Ricardian productivity differences on the distribution of profit income
we can compare Jt(z¯) in (3.108) with the respective expression for trade between two fully sym-
metric trading partners (which is the same as under autarky) in (3.17). Since such a comparison
is difficult, we choose a different approach and compare the first derivatives of the two Lorenz
curves in Eqs. (3.31) and (3.109), respectively. Doing this, we find that the respective derivative
is larger, equal, or smaller under technological dissimilarity than in the benchmark scenario of
two fully symmetric countries if
κ(z¯) ≡ (4n+ 1)
α¯∗ − α¯
(a− w¯α¯)
+ n2w¯
(
α¯∗ − α¯
a− w¯α¯
)2
−
(2n2 + 4n+ 1)w¯δ
a2 − 2aw¯µ1 + w¯2µ2
>,=, < 0 (3.110)
Noting that (4n+1) (a− w¯α¯)+n2w¯ (α¯∗ − α¯) > 0must hold, according to (3.93), if the production
in both countries is fully diversified (see the assumptions in the main text), it is immediate from
inspection of (3.110) that κ(z¯) < 0 holds for any α¯ ≥ α¯∗, which, in view of dα¯/dz¯ < 0, dα¯∗/dz¯ >
0, means for sufficiently small z¯. Noting further that ∆Jt(z¯) ≡ Jt(z¯)
∣∣
δ>0
− Jt(z¯)
∣∣
δ=0
= 0 if
z¯ = 0, we can thus conclude that (i) d∆Jt(z)/dz¯ < 0 and thus (ii) ∆Jt(z¯) < 0 for small levels of
z¯. However, in view of ∆Jt(z¯) = 0 if z¯ = 1, it is also clear that there must be some high levels
of z¯ for which d∆Jt(z)/dz¯ > 0. To shed further light on this, we can differentiate (3.110). This
yields
κ′(z¯) =
[
(4n+ 1) + 2n2w¯
α¯∗ − α¯
a− w¯α¯
] [
1
a− w¯α¯
dα¯∗
dz¯
−
a− w¯α¯∗
(a− w¯α¯)2
dα¯
dz¯
]
, (3.111)
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which, in view of dα¯/dz¯ < 0 and dα¯∗/dz¯ > 0, is unambiguously positive if α¯∗ > α¯. This implies
that, if d∆J(z¯)/dz¯ ≥ 0 at z¯∗, the derivative must be strictly positive for any z¯ > z¯∗.28 In view
of ∆J(1) = 0, this however implies that ∆J(z¯) < 0 holds for all z¯ < 1 that are consistent with
α¯∗ > α¯. Together with our insights from above that ∆J(z¯) < 0 holds for all z¯ > 0 that are
consistent with α¯ ≥ α¯∗, we can thus safely conclude that the Lorenz curve for profit income in the
case of trade between two technologically dissimilar countries lies strictly below the respective
Lorenz curve for profit income in the case of trade between two fully symmetric countries, which
provides a formal proof for the respective discussion in the main text.
To characterize the Lorenz curve for wage income, we must combine information upon the
distribution of wage payments across industries, Lt(z¯), with the distribution of workers across
industries, ρt(z¯). Starting with the analysis of Lt(z¯), we can first calculate sector-wide wage
payments W t(z) = nwt(z)lt(z). Accounting for (3.91) and (3.94), we can calculate
W t(z) =
4n2
b(2n+ 1)3(4n+ 1)2
{
(4n+ 1)2a2 − (4n+ 1)2aα(z)w¯ + 2n2(4n+ 1)aα∗(z)w¯
− 2n2(4n+ 1)aα(z)w¯ + 2n(3n+ 1)(4n+ 1)aα(z)w¯ + 2n2(4n+ 1)aα∗(z)w¯
− 2n(3n+ 1)(4n+ 1)α(z)2w¯2 − 2n2(4n+ 1)α(z)α∗(z)w¯2 + 4n3(3n+ 1)α(z)α∗(z)w¯2
− 4n3(3n+ 1)α(z)2w¯2 + 4n4α∗(z)2w¯2 − 4n4α(z)α∗(z)w¯2
}
(3.112)
Substituting the latter into W¯ t(z¯) =
∫ 1
1−z¯W
t(z)dz we obtain the total wage bill of workers in
industries z ≥ 1− z¯, which are the industries that offer the lowest wages:
W¯ t(z¯) =
4n2
b(2n+ 1)3(4n+ 1)2
{
(4n+ 1)2
[
a2z¯ + (2n− 1)aw¯
∫ 1
1−z¯
α(z)dz − 2nw¯2
∫ 1
1−z¯
α(z)2dz
]
+ 2n2w¯
∫ 1
1−z¯
[
2(4n+ 1)a+ (6n2 − 2n− 1)w¯α(z) + 2n2w¯α∗(z)
] (
α∗(z)− α(z)
)
dz
}
(3.113)
Noting that economy-wide wage income is given by W t = W¯ t(1) and accounting for Lt(z) =
W¯ t(z¯)/W t, we can calculate
Lt(z¯) =
(4n+ 1)2
[
a2z¯ + (2n− 1)aw¯
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)dz − 2nw¯
2
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)
2dz
]
(4n+ 1)2 [a2 + (2n− 1)aw¯µ1 − 2nw¯2µ2]− 2n2(4n2 − 2n− 1)δw¯2
+
2n2w¯
∫ 1
1−z¯
[
2(4n+ 1)a+ (6n2 − 2n− 1)w¯α(z) + 2n2w¯α∗(z)
] (
α∗(z)− α(z)
)
dz
(4n+ 1)2 [a2 + (2n− 1)aw¯µ1 − 2nw¯2µ2]− 2n2(4n2 − 2n− 1)δw¯2
,
(3.114)
28Recollect from above that d∆J(z¯)/dz¯ ≥ 0 requires a z¯ such that α¯∗ > α¯.
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with
dLt(z¯)
dz¯
=
(4n+ 1)2
[
a2z¯ + (2n− 1)aw¯α¯− 2nw¯2α¯(z)2
]
(4n+ 1)2 [a2 + (2n− 1)aw¯µ1 − 2nw¯2µ2]− 2n2(4n2 − 2n− 1)δw¯2
+
2n2w¯
[
2(4n+ 1)a+ (6n2 − 2n− 1)w¯α¯+ 2n2w¯α¯∗
] (
α¯∗ − α¯
)
(4n+ 1)2 [a2 + (2n− 1)aw¯µ1 − 2nw¯2µ2]− 2n2(4n2 − 2n− 1)δw¯2
> 0.
(3.115)
However, this is only one part of the Lorenz curve for wage income and in order to get a
comprehensive picture of the distribution of labour income among production workers, we must
combine Lt(z¯) with the share of workers employed in industries z ≥ 1 − z¯. Substituting (3.94)
into L¯t(z¯) =
∫ 1
1−z¯ nl
t(z)dz, we calculate aggregate employment in these industries:
L¯t(z¯) =
4n2
b(2n+ 1)2(4n+ 1)
{
(4n+ 1)
[
a
∫ 1
1−z¯
α(z)dz − w¯
∫ 1
1−z¯
α(z)2dz
]
− 2n2w¯
[∫ 1
1−z¯
α(z)2dz −
∫ 1
1−z¯
α(z)α∗(z)dz
]}
. (3.116)
Dividing (3.116) by L¯t(1) = (1−ut)L, as characterized by (3.96), we obtain the share of workers
who have a job in industries z ≥ 1− z¯:
ρt(z¯) =
(4n+ 1)[a
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)dz − w¯
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)
2dz]− 2n2w¯[
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)
2dz −
∫ 1
1−z¯ α(z)α
∗(z)dz]
(4n+ 1)[aµ1 − w¯µ2]− 2n2w¯δ
,
(3.117)
with
dρt(z¯)
dz¯
=
(4n+ 1)α¯[a− w¯α¯] + 2n2α¯w¯[α¯∗ − α¯]
(4n+ 1)[aµ1 − w¯µ2]− 2n2w¯δ
> 0. (3.118)
The Lorenz curve is fully characterized by Lt(z¯) and ρt(z¯) and has the usual properties: It is
increasing and convex.
To learn about the impact of technological dissimilarity on wage income inequality, we can
compare the Lorenz curve for labour income in the scenario of trade between two technologically
dissimilar countries with the one in the benchmark scenario of trade between two fully symmetric
countries. Since a direct comparison of Mt(ρ¯) for the two scenarios turns out to be tedious,
we try to get insights on the ranking of inequality in the two scenarios by analyzing the role of
technological dissimilarity separately for Lt(z¯) and ρt(z¯). Staring with Lt(z¯), we can infer insights
upon the ranking of Lt(z¯)
∣∣
δ=0
and Lt(z¯)
∣∣
δ>0
by investigating how technological dissimilarity
affects the derivative dLt(z¯)/dz¯. Defining ∆Lt(z¯) ≡ Lt(z¯)
∣∣
δ>0
− Lt(z¯)
∣∣
δ=0
>,=, < 0, we can see
from a comparison of (3.115) and
dLt(z¯)
dz¯
∣∣∣∣
δ=0
=
(4n+ 1)2
[
a2z¯ + (2n− 1)aw¯α¯− 2nw¯2α¯(z)2
]
(4n+ 1)2 [a2 + (2n− 1)aw¯µ1 − 2nw¯2µ2]
, (3.119)
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that d∆Lt(z¯)/dz¯ >,=, < 0 if 2n2(4n+ 1)2w¯χ(z¯) >,=, < 0, where
χ(z¯) ≡
(
α¯∗ − α¯
) [
2(4n+ 1)a+ (6n2 − 2n− 1)w¯α¯+ 2n2w¯α¯∗
] [
a2 + (2n− 1)aw¯µ1 − 2nw¯
2µ2
]
+
[
a2z¯ + (2n− 1)aw¯α¯− 2nw¯2α¯(z)2
]
(4n2 − 2n− 1)δw¯. (3.120)
It is obvious that χ(z¯) > 0 and thus d∆Lt(z¯)/dz¯ > 0 hold for all z¯ that are consistent with
α¯∗ ≥ α¯, which, in view of dα¯/dz < 0 and dα¯∗/dz > 0, refers to large levels of z¯. In view of
∆Lt(1) = 0, we can therefore conclude that ∆Lt(z¯) < 0 must hold for large levels of z¯ – more
specifically, for all z¯ < 1, for which α¯∗ ≥ α¯. Differentiating χ(z¯) further implies
χ′(z¯) =
[
a2 + (2n− 1)aw¯µ1 − 2nw¯
2µ2
]{ [
2(4n+ 1)a+ (4n2 − 2n− 1)w¯α¯+ 4n2w¯α¯∗
] dα¯∗
dz¯
−
[
2(4n+ 1)a+ (6n2 − 2n− 1)w¯α¯+ 2n2w¯α¯∗ − (6n2 − 2n− 1)w¯ (α¯∗ − α¯)
] dα¯
dz¯
}
+ [(2n− 1)a− 4nw¯α¯(z)] (4n2 − 2n− 1)δw¯2
dα¯
dz¯
. (3.121)
The latter can be reformulated to
χ′(z¯) =
[
a2 + (2n− 1)aw¯µ1 − 2nw¯
2µ2
]{ [
2(4n+ 1)a+ (4n2 − 2n− 1)w¯α¯+ 4n2w¯α¯∗
] dα¯∗
dz¯
−
[
(6n2 + 6n+ 1)w¯α¯+ 2n2w¯α¯∗ − (6n2 − 2n− 1)w¯ (α¯∗ − α¯)
] dα¯
dz¯
}
−
[
2(4n+ 1)a(a− w¯µ1)(a− w¯α¯) + (2n+ 1)w¯α¯(z)(4n
2 − 2n− 1)δw¯2
]dα¯
dz¯
−
[
4n(4n+ 1)w¯ (aµ1 − w¯µ2)− (2n− 1)(4n
2 − 2n− 1)δw¯2
]
(a− w¯α¯)
dα¯
dz¯
.
(3.122)
Noting from (3.13′′) that ut < 1 requires (4n + 1)(aµ1 − µ2w¯) > 2n2δw¯ and accounting for
dα¯/dz¯ < 0, dα¯∗/dz¯ > 0, we can thus conclude that χ′(z¯) > 0 for all z¯ associated with α¯ ≥ α¯∗.
This implies that, if χ(z¯) ≥ 0 and thus d∆Lt(z¯)/dz¯ ≥ 0 for z¯∗ (which requires that α¯ > α¯∗ at
z¯∗), then χ(z¯) > 0 and thus d∆Lt(z¯)/dz¯ > 0 must hold for any z¯ > z¯∗. In view of ∆Lt(1) = 0,
this also implies that ∆Lt(z¯) < 0 must hold for any z¯ < 1 associated with α¯ ≥ α¯∗. Together
with our previous insights that ∆Lt(z¯) < 0 also holds for any z¯ > 0 associated with α¯ ≤ α¯∗, we
can thus safely ∆Lt(z¯) < 0 holds for any z¯ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, technological dissimilarity renders
the distribution of industry-wide wage payments less equal. The impact of this effect can be read
off from Figure 3.4, where we see that a reduction of Lt(z¯) for a given ρt(z¯) induces higher wage
income inequality, according to the Lorenz criterion: Mtρ¯
∣∣
δ=0
> Mtρ¯
∣∣
δ>0
for any ρ¯ ∈ (0, 1).
With these insights at hand, we now turn to the second component of the Lorenz curve and
analyze how technological dissimilarity affects ρt(z¯). For this purpose, we define ∆ρt(z¯) ≡
ρt(z¯)
∣∣
δ>0
− ρt(z¯)
∣∣
δ=0
and note that d∆ρt(z¯)/dz¯ >,=, < 0 if 2n2(4n+1)w¯α¯ψ(z¯) >,=, < 0, where
ψ(z¯) ≡ (α¯∗ − α¯) (aµ1 − w¯µ2) + δ (a− w¯α¯) , (3.123)
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Figure 3.4: The distributional consequences of changes in Lt(z¯) for given ρt(z¯)
according to (3.118) and
dρt(z¯)
dz¯
∣∣∣∣
δ=0
=
α¯[a− w¯α¯]
aµ1 − w¯µ2
. (3.124)
It is easily confirmed that ψ(z¯) > 0 and thus d∆ρt(z¯)/dz¯ > 0 holds for any z¯ associated with
α¯∗ ≥ α¯, i.e. for sufficiently high z¯. In view of ∆ρt(1),we can thus conclude that ∆ρt(z¯) < 0
holds for any z¯ consistent with α¯∗ ≥ α¯. Differentiating ψ(z¯) further gives
ψ′(z¯) = (aµ1 − w¯µ2)
(
dα¯∗
dz¯
−
dα¯
dz¯
)
− δw¯
dα¯
dz¯
, (3.125)
which is unambiguously positive, in view of dα¯/dz¯ < 0, dα¯∗/dz¯ > 0. However, since (i) ∆ρt(0) =
∆ρt(1) = 0 and (ii) d∆ρt(z¯)/dz¯ > 0 for high levels of z¯, it is immediate that ∆ρt(z¯) has a unique
minimum on the relevant interval and at the same time is negative for any z¯ ∈ (0, 1). This
implies that workers are less equally distributed across industries if countries are technological
dissimilar. To see how this affects the distribution of wage income, we can look at Figure 3.5.
There, we see that, for a given Ltz¯, the relocation of workers towards high-productivity industries
lowers the income inequality within the group of production workers: Mtρ¯
∣∣
δ=0
< Mtρ¯
∣∣
δ>0
for
any ρ¯ ∈ (0, 1).
Combining the insights from Figures 3.4 and 3.5, we can thus conclude that technological
dissimilarity exerts two counteracting effects on the distribution of wage income, and since we
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Figure 3.5: The distributional consequences of changes in ρt(z¯) for given Lt(z¯)
are not able to determine which of the two effects is stronger, we cannot rank Mt(ρ¯)
∣∣
δ=0
and
Mt(ρ¯)
∣∣
δ>0
. Furthermore, we have shown in a simulation exercise, for which the program code
is attached to this supplement, that trade between two technologically dissimilar countries does
not necessarily lower labor income inequality relative to the closed economy. This completes the
formal discussion in this supplement.
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4 Union Wage Setting and International
Trade with Footlose Capital
4.1 Introduction
Since Calmfors and Driffill (1988) have published their seminal work on a hump-shaped relation-
ship between the degree of centralization in collective bargaining and aggregate unemployment,
it has been commonly acknowledged that sector-level unions are more successful in securing
economic rents for their members than more centralized as well as more decentralized ones,
with adverse macroeconomic consequences. However, even though the ‘hump-shape hypothesis’
seems to be well suited for explaining why continental European countries have suffered from
significantly higher unemployment rates than Scandinavian or Anglo-Saxon ones over the last
two decades, empirical research does not provide strong supportive evidence for this hypothesis
(see, for instance, Nickell, 1997; Flanagan, 1999, 2003). In the years following the publication by
Calmfors and Driffill (1988), economists have therefore searched for a rationale that can explain
the lack of supportive evidence, and openness to international trade features prominently on the
list of possible arguments. While there seems to be broad agreement among economists that
differences in union wage-setting institutions are in general less important in open economies
(see, for instance, Bean, Danthine, Bernholz, and Malinvaud, 1990; Danthine and Hunt, 1994),1
we still know surprisingly little about how different forms of openness, such as international trade
or capital mobility, contribute to this result.
Filling the gap and providing a more comprehensive picture about how different forms of
openness affect the macroeconomic consequences of differing wage-setting institutions is the
purpose of this paper. To tackle this issue, we set up a general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE)
model along the lines of Neary (2003, 2009), with a unit mass of sectors and a small (endogenous)
number of firms in each industry. Enriching this framework with a simple textbook model of
monopoly unions – in which unions set wages first and firms adjust employment afterwards – gives
an analytically tractable general equilibrium version of a unionized oligopoly model with pure
economic rents and involuntary unemployment in equilibrium (see, for instance, Egger and Etzel,
2012a).2 The crucial innovation of our paper is the introduction of capital as a second factor
1It is noteworthy that this insight does not necessarily extend to other labor market institutions. For instance,
Brecher (1974) and Davis (1998) point out that in an otherwise standard two-country, two-sector, two-factor
Heckscher-Ohlin model, in which one country introduces a binding minimum wage, factor price equalization
in the opening economy leads to an increase in unemployment in the country that suffers from the labor
market friction. This suggests that the adverse employment effects of minimum wages may become even more
pronounced in an open economy.
2A similar model has been proposed by Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) and Kreickemeier and Meland (2011).
However, assuming that only part of the industries are unionized, these models generate full employment and
are thus not equipped to study the relationship between the degree of centralization in union wage setting and
economy-wide unemployment.
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of production into the workhorse GOLE model. To keep the analysis tractable, we assume that
capital is employed as fixed input, while labor serves as a variable input in the production process.
This kind of production technology is common in models of international trade (cf. Lawrence
and Spiller, 1983; Flam and Helpman, 1987, for two early contributions), and it has been used by
Martin and Rogers (1995) to set up “the most tractable of all the economic geography models”
(see Baldwin, 2005, p. 68).
We embed this extended GOLE framework into a two-country model, in which the two
economies are symmetric in all respects, except for their wage-setting institutions. To cap-
ture the institutional differences, we assume that one country is populated by firm-level unions,
while the other country is populated by sector-level unions.3 While workers are not mobile across
country borders, capital owners can at least in the long run invest their resources where the in-
vestment yields the highest return. Of course, there is a difference between capital mobility and
the actual movement of capital owners, who act as entrepreneurs in our setting. In line with the
so-called footloose capital approach to economic geography,4 we abstract from mobility of capital
owners and assume that the return to foreign investment, which equals the operating profit from
foreign production, is repatriated to the parent country.
In a first step of our analysis, we study the two economies under autarky and reproduce
a key finding of Calmfors and Driffill (1988): Sector-level unions set higher wages than firm-
level ones, causing higher unemployment and lower welfare in the closed economy. Equipped
with this insight, we then analyze how opening up for trade changes the outcome in the two
economies. Thereby, we distinguish two possible scenarios of openness. In the first one, we
assume that product markets are fully integrated, while capital markets remain segmented. Since
this captures the idea that capital owners do not immediately adjust their investment decisions
after a globalization shock, we refer to this scenario as the short run. In this short-run scenario,
trade raises competition in the product market and lowers the ability of unions to set excessive
wages for ‘insiders’. This generates an employment and welfare stimulus in both economies and
thus raises the magnitude of economic rents that can be distributed between capital owners
and workers. Since unions set lower wages in the open economy, the share of rents attributed
to capital owners increases and this group is thus unambiguously better off than in the closed
economy. However, also the group of workers benefits from product market integration, because
the negative consequences of falling wages are counteracted and dominated by the employment
stimulus and a ceteris paribus reduction in the price level resulting from stronger product market
competition in the open economy.
Regarding the role of country-specific wage-setting institutions in the open relative to the
closed economy, our model reproduces a well known result from previous research. Product
market integration lowers the wage gap between the two economies, arising from differences in
the prevailing wage-setting institutions, and this reduces the differential in unemployment and
welfare ceteris paribus. However, there is also a counteracting effect. Fiercer competition in the
global market magnifies the employment and welfare differences associated with a given wage
3We do not discuss economy-wide agreements as a third alternative, because agreements at the highest level of
centralization have become an exception in the 21st century (see OECD, 2004).
4For a taxonomy of the different modeling approaches that are common in the economic geography literature,
see Baldwin (2005).
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gap, because production shifts towards the country that offers the lower production costs in the
open economy. There are hence two counteracting effects in our model and it is not clearcut
in general whether differences in the degree of centralization in union wage-setting lose part
of their impact on the macroeconomic performance of countries in response to product market
integration. Nonetheless, our model establishes the common result that product market inte-
gration lowers differences in unemployment and welfare, when focusing on empirically plausible
parameter domains. For instance, if those who are unemployed receive a compensation which is
less than 2/3 of the going wage rate, the common result is reproduced provided that at least two
firms are active in either country and each industry.
In the long run, capital is footloose and searches for the most profitable investment opportuni-
ties in the global economy. This generates capital flows from the country that hosts sector-level
unions to the country that hosts firm-level unions, and these flows continue until the return to
capital investment, i.e. the profit of the firm, is equalized between the two locations. Abstracting
from extra costs of investing abroad, this no arbitrage condition is reached if wages are equalized
in the two locations. However, one should not be tempted to conclude from the observation of
factor price equalization that differences in the degree of union wage setting lose their impact on
macroeconomic variables. On the contrary, the outflow of capital lowers employment and welfare
in the country that hosts the sector-level union and raises these two macroeconomic performance
measures in the country of capital inflow. This points to an important conclusion: It is not open-
ness per se that helps explaining the lack of empirical evidence for the hump-shape hypothesis
put forward by Calmfors and Driffill (1988). Rather, it is the integration of product markets as
a specific form of openness that provides a rationale for the missing evidence, while other forms
of openness, as for instance capital market integration, do not provide such a rationale. Aside
from its implications on aggregate employment and welfare, we also analyze how capital mobil-
ity influences the groups of capital owners and workers specifically. Intuitively, the additional
investment opportunities increase the real income of capital owners in the country that hosts
sector-level unions, while workers lose in this economy since capital outflow is associated with
an export of jobs in our setting. Things are different in the country that hosts the firm-level
union. Due to capital inflow, firms headquartered in this country lose their competitive advan-
tage vis-á-vis foreign producers, and hence the capital owners running these firms are worse off
than in the short run. Finally, workers in the country that attracts foreign capital are definitely
better off than in the short run, because the establishment of new local firms implies additional
domestic jobs.
In a final step of our analysis, we investigate to what extent the common trend among OECD
countries to implement less centralized forms of collective bargaining and to move towards firm-
level agreements (see OECD, 2004) can be successful in securing domestic jobs and thus guarantee
gains from trade for domestic workers also in the long run. The message from our analysis is clear:
Decentralization can be successful if it occurs early, because in this case it can prevent the capital
outflow. If decentralization is a response to the export of jobs, its implications are less promising.
Decentralization – be it politically enforced or voluntarily imposed by unions – may be ineffective
in stopping an already existing capital outflow and reversing the foreign investment decision of
firms. Furthermore, it is worth noting that in an open economy, decentralization not only affects
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the domestic labor market but also generates negative spillovers on foreign workers due to labor
market linkages arising from integrated product and capital markets. To be more specific, a
movement from sector-level to firm-level wage setting reduces the relative competitiveness of
foreign producers and thus their employment in the short run. Furthermore, if decentralization
is successful in preventing capital outflow and job exports, it additionally generates long-run
losses in terms of foreign employment.
Our paper is of course not the first one that studies the role of unions in open economies, and
some of our results have already been established in previous work. For instance, the argument
that opening up to trade lowers the ability of unions to set excessive wages can already be
found in Huizinga (1993) and Sørensen (1993). Naylor (1998, 1999) broadens our understanding
of the consequences of product market integration by looking at marginal reductions in trade
costs. While these studies were concerned with partial equilibrium effects on union wage setting
in one particular industry, Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) have pointed to the role of general
equilibrium feedback effects. In their GOLE model with a partially unionized labor market, the
competitive wage rises in the open economy and this counteracts the ceteris paribus decline of
union wages in a partial equilibrium environment. As a consequence, union wages may actually
increase in response to a country’s movement from autarky to free trade when general equilibrium
feedback effects are accounted for. While all of these studies have contributed significantly to our
understanding of the role of labor unions in the context of product market integration, they do
not provide insights on how differences in wage-setting institutions shape the outcome in open
economies.
The first study that has addressed differences in the degree of centralization in collective
bargaining in the context of international trade is Bean, Danthine, Bernholz, and Malinvaud
(1990). In an open economy version of the model proposed by Calmfors and Driffill (1988),
these authors show that differences in unemployment rates between countries with differing
degrees of centralization in collective bargaining decline when product markets become more
integrated. Relying on insights from a similar setting, Danthine and Hunt (1994) therefore
conclude that the hump shape in the relationship between the degree of centralization in collective
bargaining and unemployment flattens in an open economy.5 Sørensen (1994) looks at the role
of centralization in union wage-setting from a different angle and investigates how differences in
wage-setting institutions affect the pattern of specialization in a two-sector trade model. The
degree of centralization in collective bargaining also features prominently in a literature that
broaches the role of central bank independence and its interaction with non-atomistic wage
setters in determining key macroeconomic variables, such as unemployment or inflation (see,
for instance, Cukierman and Lippi, 1999; Soskice and Iversen, 2000). Daniels, Nourzad, and
VanHoose (2006) extend the discussion to an open economy model that allows for international
trade flows. However, none of the existing studies in these two strands of the literature addresses
the differential impact of product and capital market integration, which is in the center of this
paper’s interest.
5It is worth noting that in Danthine and Hunt (1994) the impact of product market integration on the role of
wage-setting institutions is unique, because they consider a model with perfectly competitive producers and
inter-industry trade, implying that product market integration does not expose firms of a given industry to
stronger foreign competition in the product market.
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Since capital market integration is associated with job relocation in our setting, our analysis is
also related to a sizable literature on the interaction between union wage setting and multinational
activity. To the best of our knowledge, this interaction has first been addressed by Mezzetti and
Dinopoulos (1991), who point out that the threat to shift production abroad improves a firm’s
bargaining position and reduces the negotiated wage. Zhao (1995) and Eckel and Egger (2009)
argue that this threat point argument provides an incentive to set up a foreign production facility
from which the firm can import in the case of disagreement with the union. Leahy and Montagna
(2000) look explicitly on the role of centralization in union wage setting for the investment
incentives of multinational firms and investigate under which conditions inward foreign direct
investment is welfare improving. Lommerud, Meland, and Sørgard (2003) show that a fall in
trade costs may render multinational activity more attractive in the presence of unions, which
indicates that the interaction between different forms of globalization may be complicated when
collective bargaining leads to rent sharing between firms and workers.
Furthermore, the idea of footloose capital relates our analysis to a relatively small literature
studying union wage setting in the context of economic geography. In an early contribution to
this literature, Munch (2003) studies the location of firms in unionized countries with oligopolistic
market structure. Unions in this setting negotiate a premium on wages paid in a competitive
outside sector, and this generates agglomeration forces for the following reason. The more firms
are located in one country, the more workers are covered by union wage setting and the larger
is labor income, ceteris paribus. With segmented markets, a movement of firms to a country
therefore increases the local market and thus provides a stimulus for movement of additional
foreign firms. Due to this market size externality, the country that hosts the weaker unions will
end up hosting all firms if trade costs are sufficiently small and labor supply is sufficiently high.
While there is also a tendency of clustering firms in our setting, there are no agglomeration forces.
On the one hand, we abstract from an outside sector, so that capital outflow raises economy-
wide unemployment and therefore moderates union wage claims. This lowers the incentives
of firms to follow those who have already moved abroad. On the other hand, we consider an
integrated world market in the open economy, so that a market size externality does not exist
in our setting, so that we can safely abstract from mobility of capital owners, without affecting
equilibrium production patterns.
Picard and Toulemonde (2006) also shed light on the role of union wage setting for the existence
of agglomeration forces in open economies, but instead of the oligopolistic market structure
in Munch (2003), they consider monopolistically competitive firms. Picard and Toulemonde
(2003) add technological externalities to the picture of possible motives for agglomeration forces,
while closing demand linkages by focusing on a partial equilibrium environment. In this setting,
Picard and Toulemonde (2003) show that adjustments in union wage claims are an important
obstacle to a full clustering of industrial production. Finally, Persyn (2013) deviates from the
common assumption that firms make their investment decision prior to union wage setting and
investigates the wage setting of unions, who take into account their impact on firm location. All
these studies shed light on important aspects regarding the role of union wage setting for the
agglomeration of economic activity. However, by considering an outside sector that serves as
large labor reservoir, they are not suited to shed light on the link between footloose capital and
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economy-wide unemployment, which is at the heart of our interest.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the theoretical
framework and studies the differences between firm-level and sector-level wage setting in a closed
economy. In Section 4.3, we consider two open economies that are fully symmetric in all respects,
except for the prevailing degree of centralization in union wage setting, and study how the
movement from the closed to an open economy affects aggregate employment and welfare as
well as the real income of capital owners and workers. We distinguish between two scenarios
of openness: the short run, in which product markets are fully integrated, while investment
decisions are given and capital thus remains immobile; and the long run, in which both product
and capital markets are fully integrated. In Section 4.4, we investigate whether decentralization
in the country that hosts sector-level unions can be successful in preventing capital outflow
and the export of domestic jobs. The last section concludes with a brief summary of the most
important results.
4.2 The closed economy
We start our formal analysis with a detailed model description and a characterization of the
autarky equilibrium.
4.2.1 Assumptions
We consider an economy that is populated by L workers, each of them supplying one unit of
labor, and K capital owners, each of them supplying one unit of capital. Capital is required as
a fixed input for starting up and operating firms, while labor is used as a variable input in the
production process. Product markets are modeled along the lines of Neary (2003, 2009), who
provides a workhorse for studying oligopolistic competition in a general equilibrium environment.
Regarding the remuneration of the two factors, we assume that capital owners are entrepreneurs
and thus receive operating profits as a return on their capital input. There is no imperfection in
the capital market and free entry of firms. On the contrary, there is imperfection in the labor
market due to union wage-setting. The remainder of this subsection provides a detailed descrip-
tion of preferences, technology, competition, and labor market institutions.
Preferences and consumer demand
We assume that preferences are described by an additively separable utility function over a
continuum of different goods z, with the sub-utility for each of these goods being quadratic. The
utility function of consumer c is given by
Uc[{xc(z)}] =
∫ 1
0
axc(z)−
1
2
bxc(z)
2dz, (4.1)
and his/her budget constraint equals
∫ 1
0
p(z)xc(z)dz ≤ Ic, (4.2)
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where p(z) denotes the price of good z, and Ic is income of consumer c. Provided that the budget
constraint is binding, the solution to the consumer’s utility maximization problem, gives his/her
inverse demand function for good z:
p(z) =
1
λc
[a− bxc(z)], (4.3)
where λc is the consumer’s marginal utility of income, which is a function of the first and second
(uncentered) moments of prices,
µ ≡
∫ 1
0
p(z)dz and σ ≡
∫ 1
0
p(z)2dz, (4.4)
respectively, as well as income, Ic. Rearranging the consumer’s budget constraint, we can calcu-
late
λc =
aµ− bIc
σ
. (4.5)
To determine economy-wide consumer demand, X(z), we aggregate xc over all consumers.
This gives
p(z) =
1
λ
[A− bX(z)], (4.6)
where A ≡ (K + L)a, λ ≡
∑
c λc = (Aµ− bI) /σ, and I ≡
∑
c Ic. This captures a nice prop-
erty of consumer preferences in this model: Since preferences are quasi-homothetic, there exists
a positive representative consumer, so that maximizing this consumer’s utility subject to the
economy-wide budget constraint gives aggregate demand for consumer goods. The representa-
tive consumer also has a normative interpretation in our setting and his/her preferences can
therefore be used as a measure of social welfare. As extensively discussed in Neary (2009), ig-
noring constants, we can calculate U˜ = −λ2σ as a monotonically transformed measure of the
representative consumer’s indirect utility. And we can refer to changes in U˜ when being inter-
ested in economy-wide welfare effects.
Technology, production, and competition
In each sector, an endogenous number of firms, n(z), produces a homogeneous sector-specific
output. Firm number, n(z), is finite and firms therefore take into account their impact on
price p(z), when setting quantities in Cournot competition. However, in view of a continuum
of industries, firms rationally ignore their impact on economy-wide variables, such as λ or I.
Regarding production, we assume that firms in all industries employ the same technology. They
invest one unit of capital as a fixed input and must hire one unit of labor for each unit of output
they want to produce. Denoting output of firm j in industry z by yj(z), considering product
market clearing, i.e.
∑n(z)
k=1 yk(z) = X(z), and accounting for demand function (4.6), we can
write firm-level profits as follows:
Πj(z) ≡ λπj(z) =

A− b n(z)∑
k=1
yk(z)− λwj(z)

 yj(z). (4.7)
As explained in Neary (2009), λπj(z) can be interpreted as real profits at the margin, and
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changes in this variable do not exert direct welfare implications. However, such changes are still
instructive as they indicate adjustments of the competitive environment in the product market.
Throughout our analysis we focus on the case of a positive supply of all firms and, therefore,
restrict our attention to parameter configurations that lead to A > λwj(z) for all j and z.
Labor market institutions
We assume that wages are unilaterally set by unions before firms set their employment level,
produce and sell their products to consumers.6 Unions maximize an objective function V = (w−
w¯)ℓ, where ℓ is the number of employed union members, which, in the case of a closed shop, equals
the employment level of all firms in which the respective union is active (see Booth, 1995), w is
the union wage, and w¯ ≡ βw˜ is unemployment compensation, which is a constant share β ∈ (0, 1)
of a country’s economy-wide average wage, w˜. In the background, there is a proportional tax on
both sources of labor income, wages and unemployment benefits, which provides the revenues
for financing unemployment compensation. This income tax has the attractive feature of being
a lump-sum instrument, which allows for redistributing resources towards those who do not have
a job, without affecting the maximization problems of capital owners, firms, and unions in our
model.7 For that reason, there is no difference from the perspective of unions between setting
gross or net wages, while choosing gross notation helps saving on parameters in the subsequent
analysis. Furthermore, while wage w and unemployment compensation w¯ are nominal variables,
the outcome of the union’s maximization problem would of course be unaffected if both of these
variables were divided by a common deflator, such as the consumer price index or λ−1.
It is well established in the labor market literature that the wage-setting behavior of unions
crucially depends on the degree of centralization in the wage-setting process. The literature
distinguishes three possible degrees of centralization: the firm level, the sector level, and the
country level. According to OECD (2004) the degree of centralization has continuously declined
over the last decades, rendering firm-level and sector-level wage-setting predominant in most
industrialized countries.8 We therefore focus on these two forms of union wage-setting in the
subsequent analysis and investigate, in particular, how differences in the degree of centralization
affect the labor and product market outcomes in our model. When being organized at the
sector-level (index s), unions take into account the impact of their wage claims on sector-wide
employment. However, setting a uniform wage for all firms in the industry, they do not care how
a given sector-wide employment is distributed across firms in the respective industry. This is
captured by setting ℓ =
∑n(z)
k=1 lk(z). Things are different in the case of firm-level unions (index f)
who are only interested in the consequences of their wage claims for their firm’s employment level.
This is captured by setting ℓ = lj(z) and allowing for firm-specific wage rates.9 In summary, we
6Limiting union activity to wage setting, we ignore other important aspects of their activities and may therefore
end up with a too negative picture of their welfare consequences (see, for instance, Donado and Wa¨lde, 2012).
However, this should not be a particular problem for our analysis, because the main purpose of this paper is
shedding light on the differential impact of union wage-setting in the closed and the open economy.
7In this respect, the choice of the tax instrument is in the spirit of Davidson and Matusz (2006) and, in the
context of this paper, it allows us to highlight the role of wage-setting institutions in isolation from tax policy.
8For instance, firm-level wage setting can be found in Japan, Canada, U.K., or the U.S., while sector-level wage
setting is typical for central and northern European countries, such as Austria, Germany, the Netherlands or
Sweden.
9Of course, the observation that unions are only interested in firm-level employment does not mean that firm-
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can express the objectives of sector-level and firm-level unions in the following way:
V s(z) =
[
ws(z)− w¯
] n(z)∑
k=1
lk(z), V
f
j (z) =
[
wj(z)− w¯
]
lj(z). (4.8)
This completes our discussion of the basic model ingredients, and we are now equipped to solve
for the autarky equilibrium.
4.2.2 The autarky equilibrium
The equilibrium outcome is characterized by the solution to a three-stage game in which capital
owners decide on firm entry at stage one, unions enter and set wages at stage two, while firms
choose employment and compete in quantities at stage three. We solve this three stage game
through backward induction.
Output competition at Stage 3:
Under Cournot competition, firms set their output to maximize profits (4.7) subject to yj(z) ≥ 0.
The (interior) solution to this maximization problem is given by the first-order condition, which
can be reformulated to
yj(z) =
A− b
∑
k 6=j yk(z)− λwj(z)
2b
. (4.9)
Sector-level unions set a uniform industry-wide wage and since the profit-maximization problem
is the same for all firms in this industry, we have wk(z) = w(z) and thus yk(z) = y(z) for all
k = 1, ..., n(z). Things are different if unions are organized at the firm-level. In this case, union
wage claims are only binding for workers of a specific firm. However, since firms have perfect
foresight, producer j rationally anticipates symmetry of all competitors, implying wk(z) = w−j(z)
and thus yk(z) = y−j(z) for all k 6= j.10 In view of these insights, we can reformulate Eq. (4.9)
in the following way:
y(z) =
A− λw(z)
b(n(z) + 1)
, yj(z) =
A+ (n(z)− 1)λw−j(z)− n(z)λwj(z)
b(n(z) + 1)
. (4.10)
Wage setting at Stage 2:
In view of our technology assumptions, we have lj(z) = yj(z). Substituting the latter into union
objectives (4.8), accounting for (4.10), and maximizing the resulting expressions for w(z) and
wj(z), respectively, gives the first-order conditions
dV s(z)
dw(z)
=
A− 2λw(z) + λw¯
b(n(z) + 1)
= 0,
dV fj (z)
dwj(z)
=
A+ (n(z)− 1)λw−j(z)− 2n(z)λwj + n(z)λw¯
b(n(z) + 1)
= 0.
level unions disregard the impact of higher wage claims on the competitors’ employment levels. Since firms
set quantities in oligopolistic competition after the unions have chosen w, a higher wage claim reduces com-
petitiveness of the own firm and thus leads to output and employment adjustments of the firm’s competitors
in the subsequent Cournot competition.
10We use subscript −j for referring to all firms differing from j.
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Due to symmetry of all firms and unions in industry z, we can now set wj(z) = w−j(z) = w(z).
Solving for wages, therefore gives
λws(z) =
A+ λw¯
2
, λwf (z) =
A+ n(z)λw¯
n(z) + 1
(4.11)
in the case of sector-level and firm-level unions, respectively. According to (4.11), wage setting
of sector-level unions does not depend on the competitive environment in the product market,
while firm-level unions set lower wages in response to stronger product market competition as
captured by a higher n. This result is well known from a large literature analyzing wage setting
in unionized oligopoly. However, it refers to a partial equilibrium outcome as we have treated
unemployment benefits as exogenous so far. In general equilibrium, the average wage, w˜, and
thus the level of unemployment benefits, w¯ = βw˜, are endogenously determined. And the equi-
librium outcome of these two variables as well as the equilibrium number of firms that are active
in industry z, n(z), depend on how capital owners allocate K on the unit mass of industries.
Capital allocation and firm entry at Stage 1:
Capital owners make the investment decision to maximize their profit income. Substituting
wage rates (4.11) into output functions (4.10) and noting further that Πj = by2j , we can calculate
firm-level profits
Πs(z) =
1
b
(
A− λw¯
2b (n(z) + 1)
)2
, Πf (z) =
1
b
(
n(z) (A− λw¯)
(n(z) + 1)2
)2
, (4.12)
where firm indices have been neglected because all firms in an industry are symmetric. Differ-
entiating (4.12) with respect to n(z), we see that real profit income at the margin shrinks in the
number of competitors. Hence, income maximization of capital owners requires an equal number
of firms in all industries and thus an allocation of K according to the no arbitrage condition
Π(z) = Π for all z. With a unit mass of industries, we therefore get n = K and, since in
equilibrium industries are symmetric in all respects, we can omit sector indices from now on.
Furthermore, in view of the ex-post symmetry of sectors, we can set w¯ = βw. Equipped with
this insight, we can now solve for equilibrium wages, employment and profits in the symmetric
autarky equilibrium. This gives
W s ≡ λws =
A
2− β
, W f ≡ λwf =
A
1 + n(1− β)
. (4.13)
It is easily confirmed that n > 1 implies W s > W f , so that our model reproduces the textbook
result that sector-level unions set higher wages than firm-level unions (see Calmfors and Driffill,
1988, for supportive empirical evidence). Of course, when interpreting the two expressions in
(4.13) we must keep in mind that W s and W f are real wages at the margin, and differences in
these two variables therefore do not have a direct welfare implication. However, looking at these
variables is still instructive as they capture the strength of labor market imperfection. To be
more specific, substituting (4.13) into (4.10) and accounting for the symmetry of industries, we
can calculate firm-level output and employment under the two labor market regimes: ys = ls =
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W s(1− β)/[b(n+ 1)], yf = lf = W fn(1− β)/[b(n+ 1)].
Higher wage claims of sector-level unions lead to higher production costs and lower firm-level
output and employment than in the case of firm-level unions. With firms and industries being
symmetric in equilibrium, economy-wide employment equals nl. Denoting the unemployment
rate by u and focussing on parameter configurations for which not all workers find a job in
equilibrium, total employment under the two labor market regimes is given by
(1− us)L =
nA(1− β)
b(n+ 1)(2− β)
, (1− uf )L =
n2A(1− β)
b(n+ 1)[1 + n(1− β)]
. (4.14)
From (4.14) we can conclude that in an interior equilibrium with involuntary unemployment, i.e.
u > 0, labor supply is a non-binding constraint and thus aggregate employment independent of
labor endowment L (see Brecher, 1974, for a similar result). Furthermore, sector-level unions
generate a stronger labor market imperfection leading to higher unemployment than in the case
of firm-level unions i.e. us > uf . With prices being the same in all industries, it follows from
(4.4) and (4.5) that U˜ = −A+ bλI/P , where λI is total real income at the margin and P = λp
is the consumer price index. Noting further that a binding budget constraint requires that
aggregate revenues, Pny = P (1− u)L, equal aggregate income, λI, we can safely conclude that
λI/P = (1 − u)L. Hence, us > uf implies that welfare is lower with sector-level than with
firm-level unions: U˜ s < U˜f . Summing up, (4.14) captures the well known result that in a closed
economy sector-level unions are more detrimental for the economic performance of a country
than firm-level unions (see Calmfors and Driffill, 1988).
In a final step, we now analyze how different degrees of centralization in union wage setting
affect the two income groups, capital owners and workers, in our model. Welfare of an income
group can be measured by the indirect utility of this group’s representative agent, which, as-
suming identical preferences of workers and capital owners, can be expressed as an increasing
function of total real group-specific income. In view of (4.13) and (4.14), we can determine
economy-wide labor income, Φ ≡ (1− u)LW :11
Φs =
nA2(1− β)
b(n+ 1)(2− β)2
, Φf =
n2A2(1− β)
b(n+ 1) [1 + n(1− β)]2
. (4.15)
In a similar vein, we can account for Π = by2 to calculate economy-wide profit income Ψ = nΠ:
Ψs = Φs(1− β)/(n+ 1), Ψf = Φfn(1− β)/(n+ 1).
Since, by definition, economy-wide labor and profit income must add up to total income, i.e.
Φ + Ψ = λI, we can write Φ = φλI and Ψ = ψλI, where φ and ψ denote the income shares
attributed to workers and capital owners, respectively. For the two wage-setting institutions, we
can thus calculate
φs =
n+ 1
n+ 2− β
, ψs =
1− β
n+ 2− β
, (4.16)
φf =
n+ 1
(n+ 1) + n(1− β)
, ψf =
n(1− β)
(n+ 1) + n(1− β)
, (4.17)
11With unemployment benefits being financed by a tax on labor income, total gross wage income equals total net
wage income in our model, implying that taxation per se does not affect the distribution of income between
firm owners and workers in our setting.
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where φs > φf and ψs < ψf , provided that n > 1. Noting further that a binding budget
constraint implies that total income must equal total revenues, λI = Pny, we can calculate total
real labor and capital income, Φ/P = φ(1 − u)L and Ψ/P = ψ(1 − u)L, respectively. Using
(4.14), (4.16) and (4.17), we obtain
(
Φ
P
)s
=
nA(1− β)
b [n+ 2− β] (2− β)
,
(
Φ
P
)f
=
n2A(1− β)
b [(n+ 1) + n(1− β)] [1 + n(1− β)]
, (4.18)(
Ψ
P
)s
=
1− β
n+ 1
(
Φ
P
)s
,
(
Ψ
P
)f
=
n(1− β)
n+ 1
(
Φ
P
)f
. (4.19)
From inspection of (4.19), we can infer that capital owners are better off with wage setting
at the firm instead of the sector level. This is intuitive, as we know from above that both
total economic rents, (1 − u)L, as well as the share of rents attributed to capital owners, ψ,
are larger with wage-setting at the firm-level. Furthermore, from (4.18) we can infer that,
despite our finding of φs > φf , workers are also better off under firm-level wage setting, i.e.
(Φ/P )f > (Φ/P )s. However, this does not mean that all workers necessarily prefer firm-level to
sector-level unions.12
4.3 The open economy
Let us now consider trade between two countries, i = 1, 2, whose economies are of the type
analyzed in Section 4.2. We abstract from international shipment costs and assume that product
markets are fully integrated, so that consumers in both countries pay the same price. Labor is
internationally immobile, and we distinguish two scenarios with respect to capital mobility. In
the first one, we assume that the capital investment decision is given and thus firm allocation the
same as in the closed economy. We refer to this scenario as the short run because it captures the
idea that de-investment of capital takes time. In the long run, capital is footloose and invested
where it generates the highest return, which may be at home or abroad. Of course, the outflow of
capital must be distinguished from actual movements of capital owners, who are assumed to stay
in their home country and repatriate profits when capital is invested abroad. This is a common
assumption in footloose capital models and implies that the number of consumers within an
economy remains unaffected by adjustments in the investment decision of capital owners, which
simplifies welfare comparisons in the subsequent analysis enormously. Regarding labor market
institutions, we assume that the two economies differ in the degree of centralization in union
wage setting. To be more specific, we assume that country 1 is populated by sector-level unions,
while country 2 is populated by firm-level ones. This implies that in the closed economy the
labor market friction is more severe in country 1 than in country 2 and that country 1 ends
up with lower employment and welfare as well as with lower income of both capital owners and
workers under autarky.
To characterize the open economy equilibrium, we can follow the analysis in Section 4.2 step
by step. For studying product market competition, we first need to sum up consumer demand
12 In a supplement, which is available upon request, we show that if unemployment compensation is not too
generous, those who have a job (as well as those who are unemployed) in both scenarios are better off with
sector-level than with firm-level bargaining.
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in the two economies. This gives the indirect demand function
pt(z) =
1
λ¯
[
2A− bx¯t(z)
]
, (4.20)
where superscript t is introduced for referring to trade variables and, λ¯ ≡ λ1 + λ2 denotes
the world representative consumer’s marginal utility of income. Applying the product market
clearing condition, firm j’s profits are given by
Πtj(z) ≡ λ¯π
t
j(z) =

2A− b nt(z)∑
k=1
yk(z)− λ¯wj(z)

 yj(z), (4.21)
where nt(z) is the total number of domestic and foreign firms: nt(z) = n(z) + n∗(z), with the
asterisk indicating the foreign country variable. Solving the firm’s profit maximization problem,
we can calculate j’s optimal output
yj(z) =
2A+ n∗(z)λ¯w∗(z) + (n(z)− 1) λ¯w(z)− (n(z) + n∗(z)) λ¯wj(z)
b (n(z) + n∗(z) + 1)
(4.22)
as a function of the own as well as the domestic and foreign competitors’ wage rates, wj(z), w(z),
and w∗(z), respectively.
To solve for the unions’ wage setting problem, we can substitute (4.22) into the union objectives
in (4.8) and maximize the resulting expressions for the respective union wage rates. As formally
shown in the Appendix, this gives a system of two equations that characterize the optimal wage
choices for a given capital allocation:
λ¯w1(z) =
2A [2 (n1(z) + n2(z)) + 1] + n2(z) (n1(z) + n2(z)) λ¯w¯2
3n1(z)n2(z) + 2n2(z)2 + 4n1(z) + 4n2(z) + 2
+
(n2(z) + 1) [2n1(z) + n2(z) + 1] λ¯w¯1
3n1(z)n2(z) + 2n2(z)2 + 4n1(z) + 4n2(z) + 2
, (4.23)
λ¯w2(z) =
2A [n1(z) + 2n2(z) + 2] + n1(z) (n2(z) + 1) λ¯w¯1
3n1(z)n2(z) + 2n2(z)2 + 4n1(z) + 4n2(z) + 2
+
2 (n2(z) + 1) (n1(z) + n2(z)) λ¯w¯2
3n1(z)n2(z) + 2n2(z)2 + 4n1(z) + 4n2(z) + 2
. (4.24)
Regarding capital allocation at Stage 1, we distinguish between a short-run perspective, in
which firm numbers are determined by the investment decisions of the closed economy, and a
long-run perspective, in which investment decisions are adjusted to maximize the income of cap-
ital owners in the open economy. We start with an analysis of the short-run equilibrium.
A short-run trade equilibrium with immobile capital
Since the capital allocation in the short run is the same as under autarky, we have n1(z) =
n2(z) = n(z). Accounting for w¯i = βwi, we can therefore simplify wage rates (4.23) and (4.24)
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in the following way:
W sr1 ≡
(
λ¯w1
)sr
=
2A [(2n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)]
(n+ 1)(1− β) [(3n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)] + (2n+ 1)
, (4.25)
W sr2 ≡
(
λ¯w2
)sr
=
2A [(2n+ 1) + (n+ 1)(1− β)]
(n+ 1)(1− β) [(3n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)] + (2n+ 1)
, (4.26)
where superscript ‘sr ’ refers to the short run. Substituting (4.25) and (4.26) into Eq. (4.22)
yields short-run equilibrium output levels ysr1 = W
sr
1 (n+1)(1−β)/[b(2n+1)], y
sr
2 = W
sr
2 2n(1−
β)/[b(2n+1)]. In view of symmetry of all producers in country i, we thus obtain total employment
levels by substituting li = yi into (1− ui)L = nli:
(1− usr1 )L =
2nA(n+ 1)(1− β) [(2n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)]
b(2n+ 1) {(n+ 1)(1− β) [(3n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)] + (2n+ 1)}
, (4.27)
(1− usr2 )L =
4n2A(1− β) [(2n+ 1) + (n+ 1)(1− β)]
b(2n+ 1) {(n+ 1)(1− β) [(3n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)] + (2n+ 1)}
. (4.28)
As formally shown in the Appendix, we can infer from contrasting (4.14) with (4.27) and (4.28)
that product market integration provides an employment stimulus relative to the closed economy.
And this stimulus is essential for gains from trade in our model. Since prices are identical in all
industries, consumers equally distribute their income on the unit mass of industrial goods. In
this case, a pari passu increase in the employment of all firms allows for a proportional increase in
the consumption of all products in the open economy, implying that welfare unambiguously goes
up. Put differently, similar to the closed economy country-level aggregate employment is equal
to total real income in this economy, which is an adequate welfare measure in our setting. Since
product market integration raises employment in both countries relative to the closed economy,
welfare must be higher in the open economy than under autarky.
In addition, we can determine the relative importance of wage-setting institutions for the two
macroeconomic performance measures in the open as compared to the closed economy by looking
at the sign of ∆usr −∆u, with ∆usr ≡ usr1 − u
sr
2 and ∆u ≡ u
s − uf . It is formally shown in the
Appendix that the sign of ∆usr −∆u is equivalent to the sign of −1 + (1 − β)(n2 − 1), which
in general can be positive or negative. However, noting that even in countries with generous
unemployment compensation schemes, those who do not find a job receive a compensation that
is smaller than 2/3 of the going wage rate,13 i.e. β < 2/3, we can conclude that n ≥ 2 is
sufficient for ∆us < ∆u when focusing on empirically relevant parameter domains. In this case,
our model reproduces the well known result that product market integration reduces the impact
that differences in the degree of centralization exert on key macroeconomic variables, such as
unemployment and welfare (see Danthine and Hunt, 1994).
The following proposition summarizes the main insights from the analysis above.
Proposition 6 Product market integration increases total employment and aggregate welfare
in both countries, irrespective of the degree of centralization in the wage-setting process. Fur-
13For instance, gross replacement rates are smaller than 2/3 for all OECD countries. This is also
true for standard measures of net replacement rates. Only if social assistance and housing bene-
fits are added, net replacement rates are larger than 2/3 for some of the OECD countries. (Source:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/8/49971171.xlsx)
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thermore, provided that β < 2/3 and n ≥ 2, differences in the the degree of centralization in
the union wage-setting are less important for unemployment and welfare in the short-run open
economy than under autarky.
Proof. Analysis in the text and derivation details in the Appendix.
In a next step, we are interested in the group-specific effects of product market integration.
Substituting Wi from (4.25) and (4.26) as well as (1 − ui)L from (4.27) and (4.28) into Φi =
(1− ui)LWi we can determine economy-wide labor income at the margin in the two economies:
Φsr1 =
4nA2(n+ 1)(1− β) [(2n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)]2
b(2n+ 1) {(n+ 1)(1− β) [(3n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)] + (2n+ 1)}2
, (4.29)
Φsr2 =
8n2A2(1− β) [(2n+ 1) + (n+ 1)(1− β)]2
b(2n+ 1) {(n+ 1)(1− β) [(3n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)] + (2n+ 1)}2
. (4.30)
In a similar vein, we can substitute yi from into Ψi = nΠi = bny2i to economy-wide profit
income at the margin in the two economies: Ψsr1 = Φ
sr
1 (n + 1)(1 − β)/(2n + 1) and Ψ
sr
2 =
Φsr2 2n(1 − β)/(2n + 1). Noting from the discussion of the closed economy that Φi + Ψi = λ¯Ii
and P (1− ui)L = λ¯Ii, we can furthermore compute
φsr1 =
2n+ 1
(2n+ 1) + (n+ 1)(1− β)
, ψsr1 =
(n+ 1)(1− β)
(2n+ 1) + (n+ 1)(1− β)
, (4.31)
φsr2 =
2n+ 1
(2n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)
, ψsr2 =
2n(1− β)
(2n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)
. (4.32)
Contrasting (4.31) and (4.32) with their counterparts in the closed economy, we see that trade
improves the relative position of firm owners and lowers the share of total rents that is attributed
to workers. This is not surprising, as we know from above that trade reduces union wage claims.
While the reduction of wages ceteris paribus lowers welfare of those workers who already had a job
prior to product market integration, it does not mean that workers lose on average. The reason
is that prices fall and employment expands in response to the trade shock, and this generates
two counteracting positive effects on the welfare of workers.
To shed light on which of the opposing effects dominates, we can substitute (4.27) and (4.28)
together with (4.31) and (4.32) into Φi/P = φi(1 − ui)L. This allows us to calculate total real
wage income (and thus welfare) of workers:(
Φ1
P
)sr
=
2nA(n+ 1)(1− β) [(2n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)]
b [(2n+ 1) + (n+ 1)(1− β)] {(n+ 1)(1− β) [(3n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)] + (2n+ 1)}
(4.33)(
Φ2
P
)sr
=
4n2A(1− β) [(2n+ 1) + (n+ 1)(1− β)]
b [(2n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)] {(n+ 1)(1− β) [(3n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)] + (2n+ 1)}
. (4.34)
In the Appendix, we show that, in view of (4.18), (4.33) and (4.34), group-specific welfare of
workers is unambiguously higher in the (short-run) open than in the closed economy.
To determine total real profit income (and thus welfare) of capital owners, in the open economy,
we substitute (4.27) and (4.28) together with (4.31) and (4.32) into Ψi/P = ψi(1− ui)L, which
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yields (
Ψ1
P
)sr
=
(n+ 1)(1− β)
2n+ 1
(
Φ1
P
)sr
,
(
Ψ2
P
)sr
=
2n(1− β)
2n+ 1
(
Φ2
P
)sr
. (4.35)
Since we know from our analysis above that product market integration raises both the size of
total economic rents, (1− ui)L, as well as the share of these rents attributed to capital owners,
ψi, it is immediate that capital owners must be unambiguously better off in the open than in
the closed economy.
The following proposition summarizes the short-run effects of product market integration on
group-specific welfare of capital owners and workers.
Proposition 7 Product market integration increases real income and thus welfare of capital
owners as well as workers in both countries, irrespective of the degree of centralization in the
wage-setting process.
Proof. Analysis in the text and derivation details in the Appendix.
Since both workers and capital owners are better off in the open economy, one may be tempted
to conclude that both income groups should welcome efforts of policy makers to further deepen
economic integration. However this conclusion would be short-sighted for at least two reasons.
On the one hand, while workers as a group benefit from trade liberalization due to an expansion
in aggregate employment, this is not true for each individual worker. In particular, those who
already had a job in the closed economy may experience an income loss due to wage moder-
ation of unions in the open economy and thus may oppose further economic integration. On
the other hand, globalization in the 21st century is more than just the shipment of goods across
borders. In the last few decades the increasing ability of firms to shift production to low-cost
destinations has become a major concern of workers in the industrialized world. Hence, it is
important to shed further light on this facet of globalization for getting a better understand-
ing about why workers are often not enthusiastic about openness. Studying the consequences
of capital mobility and the associated relocation of jobs is the purpose of the following subsection.
A long-run trade equilibrium with footloose capital
In the long run, capital owners adjust their investment decisions in order to maximize profit
income. Abstracting from extra costs of foreign investment, we can conclude that an interior
equilibrium with full diversification requires Π1(z) = Π2(z) ≡ Πt(z) and Πt(z) = Πt for all z. In
view of linear demand, the two no arbitrage conditions imply that firm-level output must be the
same in both countries and all industries and thus wi(z) ≡ w for all z and i = 1, 2, according
to (4.22). There exists a unique full diversification equilibrium, which is characterized by a
symmetric firm allocation across industries, i.e. ni(z) = ni for all z, and n1 = 1, n2 = 2n− 1.14
This outcome is intuitive, as we know from the analysis of the short-run scenario that, with an
equal number of firms in either country, production costs are higher in country 1 than country
2, i.e. (λ¯w1)sr > (λ¯w2)sr. And due to this production cost differences, there is an incentive
14Since the formal proof of the existence of a unique diversification equilibrium is tedious and probably of just
little interest for a broader readership, we have deferred the respective proof to a supplement, which is available
upon request.
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for capital owners to de-invest in country 1 and to set up a new production facility in country
2. As a consequence, capital flows from country 1 to country 2, and this flow continues until
profit income is equalized, i.e. until union wage-setting generates the same outcome in the two
economies, irrespective of the prevailing differences in the degree of centralization in union wage-
setting. This requires n1 = 1, because in this case the sector-level union in country 1 degenerates
to a firm-level union.15
With the equilibrium firm allocation at hand, we can now calculate employment, welfare and
group-specific income in the long-run open economy equilibrium. Setting λ¯wi = λ¯w, n1 = 1, and
n2 = 2n− 1, we can rewrite (4.23) and (4.24) in the following way:
W lr ≡ (λ¯w)lr =
2A
1 + 2n(1− β)
, (4.36)
where superscript ‘lr’ refers to the long-run open economy equilibrium. Substituting the latter
into (4.22) gives firm-level employment and output in the long-run trade equilibrium: ylr =
W lr2n(1−β)/[b(2n+1)]. Comparing the output levels from the short-run and long-run equilib-
rium, it follows that ysr1 < y
lr < ysr2 . This ranking is intuitive. On the one hand, firms in country
1 lose their competitive disadvantage in the long run and thus experience an output increase. On
the other hand, firms in country 2 lose their competitive advantage relative to foreign producers
and thus experience an output reduction.
To determine aggregate employment in country i, we can add up firm-level employment (out-
put) over all firms that are active in country i. This gives
(
1− ulr1
)
L =
4nA(1− β)
b(2n+ 1) [1 + 2n(1− β)]
,
(
1− ulr2
)
L =
4n(2n− 1)A(1− β)
b(2n+ 1) [1 + 2n(1− β)]
. (4.37)
Comparing (4.37) with the aggregate employment levels of the short-run open economy equilib-
rium in (4.27) and (4.28), we see that capital flows towards the country with more decentralized
wage setting lower employment in country 1 and raise employment in country 2. From inspection
of Eq. (4.14), we can further note that if unemployment compensation is not too generous and
the number of competitors not too small the negative employment effect triggered by capital
outflow in country 1 may be strong enough to reverse the positive short-run effect of product
market integration. The higher is n, the more capital flows from country 1 to country 2, and the
stronger is the negative employment effect in country 1. The higher is β, the smaller is firm-level
employment and the smaller is ceteris paribus the number of domestic jobs replaced by foreign
ones in the case of capital outflow.
To determine country-specific welfare, we must look at total real income λ¯Ii/P . Noting that
total labor income equals Φi = (1 − ui)LW , while total capital income is Ψi = nby2, we can
15One might speculate that an outcome with n1 = 2n− 1 and n2 = 1 is an alternative candidate for a long-run
equilibrium firm allocation. However, this is not true. While n2 = 1 indeed implies that unions in country
2 set sector-wide wages that are binding for all workers employed in domestic production of the respective
industry, there remains an asymmetry in union coverage in the two economies, and hence the outcome of wage
setting in the two countries would not be the same in this case.
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calculate: (
λ¯I1
P
)lr
=
4nA(1− β)
b(2n+ 1) [1 + 2n(1− β)]
(2n+ 1) + 2n2(1− β)
(2n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)
, (4.38)(
λ¯I2
P
)lr
=
4nA(1− β)
b(2n+ 1) [1 + 2n(1− β)]
(2n− 1)(2n+ 1) + 2n2(1− β)
(2n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)
. (4.39)
according to (4.36) and (4.37).16 Noting from the analysis above that under autarky as well as in
the short run open economy aggregate income is equal to total employment, λ¯Ii/Pi = (1− ui)L,
we can infer the welfare effects of capital relocation from a comparison of (4.14), (4.27), (4.28),
(4.38) and (4.39). As formally shown in the Appendix, the inflow of capital unambiguously
raises welfare in country 2, whereas capital outflow has negative welfare consequences in country
1. However, this does not mean that country 1 is worse off in the long-run open economy
equilibrium than under autarky. On the contrary, provided that capital owners repatriate their
profits from their foreign production activity, welfare losses associated with capital outflow are
unambiguously lower than the welfare gains from product market integration in the short run.
Regarding the impact of the degree in union wage-setting on the relative macroeconomic
performance in the two economies, we show in the Appendix that capital outflow raises both the
employment as well as the welfare differential between the two economies, and this effect is strong
enough to render the respective differentials larger than under autarky. Hence, the finding in
Bean, Danthine, Bernholz, and Malinvaud (1990) and Danthine and Hunt (1994) that in an open
economy differences in wage-setting institutions are less important for the economic performance
of countries does no longer hold – at least in our setting – if one accounts for international
capital mobility as an important feature of open economies. All other things equal, the surge
of international capital flows over the last few decades may therefore lead to a revitalization
of the hump-shape relationship between the degree of centralization in union wage-setting and
unemployment as identified by Calmfors and Driffill (1988) for the closed economy.
The following proposition summarizes the impact of capital mobility on aggregate employment
and welfare as well as their differentials between the two economies.
Proposition 8 In the long run, capital inflows increase aggregate employment and welfare in
country 2, while capital outflows reduce employment and welfare in country 1. Furthermore,
welfare is definitely higher in the long-run open economy equilibrium than under autarky. The
same is true for employment in country 2, while it is not clear in general whether in the long run
openness increases or reduces employment in country 1 relative to autarky. Finally, in the long
run open economy, the employment and welfare differentials between the two economies are even
more pronounced than under autarky.
Proof. Analysis in the text and derivation details in the Appendix.
Being not only interested in aggregate but also in group-specific effects, we additionally deter-
mine real income of workers and entrepreneurs. Looking first at the group of workers, we can
16Total income of country 1 is given by
(
λ¯I1
)lr
= Φlr1
[
1 + 2n2(1− β)/(2n+ 1)
]
, while total income of country 2
is given by
(
λ¯I2
)lr
= Φlr2
[
1 + 2n2(1− β)/(4n2 − 1)
]
. Furthermore, the value of total domestic output equals
ni (Py)
lr = Φlri [1 + 2n(1− β)/(2n+ 1)]. Putting together and substituting for y
lr and ni, we can calculate(
λ¯I1/P
)lr
,
(
λ¯I2/P
)lr
in Eqs. (4.38) and (4.39), respectively.
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calculate17 and n1 = 1, n2 = 2n− 1, then gives (4.40) and (4.41), respectively.
(
Φ1
P
)lr
=
4nA(1− β)
b[1 + 2n(1− β)][(2n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)]
, (4.40)(
Φ2
P
)lr
=
4n(2n− 1)A(1− β)
b[1 + 2n(1− β)][(2n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)]
. (4.41)
Comparing (4.40) with total real wage income of workers in the short-run open economy, we find
that capital outflow harms workers in country 1. However, this does not mean that workers also
lose relative to autarky. Contrasting (4.40) with the respective expression for the closed economy
in (4.18), we find that welfare losses of workers due to capital outflow do not necessarily dominate
the short-run welfare stimulus this group experiences from product market integration. To be
more specific, we find that workers are the more likely better off in the long-run open economy
equilibrium than under autarky, the more generous is unemployment compensation and the
weaker is product market competition. Furthermore, due to capital inflow and the establishment
of new local jobs, workers in country 2 are unambiguously better off in the long-run open economy
equilibrium than in the short run or under autarky.
In a final step, we look at total real capital income. In the absence of extra costs for foreign
investment, profit income must be the same in the two economies, and it is given by18
(
Ψ
P
)lr
=
8n3A(1− β)2
b(2n+ 1)[(2n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)][1 + 2n(1− β)]
. (4.42)
Intuitively, capital mobility improves investment opportunities of capital owners in country 1,
who are therefore unambiguously better off in the long-run open economy equilibrium than in
the short run or under autarky. Things are different for capital owners in country 2. The inflow
of capital reduces the competitive advantage of country 2 firms relative to country 1 firms, with
negative consequences for the market position of country 2 firms. As a consequence, capital
owners in country 2 lose relative to the short-run open economy equilibrium, while they are still
better off than under autarky.
Proposition 9 In the long run, better investment opportunities reinforce the short-run stimulus
of trade on total real capital income in country 1. Capital outflow lowers welfare of workers in
country 1 relative to the short-run open economy equilibrium, but these losses need not be high
enough to destroy all benefits from product market integration. Capital inflow lowers income
of capital owners in country 2, but does not entirely destroy this group’s benefits from product
market integration. Finally, capital inflow reinforces the short-run gains of workers in country
2.
Proof. Analysis in the text and derivation details in the Appendix.
17From Footnote 16, we know that (Φi/P )
lr = niy
lr [1 + 2n(1− β)/(2n+ 1)]−1. Substituting ylr from above
18Substituting ylr into Ψ = nby2 and P = 2(A− bny), it is straightforward to compute (Ψ/P )lr in (4.42).
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4.4 Decentralization in union wage setting
In view of our insights from the previous section that workers in the country that hosts sector-
level unions are hurt in the long run due to capital outflow, we now analyze how a shift from
sector-level to firm-level wage setting in country 1 affects the capital allocation in our model.
Decentralization in union wage setting not only refers to a common trend within OECD countries
over the last few decades, but also captures a possible form of policy intervention that aims at
banning those factors which render capital outflow attractive. That this is a relevant policy
option can be inferred from the observation that in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, the
European Council has suggested to “review the wage setting arrangements, and, where necessary,
the degree of centralization in the bargaining process, [. . . ], while maintaining the autonomy
of the social partners in the collective bargaining process” (European Council, 2011) as one
promising instrument to stabilize the system.
But can decentralization be a successful reform? To answer this question, it is worth noting
that with firm-level wage setting everywhere, the real wage at the margin is the same in both
locations and given by W lr, while firm-level output is ylr. This outcome does not depend on
where capital is invested. In view of this invariance result, we have to impose an additional
assumption that allows us to determine capital allocation in the case of indifference. A plausible
solution to this problem can be derived from the observation that in the case of indifference
capital owners will refuse to adjust their investment decisions if de-investment would involve
just infinitesimally small costs. However, this implies that if decentralization in union wage
setting occurs after a long-run equilibrium with firm allocation n1 = 1 and n2 = 2n − 1 has
been established (ex-post decentralization, in short), it is ineffective and leaves all long-run
equilibrium variables unchanged. On the contrary, if decentralization occurs prior to the capital
outflow (ex-ante decentralization, in short) it is fully effective and bans the long-run incentives
for de-investment in country 1.19
Since ex-post decentralization does not alter the long-run equilibrium outlined in Section 4.3,
we focus on the impact of ex-ante decentralization in the subsequent analysis. Noting that wage
claims and output after the reform are given by W lr and ylr, respectively, we can calculate
aggregate employment materializing under firm-level union wage-setting in both economies (and
symmetric firm allocation n1 = n2 = n). This gives:
(1− ur)L =
4n2A(1− β)
b(2n+ 1)[1 + 2n(1− β)]
, (4.43)
where superscript r indicates post-reform (or post-decentralization) variables. With output per
firm increasing and the number of active firms remaining constant, total employment in country
1 is higher than in the short-run open economy equilibrium. Hence, the decentralization in union
wage-setting is not only successful in abolishing the incentives for capital outflow, but it also
provides an additional short-run stimulus for domestic employment, because it lowers union wage
claims and thus the competitive disadvantage of domestic firms in the international market. Of
19In the subsequent analysis, we disregard other policy measures that may be used to alter investment decisions
in a country’s favor, such as subsidies. While it is clear that governments have an incentive to use tax
instruments strategically in our setting, considering them would not provide any novel insights relative to
Haufler and Wooton (2010) and Ferrett and Wooton (2010), and this is the reason why we ignore them.
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course, this increase in the competitiveness of domestic firms generates negative spillovers on
the foreign labor market. Since firms in country 2 lose their competitive advantage vis-á-vis
the producers in country 1, they choose lower output and therefore employ less workers than
in the (pre-decentralization) short-run open economy equilibrium. In contrast to the long-run
open economy equilibrium studied in Section 4.3, there is furthermore no capital inflow that
compensates for the decline in production triggered by the improvement in the competitiveness
of country 1 firms, and hence aggregate employment in country 2 unambiguously falls in response
to decentralization in the wage setting of country 1 unions. With welfare being directly linked
to aggregate employment in this paper, it is immediate that the positive employment effects
in country 1 are associated with welfare gains, while the employment reduction in country 2 is
accompanied by welfare losses.
Equipped with these insights, we now take a closer look at the group-specific welfare effects of
ex-ante decentralization in the wage-setting of country 1. Welfare of workers is determined by
total real labor income (Φ/P )r, while welfare of capital owners is determined by total real profits
(Ψ/P )r. To calculate these variables, we can first determine total real labor income and total
real profit income at the margin, Φr = W r(1−ur)L and Ψr = nb(yr)2, respectively. Substituting
W lr, ylr, and (4.43), we obtain
Φr =
8n2A2(1− β)
b(2n+ 1)[1 + 2n(1− β)]2
, Ψr =
16n3A2(1− β)2
b(2n+ 1)2[1 + 2n(1− β)]2
. (4.44)
Similar to the analysis in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, it is also useful to calculate the share of economic
rents that accrues to workers and capital owners, φ = Φr/(λI)r and ψ = Ψr/(λI)r, respectively.
Noting that (λI)r = Ψr +Φr must hold by definition, we can calculate
φr =
2n+ 1
(2n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)
, ψr =
2n(1− β)
(2n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)
, (4.45)
respectively. Contrasting (4.45) with the respective findings in (4.31) and (4.32) gives the follow-
ing rankings φsr1 > φ
sr
2 = φ
r and ψsr1 < ψ
sr
2 = ψ
r. We can therefore conclude that decentralization
attributes a larger share of rents to capital owners in country 1, while leaving rent-sharing in
country 2 unaffected. To put it differently, the spillover effects identified above alter the total
size of economic rents in country 2, but not the way these rents are distributed between capital
owners and workers there.
Total real income of workers can now be calculated by substituting (4.43) and (4.45) into
(Φ/P )r = φr(1− ur)L, which gives
(
Φ
P
)r
=
4n2A(1− β)
b[1 + 2n(1− β)][(2n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)]
. (4.46)
From a comparison of (4.46) with (4.33), we can conclude that it is not clearcut in general
whether workers in country 1 gain or lose due to ex-ante decentralization relative to the short-
run open economy equilibrium. As formally shown in the Appendix, the outcome depends on
the competitive environment in the product market as well as the generosity of unemployment
compensation. If unemployment benefits are small and competition sufficiently strong, workers
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in country 1 are worse off after the decentralization in the wage-setting of local unions. However,
this does not mean that workers should oppose the reform. Decentralization in union wage
setting, while generating short-run losses, may still be to the benefit of workers, because it helps
avoiding the capital outflow and thus the even more disastrous long-run outcome in (4.40).
Things are different in country 2, where workers face double losses from ex-ante decentraliza-
tion in the wage setting of country 1. On the one hand, they lose because firms in country 2
experience a fall in their competitiveness relative to producers in country 1 and therefore hire
less workers in the short run (see above). On the other hand, they also lose because the reform
abolishes the incentives for capital relocation and thus destroys the long-run gains of workers in
country 2 due to import of jobs. One final remark is in order here. While workers in both coun-
tries lose from ex-ante decentralization, one should not be tempted to conclude that globalization
– by increasing the pressure to decentralize wage setting – lowers the welfare of workers. On the
contrary, product market integration generates huge short-run benefits for workers in our setting
and these benefits (while smaller) do still exist after the change in wage-setting institutions.
To round off the analysis in this section, we finally calculate group-specific welfare of capital
owners. Substituting (4.43) and (4.45) into (Ψ/P )r = ψr(1− ur)L, we obtain
(
Ψ
P
)r
=
8n3A(1− β)2
b(2n+ 1)[1 + 2n(1− β)][(2n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)]
. (4.47)
which replicates the outcome for the long-run open economy equilibrium in (4.42). We can
therefore infer the impact of ex-ante decentralization on welfare of capital owners from the
respective discussion in Section 4.3. Capital owners in country 1 are better off after the change
in the local wage setting institutions than in the short run open economy equilibrium or under
autarky. Capital owners in country 2 lose relative to the (pre-decentralization) short run open
economy equilibrium but are still better off than in the closed economy.
The following proposition summarizes the main insights from the analysis above.
Proposition 10 For the effectiveness of decentralization in union wage-setting, the timing is
important. If decentralization occurs after the capital outflow, it is not successful in restoring
the initial capital allocation. However, if decentralization occurs early, it can prevent the capital
outflow with positive consequences for domestic employment and welfare, and possibly the real
income of workers. This success comes at the cost of negative spillovers on country 2, where
employment, welfare, and real labor income shrink in response to decentralization in the wage-
setting of country 1 unions. At least in the long run, capital owners are not affected by the
decentralization in country 1, because they can always enforce the outcome of firm-level wage-
setting by relocating their investment accordingly.
Proof. Analysis in the text and derivation details in the Appendix.
The general recommendation from our analysis for policy makers who aim at securing domestic
jobs in an open economy is clear. Act early to prevent capital outflow, because it may be difficult
(if not impossible) to reverse the investment decisions of domestic capital owners once they have
set up their production facilities abroad. The costs of responding late to new challenges in an
open economy may be even more significant if agglomeration forces are at work. In this case, a
government that aims at persuading domestic capital owners to invest at home instead of abroad
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may have to pay the full agglomeration rent – in addition to the direct costs of de-investment
in the foreign country – when these capital owners have already closed their domestic plants
because of the strong local wage-setting institutions.
4.5 Concluding remarks
This paper presents a general oligopolistic equilibrium model with unionized labor markets and
two countries that differ in the degree of centralization in union wage setting. In this framework,
we investigate how openness alters the way in which the degree of centralization in union wage
setting affects key macroeconomic variables, such as welfare and unemployment. Thereby we
distinguish two forms of openness: a short-run scenario, in which product markets are fully
integrated, while capital markets remain segmented; and a long-run scenario, in which both
product and capital markets are integrated. In the short run, product market integration has
the expected effects. It lowers the scope of unions to set excessive wages, with positive effects
on welfare and economy-wide employment in both economies. Furthermore, the results from
our analysis are consistent with findings from previous research that differences in the degree of
centralization in union wage-setting are less important for unemployment and welfare in open
economies. We also shed light on group-specific effects of openness and show that even though
product market integration alters the way economic rents are distributed in the society, the
overall increase in production generates benefits for both income groups in our model: capital
owners and workers.
However, our analysis also makes clear that these optimistic conclusions regarding the con-
sequences of openness refer to a short-run perspective. When capital becomes internationally
mobile it searches for the best investment opportunities worldwide and therefore moves to the
country with less centralized wage setting and lower labor costs. The capital outflow reduces
welfare and employment in the country with the higher degree of centralization in union wage-
setting and alters the distribution of income in this economy significantly. While workers are
worse off due to an export of jobs, capital owners benefit from having access to better invest-
ment opportunities. Things are exactly the opposite in the country with the more decentralized
level of wage-setting. Due to an inflow of capital this country experiences a welfare gain and
an employment expansion. Furthermore, while workers benefit from an inflow of capital and
the establishment of new local jobs, capital owners are worse off, because their firms lose their
competitive advantage in the product market. Our results also indicate that in the long run,
openness does not reduce the impact the degree of centralization exerts on macroeconomic per-
formance measures, but instead widens the gap in unemployment and welfare between the two
economies.
To round off the discussion in this paper, we have looked at the consequences of decentralization
of wage-setting in the country with the more severe labor market imperfection. The results from
this analysis make clear that such a reform can be successful in preventing capital outflow when
it occurs early, i.e. before the relocation of capital starts. Early attempts to decentralize union
wage-setting can indeed be essential for securing benefits of product market integration in the
long run and for rendering globalization a success story for all income groups. On the contrary, if
decentralization starts after capital owners have adjusted their investment decisions in the long
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run, the reform is less promising and may fail to restore the initial capital allocation. In this
case, long-run losses of some income groups may be unavoidable, rendering strong and persistent
opposition by the respective income groups a real threat to globalization.
While we hope that this paper broadens the understanding of how different wage-setting in-
stitutions shape the outcome in open economies, it is clear that the analysis builds on many
simplifying assumptions which are attractive from the perspective of analytical tractability, but
at the same time limit the ability of our model to inform policy makers on how to solve real world
problems. One restrictive feature of our analysis is the assumption of identical unemployment
compensation schemes. Since we know that OECD countries systematically differ in this respect,
it may be a worthwhile task for future research to consider more explicitly the interaction be-
tween union wage-setting institutions and unemployment compensation schemes for determining
unemployment and welfare in open economies. Another restrictive assumption in our model
is the immobility of workers. While it is evident that capital and product markets are more
integrated than labor markets, the increasing mobility of workers has also been an important
aspect of globalization in the last few decades. Whereas a detailed discussion on how migration
alters the insights from our analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that
the higher probability of getting a job abroad may be a key rationale for emigration in our set-
ting. Hence, if migration were possible, workers would follow capital in the long run, and this
points to differences in the degree of centralization in union wage setting as an important source
of agglomeration, with industry production concentrating in those locations that offer the least
restrictive labor market institutions.
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4.6 Appendix
Derivation of Eq. (4.22)
Maximizing profits (4.21) for yj(z), gives the first-order condition dΠtj(z)/dyj = 0. Solving the
latter for yj , gives the best-reply function 2byj(z) = 2A − b
∑
k 6=j yk(z) − λ¯wj(z). We can now
note two things: first, a structurally identical best-response function can be calculated for any
other producer k 6= j; second, due to perfect foresight, firm j rationally anticipates that all
competitors of country i = 1, 2 choose the same output in equilibrium. Introducing an asterisk
for indicating foreign variables, we can thus rewrite the best response function of firm j in the
following way:
yj(z) =
2A− b (n(z)− 1) y(z)− bn∗(z)y∗(z)− λ¯wj(z)
2b
, (4.48)
where y(z), y∗(z) refers to the common output of domestic and foreign competitors, respectively.
Accounting for the symmetry assumption of domestic and foreign competitors in the first order-
conditions of the respective producers, we can furthermore calculate
y(z) =
2A− bn∗(z)y∗(z)− byj(z)− λ¯w(z)
n(z)b
(4.49)
y∗(z) =
2A− b (n(z)− 1) y(z)− byj(z)− λ¯w
∗(z)
(n∗(z) + 1) b
, (4.50)
where λ¯w(z) and λ¯w∗(z) refer to the common wage rates of domestic and foreign competitors of
firm j, respectively. We can now solve system (4.49) and (4.50) for y(z) and y∗(z). This gives
y(z) =
2A− byj(z) + n
∗(z)λ¯w∗(z)− (n∗(z) + 1) λ¯w(z)
(n(z) + n∗(z)) b
, (4.51)
y∗(z) =
2A− byj(z) + (n(z)− 1) λ¯w(z)− n(z)λ¯w
∗(z)
(n(z) + n∗(z)) b
. (4.52)
Substituting (4.51) and (4.52) into (4.48), finally gives (4.22). QED
Derivation of Eqs. (4.23) and (4.24)
Since sector-level unions choose a uniform wage rate for all employees in the respective sector,
we can set w1j(z) = w1(z) in (4.22) to determine industry-wide employment in country 1:∑n(z)
j=1 l1j(z) = ny1(z). Substituting the latter into the union objective of sector-level union in
(4.8), gives
V1 =
[w1(z)− w¯1]n1(z)
[
2A+ n2(z)λ¯w2(z)− (n2(z) + 1) λ¯w1(z)
]
b (n1(z) + n2(z) + 1)
.
Maximizing V1 for w1(z) gives the first-order condition dV1/w1(z) = 0, which can be reformulated
to
λ¯w1(z) =
2A+ n2(z)λ¯w2(z) + (n2(z) + 1) λ¯w¯1
2 (n2(z) + 1)
. (4.53)
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In a similar vein, we can substitute (4.22) together with l2j(z) = y2j(z) into the objective function
of firm-level unions in (4.8), which gives
V2j(z) =
[w2j(z)− w¯2]
[
2A+ n1(z)λ¯w1(z) + (n2(z)− 1) λ¯w2(z)− (n2(z) + n1(z)) λ¯w2j(z)
]
b (n1(z) + n2(z) + 1)
.
Maximizing this objective for w2j(z) gives the first-order condition dV2j/dw2j = 0. Rearranging
terms and noting that w2j(z) = w2(z) must hold due to ex-post symmetry we can calculate
λ¯w2(z) =
2A+ n1(z)λ¯w1(z) + (n1(z) + n2(z)) λ¯w¯2
2n1(z) + n2(z) + 1
. (4.54)
Eqs. (4.53) and (4.54) constitute a system of two equations, which jointly determine wage rates
λ¯w1(z) and λ¯w2(z) in (4.23) and (4.24). QED
The impact of product market integration on economy-wide employment
Using (4.14) and (4.27), we can show that the sign of ∆u1 ≡ (1− u
sr
1 )L− (1− u
s)L is equivalent
to the sign of γ¯u1 ≡ (2n + 1)(2n
2 + 2n+ 1) + (1− β)(n + 1)(2n2 + 5n + 1) + (1 − β)22n(n+ 1)
and thus positive. In a similar way, we can infer from (4.14) and (4.28) that the sign of ∆u2 ≡
(1− usr2 )L− (1− u
f )L is equivalent to the sign of γ¯u2 ≡ (2n+ 1)(2n+ 3) + (1− β)(n+ 1)(2n
2 +
3n+ 3) + (1− β)22n(n+ 1), and hence is also positive. Putting together, we can thus conclude
that product market integration stimulates employment in both locations. QED
The impact of product market integration on rent sharing
Looking first at country 1, we can infer from a comparison of (4.16) and (4.32) that
∆ψ1 ≡ ψ
sr
1 − ψ
s =
n2(1− β)
[(2n+ 1) + (n+ 1)(1− β)][(n+ 1) + (1− β)]
> 0, (4.55)
while for country 2, we get
∆ψ2 ≡ ψ
sr
2 − ψ
f =
n(1− β)
[(2n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)][(n+ 1) + n(1− β)]
> 0. (4.56)
Hence, we see that capital owners in both countries are able to extract a larger share of economic
rents in the short-run open economy equilibrium than under autarky.
The impact of product market integration on the employment and welfare
differential between the two economies
In the closed economy the employment differential between the two countries is given by ∆u ≡
(1− uf )L− (1− us)L = (us − uf )L:
∆u =
n(n− 1)A(1− β)
b(n+ 1)(2− β) [1 + n(1− β)]
, (4.57)
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according to (4.14). Furthermore, accounting for (4.27) and (4.28), we can compute the respective
differential in the short-run open economy:
∆usr =
2n(n− 1)A(1− β)
b {(n+ 1)(1− β) [(3n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)] + (2n+ 1)}
. (4.58)
Combining (4.57) and (4.58), it is straightforward to show that the sign of∆u−∆usr is equivalent
to δsru ≡ −1+(1−β)(n
2−1). Hence, ∆u−∆usr is positive if β < 2/3 and n ≥ 2. Finally, noting
that aggregate employment equals total real income in the two economies and and that total
real income is a suitable welfare measure in our model, we can conclude that product market
integration lowers the employment and welfare differential between the two economies. QED
The impact of product market integration on real labor income
Looking first at country 1, we can note that total real labor income (and thus the welfare
of workers) in the short-run open economy is higher than, equal to, or smaller than in the
closed economy if ∆Φ1 ≡ (Φ1/P )
sr − (Φ/P )s >,=, < 0. In view of (4.18) and (4.33), we can
furthermore show that the sign of ∆Φ1 is equivalent to the sign of γ1(n, β) ≡ 4n
3 + 6n2 + 4n +
1+ (1− β)
(
2n2 + 7n+ 2
)
(n+1)− (1− β)2
(
3n2 − 6n− 1
)
(n+1)− 2(1− β)3n (n− 1) (n+1).
Noting that γ1(n, β) > 0 holds for any possible combination of n ≥ 1 and β ∈ (0, 1), we
can conclude that trade increases real income and welfare of workers in country 1. Looking
at country 2, we can note that total labor income in the open economy is higher than, equal
to, or lower than under autarky if ∆Φ2 ≡ (Φ/P )
sr − (Φ/P )s >,=, < 0. In view of (4.18) and
(4.34), we can furthermore show that the sign of ∆Φ2 is equivalent to the sign of γ2(n, β) ≡
(2n + 1)(2n + 3) + (1 − β)[(n + 1)2(2n + 1) + (2n + 1)2 + 1] + 2(1 − β)2n(n2 + n + 2). Noting
that γ2(n, β) > 0 holds for any n ≥ 1 and β ∈ (0, 1), we can thus safely conclude that product
market integration increases real income and welfare of workers in country 2. QED
The impact of trade and capital mobility on aggregate employment
Let us first look at country 1. The employment effects of capital outflow are determined by the
sign of ∆¯u1 ≡ u
sr
1 − u
lr
1 , which in view of (4.27) and (4.37) is equal to the sign of γ¯
u
1 (n, β) ≡
−(n − 1)
[
(2n + 1) + 2(n + 1)(2n + 1)(1 − β) + 4n(n + 1)(1 − β)2
]
. Since γ¯1(n, β) ≤ 0 holds
for all n ≥ 1 and β ∈ (0, 1), aggregate employment in country 1 must be lower in the long
run than in the short-run open economy. Furthermore, to see whether capital mobility reverses
the positive employment stimulus from product market integration, we have to look at ∆˜u1 ≡
us1 − u
lr
1 . From (4.14) and (4.37), it follows that the sign of ∆˜
u
1 is equivalent to the sign of
γ˜u1 (n, β) ≡ (2n + 3) − 2(1 − β)
(
2n2 − n− 2
)
. It is obvious that γ˜u1 (n, 1) = 2n + 3 > 0, while
γ˜u1 (n, 0) = −4n
2 + 4n + 7, where γ˜u1 (0, 0) = 7 and limn→∞ γ˜
u
1 (n, 0) < 0 imply that the sign of
γ˜u1 (n, 0) is ambiguous. In addition, we can show that γ˜
u
1 (1, β) = 7 − 2β > 0. Accounting for
the properties of γ˜u1 (n, β), we can therefore conclude that openness may have negative long-run
employment effects in country 1 if n is sufficiently large, while β is sufficiently small. Turning
to country 2, we can note that capital provides an employment stimulus if ∆¯u2 ≡ u
sr
2 − u
lr
2 ≥ 0.
Noting that, in view of (4.28) and (4.37), the sign of ∆u2 is equivalent to the sign of γ¯
u
2 (n, β) ≡
(n− 1)
[
(2n+1)+(1−β)(2n2+4n+1)+2n(n+1)(1−β)2
]
and thus positive for any n > 1 and
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β ∈ (0, 1), we can safely conclude that capital inflow reinforces the employment stimulus from
product market integration. QED
The impact of trade and capital mobility on aggregate welfare
Let us first look at country 1. The welfare implications of capital outflow can be inferred from
the sign of ∆¯U1 ≡
(
λ¯I1/P
)lr
−
(
λ¯I1/P
)sr
. Noting from our previous analysis that (λI1/P )
sr =
(1− usr1 )L, it follows from (4.27) and (4.38) that the sign of ∆¯
U
1 is equivalent to the sign of
γ¯U1 (n, β) ≡ −(n − 1)
[
(2n + 1)2 + 2(1 − β)(2n + 1)(2n2 + 2n + 1) + 4(1 − β)2n(n + 1)2
]
. Since
γ¯1(n, β) < 0 holds for any n > 1 and β ∈ (0, 1), it is clear that capital outflow lowers welfare
relative to the short-run open economy. To see, whether this detrimental effect can be strong
enough to reverse the positive welfare implications of product market integration, we have to
determine the sign of ∆˜U1 ≡
(
λ¯I1/P
)lr
−
(
λ¯I/P
)s
. Noting that
(
λ¯I/P
)s
= (1 − us)L, we can
infer from (4.14) and (4.38) that ∆˜U1 must be positive because γ˜
U
1 (n, β) ≡ (2n + 1)(2n + 3) +
4(1 − β)(n + 1)2 + 4(1 − β)2n2 > 0 holds for any n > 1 and β ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, we can
safely conclude that welfare in country 1 is higher in the long run open economy equilibrium
than under autarky. To determine the welfare effects of capital inflow in country 2, we can
evaluate ∆¯U2 ≡
(
λ¯I2/P
)lr
−
(
λ¯I2/P
)sr
. Noting that (λI2/P )
sr = (1− usr2 )L and accounting
for (4.28) and (4.39), we can show that the sign of ∆¯U2 is equivalent to the sign of γ¯
U
2 (n, β) ≡
(n− 1)
[
(2n+ 1)2 + (1− β)(4n3 + 10n2 + 6n+ 1) + 2(1− β)2n(n2 + 3n+ 1)
]
. Since γ¯U2 (n, β) is
positive for any n > 1, β ∈ (0, 1), we can thus safely conclude that capital inflow amplifies the
positive short-run welfare gains from product market integration. QED
The impact of trade and capital mobility on the employment and welfare
differential
In the closed economy, the employment differential between the two countries is given by (4.57).
In the long-run open economy, the respective differential is given by∆ulr ≡ (1−ulr2 )L−(1−u
lr
1 )L:
∆ulr ≡
8n(n− 1)A(1− β)
b(2n+ 1) [1 + 2n(1− β)]
, (4.59)
according to (4.37). Combining (4.57) and (4.59), we can show that the sign of ∆u − ∆ulr is
equivalent to the sign of δlru ≡ −(6n+ 3)− 2(1− β)(4n
2 + 7n+ 2)− (1− β)28n(n+ 1), which is
negative. In a similar vein, we can compare (4.58) and (4.59) to see that the sign of ∆usr−∆ulr
is equivalent to the sign of δ˜lru ≡ −(7n + 3) − 2(1 − β)(n + 1)(5n + 2) − (1 − β)
28n(n + 1) and
thus negative.
Let us now turn to the welfare differential. Accounting for (4.38) and (4.39), we can show that
the real income differential between the two countries in the long-run open economy equilibrium
is given by ∆U˜ lr ≡ (λ¯I2/P )lr − (λ¯I1/P )lr:
∆U˜ lr ≡
8n(n− 1)A(1− β)
b[1 + 2n(1− β)][(2n+ 1) + 2n(1− β)]
. (4.60)
Noting further that ∆U˜ ≡ (λ¯I/P )f − (λ¯I/P )s = ∆u holds in the closed economy, we can
infer from comparing (4.57) with (4.60) that the sign of ∆U˜ − ∆U˜ lr is equivalent to the sign
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of δlrU ≡ −(6n + 7) − 4(1 − β)(n
2 + 3n + 2) − (1 − β)24n(n + 2) and thus negative. Finally,
noting that ∆U˜ sr ≡ (λ¯I2/P )sr − (λ¯I1/P )sr = ∆usr, it follows from (4.58) and (4.60) that the
sign of ∆U˜ sr − ∆U˜ lr is equivalent to the sign of δ˜lrU ≡ −(6n + 3) − 4(1 − β)(2n
2 + 3n + 2) −
4(1− β)2n(n+ 2) and thus negative. Putting together, we can therefore conclude that both the
employment differential and the welfare differential are more pronounced in the long-run open
economy equilibrium than in the short run or under autarky. QED
The impact of trade and capital mobility on total real labor income
For country 1, we can infer the impact of capital outflow on total real labor income from the sign of
∆¯Φ1 ≡ (Φ1/P )
lr−(Φ1/P )
sr. In view of (4.33) and (4.40), we can conclude that γ¯Φ1 (n, β) ≡ −(n−
1)
[
(2n+1)2+4(1−β)(n+1)(2n2+3n+1)+2(1−β)2(n+1)(8n2+7n+1)+4(1−β)3(n+1)n
]
< 0
implies ∆¯Φ1 < 0, so that capital outflow reduces total real labor income in country 1 relative to
the short-run open economy equilibrium. To see whether this income loss is strong enough to
reverse the positive real income stimulus from product market integration, we have to determine
the sign of ∆˜Φ1 ≡ (Φ1/P )
lr − (Φ/P )s. In view of (4.18) and (4.40) we can conclude that the sign
of ∆˜Φ1 is equivalent to the sign of γ˜
Φ
1 (n, β) ≡ (2n + 3) − 4(1 − β)(n
2 − 2) − 4(1 − β)2(n2 − 1).
It is easily confirmed that γ˜Φ1 (n, 1) = 2n + 3 > 0, while γ˜
Φ
1 (n, 0) = 15 + 2n − 8n
2, where
γ˜Φ1 (0, 0) = 15 > 0 and limn→∞ γ˜
Φ
1 (n, 0) < 0 imply that the sign of γ˜
Φ
1 (n, 0) is ambiguous.
Accounting for the properties of γ˜Φ1 (n, β), we can therefore conclude that openness may generate
long-run welfare losses of workers if n is sufficiently large, while β is sufficiently small. Turning
to country 2, we can infer the impact of capital inflow on total real labor income by determining
the sign of ∆¯Φ2 ≡ (Φ2/P )
lr − (Φ2/P )
sr. Accounting for (4.34) and (4.41), we can conclude that
γ¯Φ2 (n, β) ≡ (n− 1)
[
(2n+ 1)2 + (1− β)
(
2n2 + 4n+ 1
)
+ 2(1− β)2n(n+ 1)
]
> 0 implies ∆¯Φ2 > 0,
so that capital inflow amplifies the positive welfare implications for workers triggered by product
market integration. QED
The impact of trade and capital mobility on total real capital income
Let us first look at country 1, where we can infer the impact of capital inflow on total real
capital income from determining the sign of ∆¯Ψ1 ≡ (Ψ1/P )
lr − (Ψ1/P )
sr. Accounting for (4.35)
and (4.42), we can show that the sign of ∆¯Ψ1 is equivalent to the sign of γ¯
Ψ
1 (n, β) ≡ (n−1)
[
(2n+
1)2(3n+ 1) + 2(1− β)n(n+ 1)(2n+ 1)(4n+ 3) + 4(1− β)2n2(n+ 1)(3n+ 2)
]
, which is positive
for any n > 1 and β ∈ (0, 1). Hence, we can safely conclude that capital outflow reinforces the
positive short-run impact of product market integration on total real capital income. Turning
to country 2, we can infer the impact of capital inflow on total real income of domestic capital
owners from the sign of ∆¯Ψ2 ≡ (Ψ2/P )
lr − (Ψ2/P )
sr, which is equivalent to the sign of γ¯Ψ2 ≡
−(1 − β)n(n − 1) and thus negative. This implies that capital inflow lowers total real income
of capital owners in country 2 relative to the short-run open economy equilibrium. To see
whether this negative impact is strong enough to reverse the short-run benefits of this income
group from product market integration, we can look at the sign of ∆˜Ψ2 ≡ (Ψ2/P )
lr − (Ψ2/P )
f .
Accounting for (4.19) and (4.42), we can show that the sign of ∆˜Ψ2 is equivalent to the sign of
γ˜Ψ2 ≡ 4n
2+12n+7+(1−β)12n(n+1)+(1−β)24n2 and thus positive. Hence, capital owners in
country 2, while losing from capital inflow, are better off in a long-run open economy equilibrium
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than under autarky. QED
The impact of ex-ante decentralization in union wage-setting on employment
and welfare
Let us first look at country 1, where we can infer the employment effects of ex-ante decen-
tralization in union wage setting from determining the sign of ∆ˆu1 ≡ u
sr
1 − u
r
1. Accounting
for (4.27) and (4.43), we can show that the sign of ∆ˆu1 is equivalent to the sign of γˆ
u
1 (n, β) ≡
(n − 1)[(2n + 1) + 2n(n + 1)(1 − β)]. Since γˆu1 (n, β) > 0 holds for any n > 1 and β ∈ (0, 1)
we can conclude that ex-ante decentralization in the wage-setting of domestic unions stimulates
employment and – in the absence of international capital flows – also welfare in country 1 rela-
tive to the short-run open economy equilibrium in Section 4.3. These positive aggregate effects
of decentralization also extend to the long run, because we know from the previous analysis
that capital outflow, which is prevented by the reform of country 1’s wage-setting institutions,
is associated with a decline in employment and welfare in country 1. For country 2, we can
infer the employment and welfare effects of ex-ante decentralization in union wage-setting from
the sign of ∆ˆu2 ≡ u
sr
2 − u
r
2, which, in view of (4.28) and (4.43), is equivalent to the sign of
γˆu2 (n, β) ≡ −(1− β)n(n− 1) and thus negative. We can therefore conclude that ex-ante decen-
tralization in the wage-setting of country 1 unions lowers employment and welfare in country 2
relative to the short-run and – since there are no international capital flows after the reform –
the long-run open economy equilibrium in Section 4.3. QED
The impact of ex-ante decentralization in union wage-setting on total real labor
income
For country 1, we can infer the short-run impact of ex-ante decentralization in the wage-setting
of local unions on total real labor income from the sign of ∆ˆΦ1 ≡ (Φ1/P )
r − (Φ1/P )
sr. In view
of (4.33) and (4.46), we can show that the sign of ∆ˆΦ1 is equivalent to the sign of (n − 1)γˆ
Φ
1 ,
with γˆΦ1 ≡ (2n + 1)
2 + (1− β)2n(n+ 1)(2n + 1) − (1− β)22n(n + 1)2 − (1 − β)34n2(n + 1). It
is easily confirmed that γˆΦ1 (n, 1) = (2n+ 1)
2 > 0, while γˆΦ1 (n, 0) = −2n
3 + 2n2 + 4n+ 1, where
γˆΦ1 (1, 0) = 1 > 0, and limn→∞ γˆ
Φ
1 (n, 0) < 0 imply that the sign of γˆ
Φ
1 (n, 0) is not clearcut in
general. To be more specific, there exists a unique nˆ(β) > 1 such that γˆΦ1 (n, 0) > 0 if n < nˆ(β),
while γˆΦ1 (n, 0) < 0 if n > nˆ(β). Accounting for the properties of γˆ
Φ
1 (n, β), we can therefore
conclude that ex-ante decentralization in the wage-setting of domestic unions can lower total
real labor income in country 1 relative to the short-run open economy in Section 4.3, if n is
sufficiently high, while β is sufficiently small. Otherwise, workers in country 1 benefit form this
change in local wage-setting institutions. Regarding the long-run implications of the ex-ante
decentralization in domestic union wage-setting, it is straightforward to infer from (4.40) and
(4.46) that (Φ1/P )
r− (Φ1/P )
lr > 0. Furthermore, we can determine the short-run consequences
of ex-ante decentralization in the wage-setting of country 1 for total real labor income in country
2 when looking at the sign of ∆ˆΦ2 ≡ (Φ2/P )
r − (Φ2/P )
sr, which, in view of (4.34) and (4.46),
is equivalent to the sign of γˆΦ2 ≡ −(1− β)n(n− 1) and thus negative. Since we also know from
the previous analysis that capital inflow renders workers in country 2 better off, we can conclude
that decentralization in the wage-setting of country 1 unions lowers total real labor income in
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country 2 relative to the short-run and long-run open economy equilibria analyzed in Section
4.3. QED
Net wage income with sector-level and firm-level unions
A balanced budget of the government requires
tη(1− uη)LW η = (1− tη)uηLβW η, (4.61)
where tη is the proportional income tax rate under labor market regime η = s, f . Solving (4.61)
for tη, we can calculate 1− tη = (1− uη)/ [1− uη(1− β)]. Substituting uη from (4.14), therefore
implies
1− ts =
nA(1− β)
bL(n+ 1)(2− β)β + nA(1− β)2
, (4.62)
1− tf =
n2A(1− β)
bL(n+ 1) [1 + n(1− β)]β + n2A(1− β)2
. (4.63)
Furthermore, we can combine (1 − uη)L(W/P )η = (Φ/P )η with the insight that (Φ/P )η =
φη(1 − uη)L, to see that real gross income of an employed production worker, (W/P )η, equals
φη, while real net income of this worker equals ωη ≡ (1− tη)φη. Substituting 1− tη from above,
then gives
ωs ≡
nA(1− β)φs
bL(n+ 1)(2− β)β + nA(1− β)2
, ωf ≡
n2A(1− β)φf
bL(n+ 1) [1 + n(1− β)]β + n2A(1− β)2
,
(4.64)
With respect to the ranking of ωs and ωf , we can note from (4.16), (4.17), and (4.64) that
ωs >,=, < ωf is equivalent to ρ(β) >,=, < 0, with
ρ(β) ≡ (n− 1)
{
n2A(1− β)3 − βbL(n+ 1) [1 + βn(2− β)]
}
. (4.65)
It is easily shown that ρ(0) > 0, ρ(1) < 1 and ρ′(β) < 0, which confirms the respective statement
in Footnote 12.20 QED
The allocation of capital in a long-run open economy equilibrium
It is the aim of this proof to show that there exists a unique full diversification equilibrium, in
which both countries produce all goods.21 Throughout the proof, we ignore the integer problem
and assume that long-run adjustments of investment decisions do not generate costs. The capital
allocation problem in the open economy has two dimensions. On the one hand, within an industry
capital owners have to decide in which country they invest and, one the other hand, capital owners
20Of course, an interior equilibrium requires uη > 0 and, in view of uf < us, we can conclude from inspection
of (4.14) that n2A(1 − β) < bL(n + 1) [1 + n(1− β)] is sufficient for positive unemployment rates in both
countries. However, this parameter restriction does not influence our findings regarding the ranking of ωs and
ωf .
21We do not study the existence of specialization equilibria, in which at least one country ceases production in a
subset of industries.
103
4 Union Wage Setting and International Trade with Footlose Capital
must determine the industry in which they set up a firm. Accordingly, we can conclude that
in any full diversification equilibrium the following two no arbitrage conditions must hold: (i)
Πi(z) = Π
t(z) for i = 1, 2, implying that capital owners cannot further increase their income
by choosing a different country for their investment in industry z; (ii) Πt(z) = Πt for all z,
implying that capital owners cannot increase their income by choosing a different industry for
their investment.
We first look at no arbitrage condition (i). Recollecting from the main text that linear consumer
demand implies Πi(z) = byi(z)2, we can conclude that in a full diversification equilibrium y1(z) =
y2(z) must hold. In view of (4.51) and (4.52), we can further note that y1(z) = y2(z) is equivalent
to λ¯w1 = λ¯w2, and from (4.23) and (4.24) we can infer that international factor price equalization
requires
(2A− λ¯w¯1) [n1(z)− 1] =
(
λ¯w¯2 − λ¯w¯1
)
[n1(z) + n2(z)] [n2(z) + 2] , (4.66)
(2A− λ¯w¯2) [n1(z)− 1] =
(
λ¯w¯2 − λ¯w¯1
)
[n1(z) + n2(z) + 1] [n2(z) + 1] . (4.67)
Recollecting from the main text that sector-level unions set a uniform wage rate for all producers
in the respective industry, we can note that wj(z) = w(z) holds in this case. Combining (4.22)
with (4.23) and (4.24) therefore yields
y1(z) =
(
2A− λ¯w¯1
) [
2n1(z)n2(z) + 2n2(z)
2 + 2n1(z) + 3n2(z) + 1
]
b [n1(z) + n2(z) + 1] [3n1(z)n2(z) + 2n2(z)2 + 4n1(z) + 4n2(z) + 2]
+
(
λ¯w¯2 − λ¯w¯1
)
[n1(z) + n2(z)] [n2(z) + 1]n2(z)
b [n1(z) + n2(z) + 1] [3n1(z)n2(z) + 2n2(z)2 + 4n1(z) + 4n2(z) + 2]
. (4.68)
Solving (4.66) for 2A − λ¯w¯1, substituting the resulting expression into (4.68) and recollecting
from above that yi(z) ≡ y(z) for i = 1, 2, we can calculate
y(z) =
(
λ¯w¯2 − λ¯w¯1
)
[n1(z) + n2(z)] [n2(z) + 1]
b [n1(z) + n2(z) + 1] [n1(z)− 1]
(4.69)
and substituting (4.67) finally gives
y(z) =
(
2A− λ¯w¯2
)
[n1(z) + n2(z)]
b [n1(z) + n2(z) + 1]
2 . (4.70)
Noting from no arbitrage condition (ii) that y(z) must be the same for all z, i.e. y(z) = y, we can
infer from Eq. (4.70) that in a full diversification equilibrium the total number of competitors is
the same in all industries z: 2n = n1(z) + n2(z) > 1. According to (4.66), we can then define
the implicit function
ζ (n1(z)) ≡
[
(2A− λ¯w¯1) + 2n
(
λ¯w¯2 − λ¯w¯1
)]
[n1(z)− 1]− 2n(2n+ 1)
(
λ¯w¯2 − λ¯w¯1
)
= 0. (4.71)
Noting that changes in n1(z) do not affect economy-wide variables λ¯w¯1, λ¯w¯2, we can conclude
from inspection of (4.71) that ζ(·) is a monotonic function of n1(z), so that a solution to ζ(·) = 0,
if it exists, must be unique. This implies that if a full diversification equilibrium exists, the
number of competitors in the two countries must be the same in all industries, i.e. n1(z) = n1
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and n2(z) = 2n − n1 = n2 for all z. However, if industries are symmetric in this respect, it
follows from (4.23), (4.24) – and the previous insight that diversification requires factor price
equalization – that λ¯wi(z) = λ¯w for i = 1, 2 and all z. This implies λ¯w¯i = βλ¯w for i = 1, 2, and
we can therefore calculate
W ≡ λ¯w =
2A (2n1 + 2n2 + 1)
(1− β)
(
3n1n2 + 2n22 + 2n1 + 2n2 + 1
)
+ (2n1 + 2n2 + 1)
, (4.72)
W ≡ λ¯w =
2A (n1 + 2n2 + 2)
(1− β)
(
3n1n2 + 2n22 + 3n1 + 2n2
)
+ (n1 + 2n2 + 2)
, (4.73)
according to (4.23) and (4.24). Accounting for n2 = 2n−n1, system (4.72) and (4.73) establishes
an implicit relationship between n1 and n:
Γ (n1, n) ≡ (n1 − 1)
[
2 (2n1 + 1) + (3n1 + 4) (2n− n1) + 2 (2n− n1)
2
]
= 0. (4.74)
It is immediate that Γ (n1, n) = 0 has a unique solution at n1 = 1. Put differently, capital mobility
establishes firm allocation n1 = 1 and n2 = 2n− 1 in a long-run open economy equilibrium with
diversification. Wages and output corresponding to this firm allocation are given by W lr and
ylr, according to (4.22) and system (4.72), (4.73).
Taking stock, we have so far shown that firm allocation n1(z) = 1, n2(z) = 2n− 1 is the only
candidate for a long-run open economy equilibrium with diversification. However, we have not
discussed whether respective firm allocation captures the capital owners’ best responses to the
investment decisions of their competitors and thus establishes an equilibrium at all. Showing
that n1(z) = 1, n2(z) = 2n− 1 characterizes a best-response equilibrium in the investment game
is the purpose of the subsequent analysis. Since capital owners foresee that their investment
decision influences product market competition and thus union wage setting in the respective
industry, we must evaluate yi(z), i = 1, 2 for asymmetric wages λ¯w1 6= λ¯w2. However, since a
single capital owner cannot influence the economy-wide average wage, we still have λ¯w¯i = λ¯w¯
for i = 1, 2. Evaluating (4.23) and (4.24) at λ¯w¯i = λ¯w¯, substituting the resulting expression into
(4.22), and accounting for wj(z) = w(z) we get
y1(z) =
2A− λ¯w¯
b
2n1(z)n2(z) + 2n2(z)
2 + 2n1(z) + 3n2(z) + 1
[n1(z) + n2(z) + 1] [3n1(z)n2(z) + 2n2(z)2 + 4n1(z) + 4n2(z) + 2]
, (4.75)
y2(z) =
2A− λ¯w¯
b
3n1(z)n2(z) + n
2
1 + 2n2(z)
2 + 2n1(z) + 2n2(z)
[n1(z) + n2(z) + 1] [3n1(z)n2(z) + 2n2(z)2 + 4n1(z) + 4n2(z) + 2]
. (4.76)
Differentiating yi(z) by ni(z) and evaluating the resulting expression at n1(z) = 1, n2(z) = 2n−1,
further implies
∂y1(z)
∂n1(z)
= −
2A− λ¯w¯
b
12n2
(2n+ 1)3 (4n+ 1)
,
∂y2(z)
∂n2(z)
= −
2A− λ¯w¯
b
2n− 1
(2n+ 1)3
. (4.77)
It is straightforward that dyi(z)/dni(z) < 0 and thus dΠi(z)/dni(z) < 0. This implies that a
capital owner cannot benefit from adjusting his/her investment if n1 = 1 and n2 = 2n−1, which
confirms that a unique full diversification equilibrium exists and completes the proof. QED
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5 Wage Moderation and the German Export
Miracle: Plant-level Evidence
5.1 Introduction
The recent surge of German exports is surrounded by a heated debate on the causes and conse-
quences of this so-called "export miracle". Opponents argue that Germany has enforced a series
of policy reforms that have led to wage moderation and thus have increased international com-
petitiveness at the expense of its trading partners, especially within the Eurozone (cf. Lagarde,
2010).1 While the broader political debate focused on the role of diverging unit labor costs for
growing current account imbalances, the "export miracle" also provokes the question about driv-
ing forces for export activity. It is commonly acknowledged that exporting firms are distinctively
different from their non-exporting competitors. Bernard and Jensen (1995) and Bernard and
Jensen (1999) documented for the US manufacturing industry that exporting firms are larger,
more productive and pay higher wages than their national counterparts.2 The seminal work by
Melitz (2003) provides a tractable theoretical model that is able to explain these stylized facts
by allowing for firm heterogeneity due to firm-specific productivity levels. While there is broad
empirical support for this mechanism,3 the economic profession is surprisingly quiet about the
role of competitiveness for sorting into exporting.
It is the purpose of this paper to fill this gap by investigating the role of unit labor costs as
measure of competitiveness for the export activity of German plants. Therefore, we construct a
proxy for competitiveness that comprises both productivity and labor costs. Higher productivity
and/or lower labor costs make plants more efficient, indicated by a higher level of competitiveness.
Moreover, we argue that the export promoting effect of competitiveness may be driven at two
different margins. A rise in competitiveness may increase the probability of a plant to switch
from the sole domestic supply regime to the exporter regime (extensive margin), or it may also
be associated with a surge in export-intensity of already exporting plants (intensive margin).
In our view, German plants are highly interesting in analyzing these questions mainly for two
reasons. First, German firms and plants have been particularly active in exporting in the recent
past. In the period 2000 to 2010, the German export volume has increased by about 60 percent
and has for the first time surpassed the level of one trillion Euro in 2012 (cf. Statistisches
1During an interview with Financial Times, Lagarde stated: "The issue at hand is really one of competitiveness.
Clearly Germany has done an awfully good job in the last 10 years or so, improving competitiveness, putting
a very high pressure on its labor costs. When you look at unit labor costs to Germany, they have done a
tremendous job in that respect. I’m not sure it is a sustainable model for the long term and for the whole of
the group."
2Similar results were found for other countries, like Germany (cf. Bernard and Wagner, 1997) and Taiwan (cf.
Aw and Hwang, 1995).
3For an excellent survey on this topic see e.g. Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2011).
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Bundesamt, 2012). Second, at the same time, a number of structural reforms had been initiated
on the German labor market. It is therefore often argued that these labor market reforms have
increased the competitiveness of German firms and plants on international markets relative to
their competitors from abroad.
In a first step of our analysis, we construct two measures of competitiveness. The first is at
the plant-level and uses data from the IAB establishment panel. We compute unit labor costs
per plant and put it in relation to the foreign trade-weighted average unit labor costs in the
corresponding industry. Similarly, we derive a measure of competitiveness at the sectoral level
by using OECD STAN data. Our analysis is closely linked to studies by Davis and Harrigan
(2011) and Harrigan and Reshef (2011) that extend the Melitz framework by considering the
sorting into exporting decision not only according to productivity costs but also according to
labor costs, whereby both variables are drawn from a joint distribution. We regress the export
share of German plants on our two measures of competitiveness. Since our endogenous variable
is a fractional variable with a probability mass at zero it is not appropriate to model this variable
by OLS or a variant of it. This issue is extensively discussed in Papke and Wooldridge (1996)
and has been applied to international trade by Wagner (2001). These papers suggest to use a
fractional logit/probit model. On the other hand, people also suggest the use of a Tobit model.
Given these discussions we chose to follow both approaches. Irrespective of the choice of model,
our results show a positive and significant relationship between plant-level competitiveness and
export activity. Plants that are characterized by lower unit labor costs relative to their average
foreign competitors export more. To the best of our knowledge, our paper provides the first
plant-level evidence on the role of both productivity and average wages as export determinants.
Moreover, we use Tobit regressions in the spirit of Felbermayr and Kohler (2006b) in order to
disentangle the total effect into its effects at the extensive and intensive margin of trade. The
Tobit model has the crucial advantage that both effects can be estimated simultaneously. Of
course, the Tobit model is appropriate only if we believe that the data generating process is
the same at both margins. Put differently, we are postulating that the forces that drive firms
exporting behavior at both margins are identical. Following this approach we are able to report
robust evidence on the export-promoting effects of competitiveness at both margins. Our results
show that a one standard deviation of plant-competitiveness is associated with a approximately
three percent higher probability of being an exporter at the extensive margin and 0.7 percent-
age points higher export intensity at the intensive margin. The results are robust to different
estimators. Our industry-level competitiveness is insignificant in all specifications and models.
Measuring competitiveness in terms of low labor costs reveals a negative relationship. Low-wage
firms tend to export less. This result is in line with a huge literature that demonstrates that
exporters pay higher wages. Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner (2007b) were the first using matched
employer-employee data from Germany in order to show that the exporter wage premium is of
the residual type. Controlling for observed and unobserved worker characteristics they ceteris
paribus find that German exporters in manufacturing industries pay higher wages than plants
that solely serve the domestic market. Klein, Moser, and Urban (2010) further distinguish be-
tween low- and high-skill workers and show that the positive premium is mainly driven by a
premium paid to the high-skilled, where low-skilled even suffer from a wage discount. Including
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both plant-level competitiveness measures reveals that ignoring the relative wage payments leads
to lower point estimates of the competitiveness measures. We find a much stronger link between
competitiveness and exports when controlling for the exporter wage premium through our labor
cost competitiveness measure.
As an additional exercise, we separate regressions into the pre- and post-Euro era. Our results
show that competitiveness was indeed important only after the Euro was introduced in the year
1999, which is in line with the critique by Lagarde and the accompanying hypothesis of wage
moderation driving export activity. In that perspective, our paper can be related to a recent
work by Hogrefe, Jung, and Kohler (2012) who argue that the introduction of the Euro gave
rise to currency misalignments. In line with their study we find at least weak evidence for an
interaction between the introduction of a common currency union, competitiveness and trade.
Finally, random effects Tobit regressions are used as a robustness test. The findings further
support the importance of wages in determining sorting into exporting. Competitiveness turns
out insignificant but the negative link between wage competitiveness and exports is not affected.
However, higher plant-competitiveness significantly increases exports at both margins when av-
erage wages are included in the regression.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data source and
provides first descriptive evidence. Section 3 introduces the empirical strategy. The results are
presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
5.2 Data and first descriptives
5.2.1 The IAB establishment panel
Our main data source is the IAB establishment panel, which is a stratified annual sample that
surveys about 16,000 German plants with at least one employee subject to social security con-
tributions. We focus on manufacturing industries where trade in goods is much more important
compared to the service sector. East German plants were firstly surveyed in the wave 1996 so
that we focus on the period 1996-2008.4
Within each wave we have information about the share of revenues generated through exports.
Unfortunately, we have only very little information about the destination of exports. More precise
information would allow us to run gravity-like regressions on the plant-level by taking distance
into account.5 We however argue, that most of the German trade is within Europe where distance
is less important.6 Besides export intensity there is a large set of additional information, such as
establishment size, measured as the total number of employees, revenue, usage of intermediate
inputs and investments. This data set has been based on the needs of the German Federal
4The panel comprises newer data that reach to the year 2010 and it would be very interesting to exploit them,
especially from the background of the financial and economic crisis. However, due to a structural break in the
data, many of our control variables cannot be computed after 2008. Therefore, we decided to use the data set
only up to the year 2008.
5For some waves there exists some limited information about export destinations. Schmillen (2011) shows how
the broader information about two different areas can be used to construct distance proxies to the export
destination for the IAB establishment panel. However, since it does not cover our whole sample period and
consists just of three very broad regional categories, we do not utilize this measure.
6The Federal Statistic Office of Germany reports that in 2012 almost 70 percent of exports of goods made in
Germany were shipped to European countries. Asia and America rank second and third by far behind Europe.
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Employment Agency so that it comprises additionally a large set of workforce characteristic
controls. For instance information about the recognition of a collective agreement, the share
of female, part-time, short-term or qualified employees is available or can be constructed. See
Felbermayr, Hauptmann, and Schmerer (2012) for a detailed discussion on the data used. More
comprehensive information on the IAB establishment can be found in Fischer, Janik, Müller,
and Schmucker (2009) and Kölling (2000).
There is no capital information in the data. As proxy we apply the perpetual inventory
method proposed by Müller (2008, 2010). Based on the information about the amount and type
of expansion investments by plant we construct proxies for plant’s capital stocks by summing
over all periods. Type-specific depreciation rates are used as discount factors.
The industry-level data on labor costs, total value, and bilateral trade flows are taken from
the STAN-database of the OECD.
5.2.2 First glimpse at the data
Figure 5.1 graphs the variables of interest over time. The left panel compares the share of
exporters (extensive margin), the export intensity of exporting plants (intensive margin) and
the average level of competitiveness in German manufacturing industries.7 The latter measures
competitiveness of Germany relative to its trading partners through production costs per unit of
output.8 Hence, a lower index for competitiveness implies that Germany has a relative cost ad-
vantage compared to its trading partners. To make this more illustrative and intuitive we decided
to use the inverse of the index such that a higher measure corresponds to higher competitiveness.
Figure 5.1: The evolution of exports, competitiveness, and wages
The first glimpse at the data reveals that the export intensity of German manufacturers and the
relative cost advantage were increasing over time, as displayed in the left panel. Except of a short
but sharp dip in 1998 for the share of exporting plants and a brief period of decreasing export
intensity of exporting plants (2000-2002), both the extensive and intensive margin have risen in
the period under consideration. The end of the timeline indicates the downturn in exporting
that is due to the begin of the economic and financial crisis that sparked off in 2008. Despite the
7All plant-level means are constructed using propability weights.
8See the methodology section for more details on the construction of the index.
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downturn, the export activity at both margins is still about 10 percentage points higher than
in 1996. Our measure of competitiveness indicates no clear cost advantage for Germany until
2000. From then on, we first observe a moderate increase in competitiveness between 2000 and
2003 before German plants managed to push up their relative cost advantage more significantly.
Interestingly, the emerging crisis seems to dampen the competitiveness of German plants relative
to its foreign rivals.
The right panel plots average individual wages over time. Without making the distinction
between manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, we find the well-known picture that wage
growth in Germany was stagnant after 2000, which is often associated with "wage moderation".
If we focus on manufacturing industries, which are characterized by their high degree of export
participation, we find a considerable increase in wages since 1998. Thereby, the picture at
least challenges the proposed nexus between wage moderation and export status. Moreover, it
also provokes the question how rising wages and increasing competitiveness fit together. Two
potential explanations consistent with these stylized facts are an increase in labor productivity
and/or soaring labor costs of Germany’s trading partners.
5.3 Empirical strategy
Our empirical strategy is twofold. In a first step we construct various measures of competitiveness
for Germany. We then regress the plant’s export intensity on the competitiveness measures. We
try to put as many plant controls as possible in order to account for the omitted variable bias.
Different estimators are used to address potential concerns about unobserved heterogeneity and
in order to disentangle the overall effect into its effect at different margins.
5.3.1 The competitiveness measures
Measuring plant-competitiveness. We construct plant-level competitiveness measures that al-
low to relate a plant’s unit labor costs to its international engagement through the variable
Cit = Vit/Wit , (5.1)
where Vit/Wit measures plant i’s value added over its wage sum at time t. In this sense our
competitiveness measure mirrors the inverse of nominal unit labor costs. A higher competitive-
ness may be due to higher productivity and/or lower labor costs. Hence, we also shed light on
the role of wages on unit labor costs as further plant-level evidence in order to asses the role
of wage moderation on competitiveness by running all regressions including the average plant-
wage or/and the unit labor costs. Higher export intensity may be positively correlated with the
average plant-wage as long as unit labor costs are falling. Firms that become more productive
can pay higher wages but still have relatively low unit labor costs. We expected a negative
relationship between unit labor costs and plant-exports. The effect of wages and exports may go
in both directions.
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Measuring industry-competitiveness. We use data from the OECD STAN database to con-
struct a proxy for Germany’s international competitiveness at the industry level as
Cjt =
VDjt/WDjt∑
k akjtVkjt/Wkjt
, (5.2)
where WDjt/VDjt denotes real unit labor costs in industry j at time t in Germany (indicated by
subscript D) computed as labor cost (WDjt) over value added (VDjt). The denominator in (5.2)
is a sum of unit labor costs of Germany’s trading partners, weighted by each partner’s trade
share akjt.9 Competitiveness increases if German unit labor costs increase (decrease) less (more)
compared to its trading partners’ average unit labor costs. Therefore, lower levels of Cjt are
associated with a higher level of competitiveness in industry j. We use the predetermined trade
share from the wave 1995 for all waves. Thus, the weights are constant over all waves included
in our study (1996 to 2008).
5.3.2 Econometric setup
To estimate the export intensity and competitiveness nexus we run the following model
EXPit = α+ Citγ1 + Cjtγ2 +Xitβ + θj + θt + θr + εit, (5.3)
where EXPit is the export share of plant i in year t. Cit denotes our plant-level competitiveness
measure. Cjt is competitiveness of plant i’s industry j at time t. Xit is a vector of plant
characteristics. Finally, εit represents a stochastic error term. We always include controls for
year-specific fixed effects, θt, industry-specific fixed effects, θj , and regional-specific fixed-effects,
θr.
As suggested in Wagner (2001) and Wagner (2011) the preferred model is a fractional Pro-
bit/Logit estimator as proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). Their major contribution was
to establish an estimator that fits a distribution that accounts for the proportions 0 and 1.
Our sample contains both single- and multi-plant firms, which may cause problems with the
export variable. It may well be that part of the production is indirectly exported through the
firm rather than the plant. We tackle this issue by including only single-plant firms in the sample,
which is the majority.
Exploring the intensive and extensive margins of German export success. Felbermayr and
Kohler (2006a) use a corner solutions approach in order to disentangle the effect of distance on
bilateral trade into its effects at the intensive and extensive margin.10 They propose a Tobit
regression approach which allows them to estimate both effects simultaneously. We employ the
same estimator {
EXP ∗ = x′β + u
EXP = max(0, EXP ∗)
9The weights are constructed such that akjt = Tkjt/
∑
k Tkjt, where Tkjt denotes the trade between Germany
and its partner country k in industry j. The weights therefore sum up to unity.
10Galiani (2008) provides a comprehensive overview over the corner solutions approach and its implementation
into STATA.
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The dependent variable takes the value zero with a certain probability p(EXP = 0|x). Certain
values above zero, observations for exporters, happen with zero probability. Put differently, the
export intensity is partly continuous over a certain interval. The model can be estimated using
a consistent maximum-likelihood estimator
L(β) =
n∏
i=1
[
P (EXPi = 0)
1−wif(EXPi|xi, EXPi > 0)
wi
]
, (5.4)
where wi is an indicator variable that takes the value one if EXP > 0. The solution to the
maximization problem yields the coefficients β with the following interpretation
∂E(EXP ∗|x)
∂x
= β . (5.5)
However, besides the partial derivatives on the "latent" variable EXP ∗ the non-linear estimates
obtained from the maximization of equation (5.4) can be used to compute the effects at the
extensive and intensive margin through
∂P (EXP > 0|x)
∂x︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extensive
,
∂E(EXP |x,EXP > 0)
∂x︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intensive
,
∂E(EXP |x)
∂x︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total
, (5.6)
which can be predicted based upon the estimates obtained from solving 5.4.11 All marginal
effects are evaluated at the sample means. The effects at the intensive margin can be interpreted
as the marginal effect of variable x on the expected export intensity of firms that already export.
The effect at the extensive margin is the change in probability of becoming an exporter if x
changes.
The two-step approach: Probit. There is also a heated discussion about whether to use a
two-step approach to estimate the sorting into export using a Probit model. Hence, we also
rerun our empirical specification presented in equation (5.3) based on a Probit model. A plant’s
export performance is measured by a dummy that takes the value one if the plant has a positive
export-share. However, the export intensity itself is not taken into account so that the marginal
effect of competitiveness gives us the change in the propability of being an exporter.
5.4 Results
Table 5.1 reports coefficients obtained from estimating (5.3), where both plant- and industry-
level competitiveness are included. Plant-level competitiveness is included in logs in order to
account for the huge variation of unit labor costs.12 Coefficients are reported in the first row of
Table 5.1. Overall we find that firms that are more competitive due to lower unit labor costs
11We use the Stata commands mfx compute, predict(p(0,.)), mfx compute, predict(e(0,.)), mfx compute, pre-
dict(ys(0,.)) in order to predict the marginal effects in equations (5.6). See Galiani (2008) for more informa-
tion.
12The standard deviation of plant-competitiveness in logs is 0.7, the minimum is around -7.57 and the maximum
is around 3.335. Unit labor costs capture a plants cost efficiency which has a relatively large standard deviation
compared to the industry-level measures.
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export more. However, the magnitude of the effect changes with different models and the level
of significance varies systematically over different samples. All coefficients reported are marginal
effects.
The role of unit labor costs. As a first step we distinguish between a Fractional Probit (col-
umn 1) and Fractional Logit estimator (column 2). The coefficients measure the total effect of
competitiveness on exports so that a further decomposition into the effects at the extensive and
intensive margin is not possible based on the Fractional Probit/Logit model. The descriptives
in the appendix show that the standard deviation of plant-competitiveness is approxematly 0.7.
Exploiting this information helps us to evaluate the magnitude of the effects. Competitiveness is
measured in logs so that the 0.7 standard deviation translates into a 70 percent standard devia-
tion from the mean in both directions. A two-standard deviation increase in competitiveness is
associated with a 1.4 to 1.26 percent higher export-intensity, depending on whether we assume
a Probit or Logit distribution, reported in columns (1) and (2) respectively.13
However, the results may be biased due to the presence of a corner solution problem that
plagues our dependent variable. Zero export intensity is observed at a positive probability,
whereas a certain export intensity above zero has zero mass in a continuous distribution. Linear
models yield biased results, which can be addressed using a simple Tobit regression approach.
The solution to the maximum likelihood function yields a one-step estimator for both the
probability of being a corner solution (non-exporter) and the density of the export intensity
conditional on our variables of interest. Coefficients of the latent variable EXP ∗ (∂E(EXP
∗|x)
∂x
=
β) are omitted. The interpretation would be meaningless in our application.14 The McDonald
and Moffitt (1980) decomposition allows to compute the marginal effects for different regions of
the non-linear Tobit regression results. At the extensive margin, we are interested in the effects
of competitiveness on the probability of being an exporter, ∂P (EXP>0|x)
∂x
, reported in column (3)
as Tobit I. Coefficients are evaluated at the mean of all other regressors. At the intensive margin,
we are mainly interested in the effects of competitiveness on the export intensity of plants that
already export, ∂E(EXP>0|x)
∂x
, reported in column (4) as Tobit II. Again, all marginal effects are
evaluated at the sample means of all other regressors.
At the intensive margin we find that plants that increase their competitiveness relative to their
foreign "rival" by the same two standard deviations have a 4.2 percent higher probability of being
an exporter. Conditional on already being an exporter, plants that increase competitiveness by
two standard deviations can increase their export intensity by 1.12 percentage points. The
combined total effect at both margins (labeled TOBIT III) is reported in column (5). The same
two standard deviation increase in plant-competitiveness is associated with an increase in exports
of roughly 1.54 percentage points.
This last coefficient is the counterpart to the coefficient reported in column (1) and (2), where
we used the Fractional Probit/Logit estimator to estimate the total effect of competitiveness on
exports. It turns out that both the fractional models and the Tobit model yield results that are
remarkably close to each other with coefficients between 0.008 and 0.01. Given the huge standard
13We compute the effect as 1.4× 0.009 = 1.26.
14Plants that report zero trade are non-exporters so that there is no latent trade variable as it is the case in the
famous textbook example on expenditure and consumption.
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Table 5.1: The extensive and intensive margin I
Dependent variable: Export intensity (share)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FRACP FRACL TOBIT I TOBIT II TOBIT III PROBIT
Plant-comp. (ln) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010)
Industry-comp. 0.010 0.005 0.064 0.015 0.020 0.075
(0.025) (0.023) (0.081) (0.019) (0.025) (0.095)
Employment (ln) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.012)
Capital (ln) 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Female workers (share) 0.058∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.023) (0.005) (0.007) (0.050)
Part-time workers (share) −0.082∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ −0.239∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.018) (0.031) (0.007) (0.010) (0.063)
Short-term workers (share) 0.050∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.102∗ 0.024∗ 0.031∗ 0.012
(0.024) (0.021) (0.052) (0.012) (0.016) (0.080)
Apprentices (share) −0.238∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗ −0.739∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗ −0.227∗∗∗ −0.793∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.040) (0.065) (0.015) (0.020) (0.124)
Qualified tasks (share) 0.021∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.014∗∗ −0.024
(0.010) (0.009) (0.018) (0.004) (0.006) (0.035)
Multi-empl. barg. (dummy) −0.024∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.018)
Single-empl. barg. (dummy) −0.012∗∗ −0.010∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.013) (0.003) (0.004) (0.025)
Workers council (dummy) 0.028∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.003) (0.004) (0.024)
West Germany (dummy) 0.012 0.010 0.026 0.006 0.008 −0.053
(0.031) (0.029) (0.051) (0.012) (0.016) (0.088)
Foreign ownership (dummy) 0.094∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.005) (0.008) (0.051)
Ownership n.a. (dummy) 0.019∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.017) (0.004) (0.006) (0.030)
Capital company (dummy) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) (0.020)
Founded before 1990 (dummy) −0.004 −0.002 −0.011 −0.003 −0.003 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.022)
Observations 18620 18620 18620 18620 18620 18620
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard
errors clustered at establishment-level in columns (1), (2) and (6). Bootstraped standard errors in columns
(3)-(5) using 200 repetitions. Constant, year-, industry-, and regional-dummies included in all models but not
reported. All coefficients are marginal effects evaluated at the means of the other regressors. FRACP denotes
fractional-probit, FRACL denotes fractional-logit estimator. TOBIT I reports ∂P (T > 0|x)/∂x, TOBIT II reports
∂E(T > 0|x)/∂x, TOBIT III reports ∂E(T |x)/∂x. PROBIT denotes probit model with dependent variable equal
to one if export share larger than zero. Only single plants included in the regressions.
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deviation of competitiveness the difference between the coefficients is not significant.
The role of wages in determining competitiveness. As a second step we analyze the role
of wages for exports in Germany. Higher wages may reduce competitiveness through higher
production costs. On the other hand, higher wages may be one of the crucial determinants
of high quality. Both arguments have opposing effects on competitiveness but equally explain
the observable surge in exports observed in Germany. We thus analyze the role of wages and
competitiveness separately by first including only the inverse average wage measure (Table 5.2)
before we include both, the wage and the unit labor costs variable, into the same regression as
reported in Table (5.3). Notice that we focus on the inverse wage rate so that higher wages are
associated with lower wage competitiveness. We compare the same models as before.
There is already a large literature on the exporter wage premium that states that exporting
firms pay higher wages, which would be consistent with a negative sign of the competitiveness
measure. The hypothesized wage moderation to export promotion effect would be validated by
a positive sign of the wage competitiveness measure.
However, despite the higher labor costs exporting firms may still be more efficient through
their higher productivity. Our results confirm the hypothesized negative relationship. The
export promoting effect of competitiveness reported in Table (5.2) hardly stems from firms’ low
wage payments. On average, higher wages are associated with more intensified trade at both
margins.
Slicing the sample into a pre- and a post-Euro era. Tables 5.4 to 5.6 report the results
obtained from the post-Euro sample that goes from 1996 (the earliest wave that covers all regions
in Germany) and 1999, the year the exchange rates were officially fixed within the Euro area.
Again we compare fractional Probit, Tobit and Probit models. Except of the Tobit model results
competitiveness is insignificant before the year of the introduction of the common currency in
1999. We compare those results to the estimates obtained from regressions based on the post-
Euro sample, which are reported in Table 5.5 and 5.6, where we slice the post-Euro sample into
a pre- and post-Hartz 4 sample. The advantage of slicing the post-Euro period into two sub-
periods is that the different samples are roughly comparable in its time length. However, the
results have to be treated cautiously, at least for the Tobit estimators. There is a discussion that
nonlinear estimators yield results that are not comparable across different samples. Nevertheless,
we are mainly interested in the inference of statistical significance. The magnitude of the effects
can be compared based on the outcomes of the linear models. We obtain significant estimates
for the period after the Euro was introduced.
Estimates for the period 2005 to 2008 are significant only for the Tobit model. Competitiveness
is insignificant for the Probit model. For Fractional-Probit/Logit we obtain coefficients that are
significant only on the 10 and 5 percent level. This supports the hypothesized link between the
establishment of a common currency union and competitiveness.
The random effects Tobit model. Including factor variables when estimating Tobit regressions
is not appropriate due to the non-linearity of the Tobit model. We therefore use a random-effects
estimator in order to purge the regressions from unobserved heterogeneity at the plant-level.
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Table 5.2: The extensive and intensive margin II
Dependent variable: Export intensity (share)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FRACP FRACL TOBIT I TOBIT II TOBIT III PROBIT
Plant-comp. wage (ln) −0.048∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.003) (0.004) (0.023)
Industry-comp. 0.007 −0.001 0.059 0.014 0.018 0.081
(0.025) (0.022) (0.072) (0.017) (0.022) (0.095)
Employment (ln) 0.024∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.012)
Capital (ln) 0.010∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Female workers (share) 0.066∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.022) (0.005) (0.007) (0.050)
Part-time workers (share) −0.050∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.135∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗
(0.020) (0.019) (0.035) (0.008) (0.011) (0.063)
Short-term workers (share) 0.051∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.111∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.012
(0.023) (0.020) (0.053) (0.012) (0.016) (0.082)
Apprentices (share) −0.205∗∗∗ −0.185∗∗∗ −0.642∗∗∗ −0.150∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗ −0.709∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.040) (0.070) (0.016) (0.021) (0.125)
Qualified tasks (share) 0.006 0.011 −0.004 −0.001 −0.001 −0.068∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.004) (0.006) (0.035)
Multi-empl. barg. (dummy) −0.026∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.135∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.018)
Single-empl. barg. (dummy) −0.013∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.024)
Workers council (dummy) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.024)
West Germany (dummy) 0.007 0.004 0.010 0.002 0.003 −0.066
(0.031) (0.028) (0.044) (0.010) (0.013) (0.089)
Foreign ownership (dummy) 0.090∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.005) (0.007) (0.052)
Ownership n.a. (dummy) 0.018∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.016) (0.004) (0.005) (0.030)
Capital company (dummy) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) (0.021)
Founded before 1990 (dummy) −0.004 −0.002 −0.013 −0.003 −0.004 0.006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.022)
Observations 18620 18620 18620 18620 18620 18620
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard
errors clustered at establishment-level in columns (1), (2) and (6). Bootstraped standard errors in columns
(3)-(5) using 200 repetitions. Constant, year-, industry-, and regional-dummies included in all models but not
reported. All coefficients are marginal effects evaluated at the means of the other regressors. FRACP denotes
fractional-probit, FRACL denotes fractional-logit estimator. TOBIT I reports ∂P (T > 0|x)/∂x, TOBIT II reports
∂E(T > 0|x)/∂x, TOBIT III reports ∂E(T |x)/∂x. PROBIT denotes probit model with dependent variable equal
to one if export share larger than zero. Only single plants included in the regressions.
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Table 5.3: The extensive and intensive margin III
Dependent variable: Export intensity (share)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FRACP FRACL TOBIT I TOBIT II TOBIT III PROBIT
Plant-comp. (ln) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010)
Plant-comp. wage (ln) −0.055∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.015) (0.003) (0.004) (0.024)
Industry-comp. 0.006 −0.001 0.052 0.012 0.016 0.070
(0.025) (0.023) (0.068) (0.016) (0.021) (0.095)
Employment (ln) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.012)
Capital (ln) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Female workers (share) 0.069∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.023) (0.005) (0.007) (0.050)
Part-time workers (share) −0.044∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.107∗
(0.020) (0.019) (0.037) (0.009) (0.011) (0.062)
Short-term workers (share) 0.058∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.037
(0.023) (0.020) (0.058) (0.014) (0.018) (0.081)
Apprentices (share) −0.193∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗ −0.606∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗ −0.674∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.039) (0.069) (0.016) (0.021) (0.125)
Qualified tasks (share) 0.005 0.010 −0.009 −0.002 −0.003 −0.072∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.018) (0.004) (0.005) (0.035)
Multi-empl. barg. (dummy) −0.026∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.018)
Single-empl. barg. (dummy) −0.012∗∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.024)
Workers council (dummy) 0.024∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.024)
West Germany (dummy) 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.075
(0.031) (0.028) (0.043) (0.010) (0.013) (0.088)
Foreign ownership (dummy) 0.088∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.005) (0.007) (0.052)
Ownership n.a. (dummy) 0.016∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.018) (0.005) (0.006) (0.030)
Capital company (dummy) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) (0.021)
Founded before 1990 (dummy) −0.004 −0.002 −0.012 −0.003 −0.004 0.007
(0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.022)
Observations 18620 18620 18620 18620 18620 18620
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard
errors clustered at establishment-level in columns (1), (2) and (6). Bootstraped standard errors in columns
(3)-(5) using 200 repetitions. Constant, year-, industry-, and regional-dummies included in all models but not
reported. All coefficients are marginal effects evaluated at the means of the other regressors. FRACP denotes
fractional-probit, FRACL denotes fractional-logit estimator. TOBIT I reports ∂P (T > 0|x)/∂x, TOBIT II reports
∂E(T > 0|x)/∂x, TOBIT III reports ∂E(T |x)/∂x. PROBIT denotes probit model with dependent variable equal
to one if export share larger than zero. Only single plants included in the regressions.
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Table 5.4: The extensive and intensive margin 1996-1999
Dependent variable: Export intensity (share)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FRACP FRACL TOBIT I TOBIT II TOBIT III PROBIT
Plant-comp. (ln) 0.006 0.004 0.029∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.025
(0.004) (0.003) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.020)
Industry-comp. −0.064 −0.057 −0.028 −0.005 −0.007 0.045
(0.056) (0.047) (0.268) (0.052) (0.064) (0.331)
Employment (ln) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.002) (0.003) (0.021)
Capital (ln) 0.012∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012)
Female workers (share) 0.032∗ 0.026∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.053) (0.010) (0.013) (0.085)
Part-time workers (share) −0.088∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.444∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗∗ −0.538∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.023) (0.086) (0.017) (0.020) (0.119)
Short-term workers (share) 0.028 0.026 0.026 0.005 0.006 −0.165
(0.031) (0.026) (0.116) (0.023) (0.027) (0.168)
Apprentices (share) −0.289∗∗∗ −0.275∗∗∗ −1.045∗∗∗ −0.203∗∗∗ −0.248∗∗∗ −1.096∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.050) (0.173) (0.035) (0.041) (0.244)
Qualified tasks (share) 0.015 0.016 0.038 0.007 0.009 0.002
(0.013) (0.011) (0.042) (0.008) (0.010) (0.066)
Multi-empl. barg. (dummy) −0.014∗ −0.012∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.024) (0.005) (0.006) (0.035)
Single-empl. barg. (dummy) −0.006 −0.007 −0.040 −0.008 −0.009 −0.064
(0.008) (0.006) (0.030) (0.006) (0.007) (0.042)
Workers council (dummy) 0.017∗ 0.015∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.025) (0.005) (0.006) (0.042)
West Germany (dummy) 0.053 0.063 0.140 0.028 0.034 −0.029
(0.042) (0.042) (0.117) (0.024) (0.030) (0.149)
Foreign ownership (dummy) 0.101∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.026) (0.054) (0.019) (0.027) (0.098)
Ownership n.a. (dummy) −0.022 −0.028 −0.036 −0.007 −0.009 0.022
(0.018) (0.017) (0.069) (0.013) (0.016) (0.082)
Capital company (dummy) 0.015∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.059
(0.008) (0.007) (0.024) (0.005) (0.005) (0.037)
Founded before 1990 (dummy) −0.007 −0.005 −0.031 −0.006 −0.007 −0.012
(0.008) (0.007) (0.023) (0.005) (0.006) (0.037)
Observations 3150 3150 3150 3150 3150 3150
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard
errors clustered at establishment-level in columns (1), (2) and (6). Bootstraped standard errors in columns
(3)-(5) using 200 repetitions. Constant, year-, industry-, and regional-dummies included in all models but not
reported. All coefficients are marginal effects evaluated at the means of the other regressors. FRACP denotes
fractional-probit, FRACL denotes fractional-logit estimator. TOBIT I reports ∂P (T > 0|x)/∂x, TOBIT II reports
∂E(T > 0|x)/∂x, TOBIT III reports ∂E(T |x)/∂x. PROBIT denotes probit model with dependent variable equal
to one if export share larger than zero. Only single plants included in the regressions.
Table 5.7 reports the results. The coefficient indicates a rather low relationship between unit
labor costs and exports once we control for the random effects.
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Table 5.5: The extensive and intensive margin 2000-2004
Dependent variable: Export intensity (share)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FRACP FRACL TOBIT I TOBIT II TOBIT III PROBIT
Plant-comp. (ln) 0.008∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.012)
Industry-comp. 0.006 −0.007 0.096 0.023 0.030 0.204
(0.052) (0.047) (0.220) (0.052) (0.068) (0.224)
Employment (ln) 0.027∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.015)
Capital (ln) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008)
Female workers (share) 0.058∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.016) (0.037) (0.009) (0.011) (0.059)
Part-time workers (share) −0.067∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.102
(0.024) (0.022) (0.045) (0.011) (0.014) (0.081)
Short-term workers (share) 0.020 0.017 0.020 0.005 0.006 −0.021
(0.033) (0.029) (0.084) (0.020) (0.026) (0.105)
Apprentices (share) −0.255∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗∗ −0.715∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗ −0.668∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.051) (0.101) (0.024) (0.031) (0.161)
Qualified tasks (share) 0.007 0.012 0.002 0.001 0.001 −0.065
(0.013) (0.011) (0.025) (0.006) (0.008) (0.043)
Multi-empl. barg. (dummy) −0.024∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.013) (0.003) (0.004) (0.023)
Single-empl. barg. (dummy) −0.010 −0.007 −0.054∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.019) (0.004) (0.005) (0.031)
Workers council (dummy) 0.024∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.015) (0.004) (0.005) (0.029)
West Germany (dummy) 0.028 0.023 0.082 0.020 0.026 0.015
(0.037) (0.034) (0.061) (0.015) (0.019) (0.113)
Foreign ownership (dummy) 0.075∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.012) (0.021) (0.007) (0.010) (0.059)
Ownership n.a. (dummy) 0.021 0.018 0.098∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.173∗∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.038) (0.010) (0.014) (0.078)
Capital company (dummy) 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.003) (0.004) (0.025)
Founded before 1990 (dummy) −0.003 −0.002 −0.005 −0.001 −0.001 0.023
(0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.003) (0.004) (0.026)
Observations 8586 8586 8586 8586 8586 8586
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard
errors clustered at establishment-level in columns (1), (2) and (6). Bootstraped standard errors in columns
(3)-(5) using 200 repetitions. Constant, year-, industry-, and regional-dummies included in all models but not
reported. All coefficients are marginal effects evaluated at the means of the other regressors. FRACP denotes
fractional-probit, FRACL denotes fractional-logit estimator. TOBIT I reports ∂P (T > 0|x)/∂x, TOBIT II reports
∂E(T > 0|x)/∂x, TOBIT III reports ∂E(T |x)/∂x. PROBIT denotes probit model with dependent variable equal
to one if export share larger than zero. Only single plants included in the regressions.
120
5.4 Results
Table 5.6: The extensive and intensive margin 2005-2008
Dependent variable: Export intensity (share)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FRACP FRACL TOBIT I TOBIT II TOBIT III PROBIT
Plant-comp. (ln) 0.009∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.008
(0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) (0.015)
Industry-comp. 0.001 −0.002 0.020 0.005 0.007 0.103
(0.032) (0.031) (0.123) (0.031) (0.041) (0.105)
Employment (ln) 0.030∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.016)
Capital (ln) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010)
Female workers (share) 0.068∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.018) (0.037) (0.009) (0.012) (0.068)
Part-time workers (share) −0.098∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.276∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ −0.286∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.028) (0.058) (0.014) (0.019) (0.084)
Short-term workers (share) 0.084∗∗ 0.077∗∗ 0.211∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.069∗∗ 0.151
(0.038) (0.033) (0.087) (0.022) (0.029) (0.112)
Apprentices (share) −0.186∗∗∗ −0.161∗∗∗ −0.638∗∗∗ −0.159∗∗∗ −0.210∗∗∗ −0.786∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.054) (0.101) (0.025) (0.034) (0.162)
Qualified tasks (share) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.017
(0.015) (0.014) (0.029) (0.007) (0.010) (0.051)
Multi-empl. barg. (dummy) −0.029∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.003) (0.004) (0.026)
Single-empl. barg. (dummy) −0.017∗∗ −0.014∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.067∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.019) (0.005) (0.006) (0.037)
Workers council (dummy) 0.039∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.004) (0.006) (0.033)
West Germany (dummy) −0.022 −0.020 −0.060 −0.015 −0.020 −0.085
(0.039) (0.035) (0.100) (0.025) (0.033) (0.128)
Foreign ownership (dummy) 0.121∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.018) (0.024) (0.010) (0.014) (0.065)
Ownership n.a. (dummy) 0.016 0.012 0.077∗ 0.020∗ 0.027∗ 0.140∗
(0.019) (0.016) (0.040) (0.011) (0.015) (0.079)
Capital company (dummy) 0.032∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.005) (0.006) (0.030)
Founded before 1990 (dummy) −0.002 0.001 −0.011 −0.003 −0.004 −0.003
(0.008) (0.007) (0.016) (0.004) (0.005) (0.028)
Observations 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard
errors clustered at establishment-level in columns (1), (2) and (6). Bootstraped standard errors in columns
(3)-(5) using 200 repetitions. Constant, year-, industry-, and regional-dummies included in all models but not
reported. All coefficients are marginal effects evaluated at the means of the other regressors. FRACP denotes
fractional-probit, FRACL denotes fractional-logit estimator. TOBIT I reports ∂P (T > 0|x)/∂x, TOBIT II reports
∂E(T > 0|x)/∂x, TOBIT III reports ∂E(T |x)/∂x. PROBIT denotes probit model with dependent variable equal
to one if export share larger than zero. Only single plants included in the regressions.
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Table 5.7: Robustness checks
Dependent variable: Export intensity (share)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
XTTOBIT XTTOBIT XTTOBIT XTTOBIT XTTOBIT XTTOBIT XTTOBIT XTTOBIT XTTOBIT
Ext. mar. Int. mar. Both mar. Ext. mar. Int. mar. Both mar. Ext. mar. Int. mar. Both mar.
Plant-comp. (ln) 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.009∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Wage Comp. wage (ln) −0.037∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003)
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Bootstraped standard errors computed
based on 200 repetitions. Included controls identical to those in Table (1) - (6) but coefficients are not reported. All coefficients are marginal effects
evaluated at the means of the other regressors. Only single plants included in the regressions.
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5.5 Conclusion
Moreover, the unit labor costs measure is insignificant in columns (1) to (3). Thus, the
exporting promoting effects seems to be driven by some unobservable factors omitted in the
regressions above. Columns (4) to (6) report regression results where only wage competitiveness
is included. Again, we find a significant relationship between higher wages and higher exports.
Most interestingly, columns (7) to (9) report regression results where we include both plant-
competitiveness measures. Finally, plant-competitiveness is significantly associated with exports
at both margins.
5.5 Conclusion
Our paper contributes to the discussion about potential explanations for Germany’s recent export
success. We are able to show that higher plant-level competitiveness due to higher productivity
and/or lower wages is positively correlated with its export intensity at the intensive and extensive
margin. Moreover, the effect is not driven by lower wage payments as exports are associated
with higher wages. There are two explanations: firms are more efficient in producing goods,
or real exchange rate movements in the Euro area led to higher export demand for relatively
cheaper German exports. The latter equally affects all industries. Moreover, both arguments
still are consistent with higer wage payments in exporting plants. Our regressions support this
view in so far that separate regressions for pre- and post-Euro periods reveal that the export
promoting effect of competitiveness is strongest shortly after the Euro was introduced. Some of
the models yield insignificant coefficients of competitiveness before 1999 or after 2004. Future
research has to be done in quantifying the effects at work based on a structural estimation of a
macro-economic model. However, this is beyond the scope of our paper.
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6 Summary
It was the purpose of this book to investigate the impact of different forms of globalization on in-
equality, unemployment and welfare in unionized labor markets and to examine the role of (unit)
labor costs as a potentially crucial determinant of international competitiveness in the export
activity of plants and firms. Chapter 2 provided an extended review of important contributions
to the literature on labor market imperfections in open economies. Hereby, different forms of
labor market imperfections have been distinguished, with particular emphasis given to the role
of labor unions.
Chapter 3 analyzed the impact of trade on welfare, income distribution, and employment in a
model of general oligopolistic equilibrium with unionized labor markets. In the benchmark sce-
nario of two symmetric countries, the study showed that trade reduces the wage claims of unions
which stimulates employment and leads to an increase in aggregate welfare. The consequence for
income distribution between workers and firm owners is ambiguous and depends on the competi-
tive environment. With respect to intra-group inequality, the study revealed that trade between
symmetric countries does not impact the distribution of income between firm owners, while at
the same reducing inequality among workers. Moreover, the study investigated the robustness of
the results when relaxing the assumption of two fully symmetric countries. Two different types
of asymmetry were analyzed: country size differences and technology differences à la Ricardo.
It was shown that country size differences do not have a qualitative impact on the variables of
interest but only change the volume of the effects. By contrast, differences in technology may
change some of the results in a complex way depending on the size of the technological dissimi-
larity.
The aim of chapter 4 was to study the impact of openness on macroeconomic performance
measures when countries differ in the centralization of union wage setting. Abstracting from
inter-sectoral productivity differences, this study was not able to address the issue of intra-group
inequality but shed new light on employment and welfare consequences of openness. The anal-
ysis allowed for two different forms of openness. The first one assumed that goods markets are
integrated while capital markets remained segmented. This scenario was associated with the
short run since entrepreneurs cannot immediately change their investment decisions in response
to a globalization shock. In this scenario, trade reduced wage claims of unions and increased
employment and welfare in both countries, and the economic rents of entrepreneurs as well as
workers. For plausible parameter domains it was shown that the country-specific wage-setting
institutions become 41less important when opening up for trade as differences in the variables of
interest are reduced. In the long run, however, this needs no longer be true. When entrepreneurs
can adjust their investment decisions to the shock of globalization they will search for the most
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profitable investment opportunities. Hence, capital flows from the country with the more cen-
tralized wage setting to the country with firm-level unions. These capital flows aggravate the
differences in macroeconomic performance measures between the two countries and create win-
ners and losers in both economies. Finally, the study also discussed potential consequences of a
unilateral policy-induced shift towards a less-centralized wage bargaining regime.
The contribution of chapter 5 was to investigate the role of unit labor costs for the export
activity of firms and plants. Thereby, we constructed an appropriate measure of international
competitiveness of German plants combining panel data from the German Institute for Employ-
ment Research with OECD data. The study showed that higher plant-level competitiveness due
to higher productivity and/or higher wages is positively correlated with its export intensity at
both, the intensive and extensive margin of trade. However, as exports are associated with higher
wages, this effect is not driven by lower wage payments. When slicing the sample into pre- and
post-Euro periods, our regression results reveal that the export-promoting effect of competitive-
ness was strongest shortly after the introduction fo the Euro.
As indicated in chapter 1 this book does not provide a comprehensive picture of all possible
consequences of international trade on unemployment and the distribution of income. Important
aspects that were out of the picture in the three essays conducted here include the adjustment
of firms via firm-internal labor markets, the possibility of unions to cooperate internationally,
and also the role of migration. The empirical section does not provide an assessment of the
theoretical hypotheses, but rather aimed at shedding some basic insights on what can explain
exporting activity. This is, of course, at best a first step towards a better understanding on
how wage costs can influence competitiveness and then trade. Although the book can not give
an answer to all relevant questions that can be raised in the context of trade and labor market
imperfections, I still hope that the study of this book has led to some additional insights into the
role and consequences of wage policy in an open world and has stimulated the reader’s interest
in this topic.
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